Frequently Asked Questions:
Note: I lost most of my earliest emails, (and there
were some very good ones), to the “blaster virus” in about 2003 so these are
the best that I can produce. Ask your
questions and I will try to answer them.
Email to jiglowitz@rcsis.com Please
insert in the subject line: “In
reference to your webpage”, or I will likely unknowingly delete it as “spam”
Note: I always replace the actual name of my
correspondents with pseudonyms and delete any personal information from this
page for the sake of their privacy. If
they should desire otherwise, they should email me about it and I will undo
that. This does not apply to journal
correspondence. Incidentally I do not
correct spelling typos in my received documents. And another note: all chapter references are to
then-contemporaneous documents.
Ordering will be from
most recent to oldest.
MOST RECENT: A link to an online blog by Blaise Lara,
Professor Emeritus at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, former director
of that institution’s Computer Science department for many years, and a highly
respected specialist in mathematical statistics. Here is the link to a Google (machine)
translation of the original Spanish text.
In spite of the vagaries of the machine translation, it is pretty much
lucid if you are willing to work around the (Google translated) language.
#1. (A very
contemporaneous response.) I consider
this the most complete comprehension of my ideas, (almost), to date. Cassirer is this correspondent’s biggest
hurdle yet to accomplish, but short of that, I think he has actually understood
most of my arguments and purpose.
Response to first two
letters:
Important****: (D.York), I will
follow a convention here of inserting my comments in CAPS, so as to be easily
visually distinguishable from your original letter as I intersperse comments
with original text. This has nothing to
say about egos, as I might just as well have reversed the process. (You may do so if you wish.) No other intention was assigned). Note: This is my normal method of response!
–Copy of D.York’s original email
From D.York
I wonder whether you
would be kind enough to consider a question at this stage, as it relates to
something I'd been thinking about prior to discovering your work, and indeed it
was this thought that had stimulated the online research that led me to
it. When discussing the idea of the
"interface", you say:
"The reality, the
metaphysical presence of this interface is the immediate and necessary
consequence of the synthesis of our two realist intentional fundamentals:
externality and experience."
THE KEY ADJECTIVE HERE
IS “INTENTIONAL”. HERE IS A LINK TO AN OLD
WRITING OF MINE STILL RESIDENT ON MY WEBPAGE –IT WAS MY ORIGINAL “INTRODUCTION
FOR BEGINNERS”, (WHICH YOU CERTAINLY DON’T FIT), BUT IT TALKS ABOUT REALIST
INTENTIONALITY –WHICH, I THINK, PRECISELY DESCRIBES REALISM ITSELF –IT IS A
STANCE BASED UPON A PERSPECTIVE, NOT ONE BASED ON KNOWLEDGE.
http://www.foothill.net/~jerryi/INTRODUCTION.mht YOU SHOULD SEARCH THAT WEBPAGE FOR: “KNOWING
VS BELIEF: WHERE THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS LIES”
My question relates to
your grounds for characterising the presence of the
interface as "necessary". IT
IS “NECESSARY” BECAUSE, AS ARGUED IN MY BOOK, THESE ARE TWO CORE REQUIREMENTS
OF ANY COHERENT, (AS YOU CORRECTLY INTERPRETED IT), REALIST STANCE ITSELF. IT IS NOT BASED IN ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE. I wonder
is this necessity in your view mandated wholly by the manifest existence of
experience, however we seek to explain it (something by the way that I
personally endorse without reservation, contra Dennett) - which I take it is
what you mean by its being a realist fundamental, since as you say it is
assumed, even if only implicitly or virtually, by any coherent view of the
field. Or do you also have in mind some
species of, as it were, God's eye metaphysical or logical necessity for such a
"substantive" form of its existence? ABSOLUTELY NOT. AS A CASSIRERERIAN/RELATIVIZED
REALIST-MATERIALIST, I CAN BELIEVE, FOR INSTANCE, THAT “MIND” EXISTS, THAT I
EXIST, THAT YOU EXIST, AND THAT MY BOOK EXISTS, BUT THESE ARE BELIEFS, NOT “FACTS”.
On this latter point,
the thought that I'd been having runs something like this: Prior to reading your work I'd been
attempting to conceptualise what you call the
interface as, very generally, an "integrative mechanism" whose role
would be to, as it were, "construct" our version of macroscopic or
composite "object" reality on a base of some "primary"
domain of micro-level maximal differentiation. THIS IS NOT BAD. ACTUALLY, IF YOU SEARCH THE MS FOR THE WORDS:
“AND THE PROFOUND MILEAU BENEATH”, IT’S IN THE CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION YOU WILL
SEE MY REFERENCE TO THIS NOTION. In this
regard, by the way, I find your operative approach of great interest in
contrast to representationalist ideas, and indeed it has sent me back to some
earlier thoughts I haven't seriously reconsidered for many years.
It strikes me, either
with reference to my own notion (hardly worked out though it is), or your own
worked-through conception of the interface as the ideal or indeed, in a sense,
the integration, of all possible modes of operatively constructing the "object",
that dismissing the "substantive" existence of such an interface is
equivalent to reducing the available realist postulates to the single one of
the bare externality. Now of course, the
externality is by itself, from a Kantian perspective, wholly uninterpreted. Consequently, if we abandon the interface as
a realistic entity what remains is not only an unknowable externality, but an
entirely unknown one. This wouldn't
leave very much of interest, to say the least!
Possibly, this amounts to a reductio ad absurdum.
Thus in a nutshell, if
we seek a "necessary" explanation. even from a God's eye view, of the
conditions under which there can be a knowable world, we need to posit such a
real interface, not just an imaginary or virtual one. I think the reason that certain "tough
realists" of Dennett's ilk don't see this is that they are naive or direct
realists, and hence don't accept the Kantian analysis. (AH, THE JOYS OF PRAGMATISM SANS THEIR
RELATIVIZATION AND SUBSEQUENT LEGITIMIZATION A LA CASSIRER’S SYMBOLIC FORMS.
–SEE CHAP 12 -DURANT) For them, external
reality is just there to be "observed", fully interpreted on its
face. How anyone can hold to this in
full knowledge of the revelations of quantum mechanics is a mystery to me
(perhaps this was one of the things Richard Feynman had in mind when he said
nobody understands QM) but as you've said, there are powerful survival reasons
why Naturalism exerts such a powerful hold on us.
Anyway, I don't want to
ramble on, and I suspect I may have answered my own question by typing it out
like this, but I'd be really grateful if you could spare a few moments to
respond.
FIRST REPLY:
On 19 August 2010 03:41,
Jerry Iglowitz <jiglowitz@surewest.net> wrote:
Dear D.York,
<SNIPPET> I
will go into your questions as soon as I am able, but for now let me state that
the core "nut" for you, (and me too!), centers around Cassirer's
"Symbolic Forms"! This is probably the most difficult and
subtle philosophy and actual theory of relativity imaginable. I spent
some years trying to digest and internalize, (and to extend), this brilliant
conception. Modern philosophy has pretty much bypassed his ideas for the
easier answers of pragmatism, et al. Modern science on the other hand
will, I believe, correct this omission as Cassirer does in fact, (as I stated
in the first chapter), better fit with materialist view of the brain and
cognition. But his relativization of materialism itself makes the latter
just one of many legitimate cognitive perspectives!
You have good questions -please give me
a little time -getting to be a very old man, but still kicking!
CASSIRER’S IS PROBABLY
THE BROADEST EXPANSION CONCEIVABLE FOR THE CONCEPT OF RELATIVISM. COPERNICUS, GALILEO, AND EINSTEIN WERE HIS
ACTUAL ANTECEDENTS IN THIS REGARD.
FROM D.York
8-19-2010 –EXCERPTS OF
EMAIL
Dear Jerry
---<SNIPPET> I
have spent my professional career in computing and IT, variously as a
programmer, systems analyst, project manager and latterly, head of the information
technology department of an internet bank. I've recently retired from full-time
work, and apart from a little consulting, have more time to devote to some of
my abiding intellectual interests, which have always included a fascination for
mind and cognition.
Oddly (or perhaps its
not all that odd) this was originally stimulated, somewhat as in your own case,
by personal experience with mental distress,…<SNIPPET>
So my very early reading
and thinking were largely centred on psychology,
rather than philosophy. My first real
interest in the latter area, I think, was Karl Popper, both for his ideas on
falsification and the ever-provisional nature of scientific "conjecture
and refutation", and also his corresponding political analysis of the Open
Society. I've was also attracted by the
ideas of systems thinkers like Gregory Bateson on how Nature and Mind develop
analogously under the combined influence of stochastic and selective processes. Since I've never followed an academic course
in philosophy, I suffer no doubt from the autodidact's
mix of eclecticism and blind spots, in the course of pursuing whatever seizes
my interest. So it was in 1984, when the BBC invited John Searle to give the
Reith Lectures on "Minds, Brains and Science", that the topic of
consciousness really grabbed me.
However, at the time I
found most of the books available on "the mind" in local libraries
seemed to be about everything BUT consciousness - the word was hardly
mentioned, and when it was, it didn't seem to describe what it meant to
me. Functionalism seemed to be the topic
of the day, but as a programmer, I wasn't fooled, ME NEITHER -SEE MY PRECIS,
(CHAPTER 1), PASSAGE ON HIGH LEVEL LANGUAGES AND EMERGENCE and covered copious
sheets of paper with detailed arguments and refutations. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE
YOUR EXPANSION OF THIS LINE OF THOUGHT.
Later, I discovered Daniel Dennett, and much of what he said seemed to
make sense, but my idea of consciousness still seemed to get lost somewhere in
his overall thesis. These days, I have
many of the competing theories, much thumbed, on my bookshelves - Chalmers,
Penrose, Edelman, Strawson, Rosenberg et al (though
not, to this point, Cassirer) I
OBVIOUSLY THINK CASSIRER SUPPLIES GIVES THE ESSENTIAL BEGINNINGS TO THE CORE OF
THE SOLUTION - and I've spent many hours, both personally and online, perusing
and discussing ideas, sometimes worth considering and others half-baked or
frankly crackpot, and through this have come to realize that the task of truly
understanding the mind is possibly the most complex facing us. I THINK IT IS
–QUOTING FROM P. 466 OF MY MS BELOW: (YOU MIGHT ALSO SEARCH THE MS FOR THE
RAICHLE AND EDELMAN REFERENCES)
“So where do we go from
here?
The biggest problem still remaining for the
science of man is the physical brain itself.
Physical science thinks it has solved the essential problem of
everything else, (almost), but how large is the scope of its knowledge? A few billion pieces of knowledge, I
think. Minsky thinks it is just a few
pieces.
(FOOTNOTE BELOW –I don’t
think it will transfer to email:
Dreyfus cites Minsky's
attempt to specify the magnitude of the mass of knowledge necessary for
humanoid intelligence. Minsky estimates
the number of facts required as on the order of one hundred thousand for reasonable
behavior in ordinary situations, a million for a very great intelligence. If this doesn't satisfy us, we are to
multiply this figure by ten! Dreyfus 1992.
Minsky apparently thinks that ten million is a huge number! I don’t think it is.)
But, conversely, how big
is the physical brain in itself? It is
100 billion cells alone, and its synapses are of the order of 10 trillion. Think of the combinations and the complexity
of our original and foundational mechanism which is, furthermore, self-referential
by definition!
Which is the larger,
more difficult problem? I think the
answer is pretty clear. The focus on the
brain will become the primary focus of any future science.”
(D.York
continues) I'm always encouraged when
on occasion I'm fortunate enough to encounter something of real originality and
depth, as I believe is the case with your own ideas.
In this regard, I've
been thinking again about Searle's notorious Chinese Room argument, in the
context of the notion of implicit definition. Searle's complaint about the computer, like
the man in the Chinese Room, is that it deals only with symbols at the level of
syntax, not semantics. In fact, later he
says that even this argument concedes too much, because characterising
a system as a "computer" in the first place itself requires an
external interpretative attribution by a mind.
Only minds can have semantics, says Searle, and it's not because of
symbol manipulation, so in his view the brain must have some transcendent - and
quite unknown - causal power in this
respect.
Now, I've always followed him in this
analysis, which was my objection to functionalism, but thinking about implicit
definition has shed new light. If we
consider the matter from the perspective of a generalised
system in which both "brain" and "mind" are embedded, there
can't then be any way for "semantics" to be injected as it were, by
stipulation, from the outside (unless by God).
Consequently if real, rather than merely metaphorical or externally
imputed, understanding is to be present, as I bear witness it is, the
phenomenon must somehow be internally self-sufficient - i.e. it must be defined
IMPLICITLY in some way - there's simply no other route to resolving the
conundrum.
Considered like this, the notion of implicit
definition starts to acquire the appearance of a getting-on-for-SUPERB
idea! THANKS. NOW YOU NEED TO START ON CASSIRER. CHAPTER’S 8 & 9 ARE A KIND OF PRECIS OF
SYMBOLIC FORMS,(CASSIRER WAS A PROFOUND MIND, BUT HIS WRITING IS “OBLIQUE” IN
THE EXTREME!) AND CHAPTERS 3 & 5 DEAL WITH HIS RE-INTERPRETATION OF
LOGIC. BOTH OF THESE BRILLIANT INSIGHTS
ARE CRUCIAL TO THE PROBLEM.
Best wishes
Jerry
RESPONSE TO LETTER OF
Dear D.York,
The following will
be my last response for awhile, I hope it helps. I am currently trying to conceptualize a new
book about the significance of it all –I think they, (sic), are huge and
important for our survival. I am calling
it, tentatively: “Essays on Man” –in allusion to Cassirer’s similarly titled
book. Actually some of the text was
written long ago when I thought it would be easy to present the initial idea
you have addressed.
<SNIP>
Now, in
response to your letter of 9-14-10. This
will be slightly disconnected in terms of flow, but I think I have addressed
most of the salient points and needed to get it finished:
First, I have
never seen a good book about
Cassirer. I have seen profound books by him, however. I think that ultimately he will come to be
known as one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century. (Smart’s essay –a
logical critique, though negative, in the posthumous volume: “The Philosophy of
Ernst Cassirer”, Library of Living Philosophers, Tudor Publishing Company, 1958
makes some important points however.)
As I have said
before, it is important to realize that Cassirer is the originator of two very distinct and important ideas
and it is important to consider them both separately and in their
interrelation:
(1) His redefinition of the very word
“concept” itself, (this is profound, extremely deep and forces us to consider
the very way we think!), and
(2) his “Theory of Symbolic Forms” which is
relativism pushed to the (almost) very limit.
But it is a relativism of epistemologies
themselves –no individual one
epistemology is sufficient, (see later –this is about invariants and
mathematical ideals –See Chap 9). It is
on the latter point that I think you are stumbling.
As far as
books go, I will cite you chapter and verse for just two of his books.
1. For his redefinition of “concept”: “Substance and Function”, (German title:
“Substance Concepts and Function Concepts).
Actually all you need is Chapter one of this book if you are capable of
truly contemplating its meaning –and,
from our discussions, I think you might be.
This was the book I read at 18, and it changed my whole concept of
mathematics, (and everything else).
Actually I quoted extensively from it in my MS, and the citations are
there for you to follow. It is not
excessively long, and you might consider purchasing it –or borrow it from your
friend.
2. For his “Theory of Symbolic Forms”. This one, as I have said, is extremely
oblique in its presentation. On the
other hand, if you were to crash-land on a desert island, it is fascinating and
he writes beautifully –his sections on psychology are interesting as hell, and
might interest you –he had read just about everything, (about everything!)-his sections on Jackson appealed to me). The problem with this book, (contrary to the
case with “Substance and Function” is that he never comes to the point –or
rather, he does so only casually. I will
site you what I think are the proper beginning and ending points that I think
are most relevant to our problem.
I think the
proper beginning point on this book is to consider his quoted comment of
Hertz’s on the nature of science itself, (considered in concert with Cass’s
Mathematical Concept of Function” hereinafter =MCF of “Substance and
Function”):
"The images
of which we are speaking are our ideas of things; they have with things the one
essential agreement which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement,
[of successful consequences], but further agreement with things is not
necessary to their purpose. Actually
we do not know and have no means of finding out whether our ideas of things
accord with them in any other respect than in this one fundamental relation.", (H. Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik", my
emphasis)
Then it is necessary
to consider it from his comment, (in reference to the nature of his
reformulated Concept, (MCF), that the latter is “a new form of consciousness”, not derived from the traditional,
Aristotelian methodology of presentation/attention/abstraction. That is, it is not derived from presentation! This is a key issue, and I address it below
in my interleaved response to your letter.
Ultimately,
consider this passage by Cassirer: (cited on p.343 my book)
"Each of the original
directions of knowledge, each interpretation, which it makes of phenomena to
combine them into the unity of a theoretical connection or into a
definite unity of meaning, involves a special
understanding and formulation of the concept of reality."XXII THIS IS THE CITATION
REFERENCE COLOR
QUOTED FROM AN OLD VERSION OF
MY BOOK= from compiled
This
change of perspective, (a genuine "Copernican Revolution" in Kant's
sense), necessitates and validates Cassirer's conclusion of the innate symmetry
and a relativity of interpretations for
phenomena. "With this critical
insight ... science renounces its
aspiration and its claim to an 'immediate' grasp and communication of reality."1
It
realizes that the only objectivization of which it is capable is, and must
remain, mediation, [my emphasis]. And in this insight, another highly
significant [critical]2
idealistic consequence is implicit. If
the object of knowledge can be defined only through the medium of a particular
logical and conceptual structure, we are forced to conclude that a variety of media, [my emphasis], will
correspond to various structures of the object, to various meanings for
'objective' relations.3
This
is the assertion of symmetry and the foundation for his thesis of
"Symbolic Forms".
Even in 'nature',4 [my
emphasis], the physical object will not coincide absolutely with the chemical
object, nor the chemical with the biological -because physical, chemical,
biological knowledge frame their questions each from its own particular
standpoint and, in accordance with this standpoint, subject the
phenomena to a special interpretation and formation.5 It might also seem that this consequence in
the development of [critical] idealistic thought had conclusively frustrated
the expectation in which it began. The
end of this development seems to negate its beginning -the unity of being, for
which it strove, threatens once more to disintegrate into a mere diversity of
existing things. The One Being, to which
thought holds fast and which it seems unable to relinquish without destroying
its own form, eludes cognition.6
It is the phenomena, (experience), not reference, however, that is the
fulcrum of, (and reunifies), this relativity of perspectives. The forms do not refer to (metaphysical) reality, (their objects are not images of reality), they organize experience. Metaphysical reality becomes "a mere
X"!1
"The more its metaphysical unity as a 'thing in itself' is
asserted, the more it evades all possibility of knowledge, until at last it is
relegated entirely to the sphere of the unknowable
and becomes a2 mere 'X'", [my emphasis].3 It is the realm of phenomena, "the true sphere of the knowable with its enduring
multiplicity, finiteness and relativity", on which we stand. It is the (multiplicitous and relativized) organization of phenomena, not
reference to a metaphysical origin, which lies at the basis of knowledge.
"And
to this rigid metaphysical absolute is juxtaposed the realm of phenomena, the true sphere of the
knowable4 with its enduring
multiplicity, finiteness and relativity.5
But
this reorientation does not destroy the either the unity or the coherence of
knowledge.
"But
upon closer scrutiny the fundamental postulate of unity is not discredited by
this irreducible diversity, [my
emphasis], of the methods and objects of knowledge; it merely assumes a new
form. True, the unity of knowledge
can no longer be made certain and secure by referring knowledge in all its
forms to a 'simple' common object which is related to all these forms as the
transcendent prototype to the empirical copies." [my emphasis]1
(This latter demand is, of
course, the rationale of the Naturalist claim of reference.)
But instead, a new task arises: to gather
the various branches of science with their diverse methodologies - with all their
recognized specificity and independence - into one system, whose separate parts
precisely through their necessary diversity will complement and further one
another. This postulate of a purely
functional unity replaces the postulate
of a unity of substance and origin, which lay at the core of the ancient
concept of being."2
HERE IS ANOTHER REFERENCE:
“Every authentic function of the human
spirit has this decisive characteristic in common with cognition: it does not
merely copy but rather embodies an original, formative power. It does not express passively the mere fact
that something is present but contains an independent energy of the human
spirit through which the simple presence of the
phenomenon assumes a definite 'meaning', a particular ideational content."VI
"This is as
true of art as it is of cognition; it is as true of myth as of religion. All
live in particular image-worlds, which do not merely reflect the empirically
given, but which rather produce it in
accordance with an independent principle.”
[Note: That is, in accordance with “a rule”.]
Each of these
functions creates its own symbolic forms which, if not similar to the
intellectual symbols, enjoy equal rank as products of the human spirit. None of these forms can simply be reduced to,
or derived from, the others; each of them designates a particular approach, in
which and through which it constitutes its own aspect of 'reality'. They are
not different modes in which an independent reality manifests itself to the
human spirit, but roads by which the spirit proceeds towards its
objectivization, i.e. its self-revelation."VII
FROM MY BOOK:
Ordinary Naturalism confuses a particular organization, (mathematical physics), with
the phenomena themselves which are organized. That is
the basis of its assertion of reference –and its "scientific
realism". "The "objects", (the organizational primitives
-i.e. images"), of one particular form are assumed,
(incorrectly), to reference ontology
-to relate to "an ultimate metaphysical unity".
"Where
there exist such diversities in fundamental direction of consideration, the results of consideration cannot be directly
compared and measured with each other. The naive realism of the ordinary view
of the world, like the realism of dogmatic metaphysics, falls into this error,
ever again. It separates out of the totality of possible concepts of reality a
single one and sets it up as a norm and pattern for all the others. Thus certain
necessary formal points of view, from which we seek to judge and understand the
world of phenomena, are made into things, into absolute beings”.[my emphasis]XXIII
What these "formal points of view" do, instead, he argues is organize phenomena. What is consistent under all forms, however, are the phenomena themselves.
Naturalism confuses a particular "frame of reference", i.e. “form”, with
the invariant relationality of
experience in the abstract
-i.e. under all
consistent frames. It
confuses a specific organization, (and a specific characterization), of
experience with the experience itself
which is organized. It results, (and I repeat myself), in an improper
assignment of unique metaphysical reference rather than a legitimate judgment
of empirical, (i.e. experiential), adequacy for the primitives of its theories.
"Only when we resist the temptation to
compress the totality of forms, which here result, into an ultimate
metaphysical unity, into the unity and simplicity of an absolute 'world ground'
and to deduce it from the latter, do we grasp its true concrete import and
fullness.
No individual form can indeed claim
to grasp absolute 'reality' as such and to give it complete and adequate
expression.[my emphasis]"XXIV
Now let me do
a mini-critique of your letter of 9-14-10, as I think you are confusing Cassirer’s
two very distinct ideas.
“As I said, d'Espagnat cites his ideas at reasonable length
as the clearest example of the neo-Kantian approach to "empirical
reality" (i.e. what is in principle accessible to observation, as distinct
from a deeper reality that, though its presence may be inferred, must
inevitably remain ontologically indeterminate)” THIS INVOLVES A SUBTLE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE BOTH OF CASSIRER’S MAIN IDEAS CITED ABOVE. FIRST WE MUST COMPREHEND THAT S&F,
(ABBREVIATION TO BE USED FOR “Substance and Function”), IS BASED IN THE FORM OF A SERIES VS THE ELEMENTS OF THE SERIES. REREAD CHAPTER 3, (PPS. 98-107) OF MY MS,
(AND CHAP 5 IS ALSO RELEVANT). HERE IS A
BRIEF EXCERPT CITING CASSIRER:
The formal Concept is no longer logically derivable from its
extension,
(its membership), however:
"The meaning of the law that connects the
individual members is not to be exhausted by the enumeration of any number of
instances of the law; for such enumeration lacks the generating principle that enables us
to connect
the individual members into a functional
whole."
“If we know the relation according to which
a b c . . . are ordered, we can deduce them by reflection and isolate them as
objects of thought. "It is impossible,
on the other hand, to discover the special character of the connecting relation
from the mere juxtaposition of a,b,c in
presentation."
And again:
"That
which binds the elements of the series a,b,c, ... together is not itself a new
element that was factually blended with them, but it is the rule of progression, which remains
the same, no matter in which member it is represented. The function F(a,b), F(b,c), ..., which determines the
sort of dependence between the successive members, is obviously not to
be pointed out as itself a member of the series, which exists and develops according to
it." (My emphasis) See
footnote.
This is the definitive argument against
“abstraction” as the general case
and against “presentation”, [“things”], as an ultimate foundation for logic. BUT THE RULE ITSELF BECOMES “A NEW FORM OF
CONSCIOUSNESS”
FROM D.York
REITERATING:
As I said, d'Espagnat
cites his ideas at reasonable length as the clearest example of the
neo-Kantian approach to "empirical reality" (i.e.
what is in principle accessible to observation, BUT WHAT IS “OBSERVATION” -IT IS AN ATTEMPT AT A GOD’S EYE VIEW OF
ONTOLOGY, (HOWSOEVER YOU MAY QUALIFY
IT), RATHER THAN EXISTING AS A COMPONENT
OF SOME PARTICULAR, (COGNITIVE), SYMBOLIC FORM. as distinct from a
deeper reality that, though its presence may be inferred, must inevitably
remain ontologically indeterminate). THE
POINT IS THAT YOU CAN NEVER GET TO A
GOD’S EYE VIEW. THERE IS A QUOTE IN AN
OFFLINE PAPER OF MINE, (THE ORIGINAL INTRODUCTION FOR BEGINNERS –STILL ACTIVE
LINK = http:www.foothill.net/~jerryi/INTRODUCTION.mht)
WHEREIN I REFERED TO KANT AS WALKING ON WATER.
HERE IS THE QUOTE FROM THAT PAPER:
“Have you ever seen the modern remake of the movie "Cinderella",
("Forever After")? There is a scene in it where the heroine is seen
paddling around, face-up in a lake. Prince Charming arrives on the scene
accompanied, strange to say, by Leonardo da Vinci dressed, appropriately, in
medieval clothes. Leonardo decides to try out his latest invention, a pair of
miniature canoe-like floatation shoes, and he proceeds to walk on water,
startling the heroine when he reaches her.
Try to hold that image - of the medieval Leonardo walking across the lake. It
reminds me, strange to tell, very much of Immanuel Kant exploring the
"lake" of ontology. Kant looked at the possibilities of human
cognition and concluded that our knowledge, (what we can know), could not be
the "solid knowledge" of "bottom dwellers", (objectivists,
materialists), nor could it be the "airy knowledge" of birds,
(idealists, solipsists), flying unattached and independent of the earth. He
concluded that human knowledge must take account of its own medium, (the
water). The best we could do was to discover the means to float upon it. We cannot
build a bridge here, (as the bottom dwellers insist), because the lakebed is
made of quicksand and the deeper we attempt to drive the piers, the deeper they
sink. Kant's "means", (his "buoyancy"), lay in the
fundamentally relativistic conception of realism that he spelled out. It
centers in the innate necessities of human cognition itself. The only knowledge
we are capable of is that "which floats"!
THIS REMINDS ME OF A QUOTE
FROM NEURATH, (I ENCOUNTERED IT IN READING QUINE), THAT “WE MUST KICK AWAY THE LADDER!” THINK ABOUT THIS. IT IS THE RIGID BUT INADEQUATE EPISTEMOLOGICAL LADDER, (THE GOD’S EYE VIEW),
THAT WE MUST KICK AWAY!
I would say that my current understanding of these issues, at
least in relation to your book, is that the total relation of an organism – or
indeed a community of organisms - with its environment comes to be embodied,
through evolving processes of interaction and feedback, in a system of symbolic
forms. (THIS IS A LEGITIMATE, BUT RELATIVISTIC STATEMENT BUT IT MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN
A PARTICULAR, BIOLOGICAL COGNITIVE FORM)
As a result of this process, the evolved symbol system then comes to
constitute its total empirical reality. (“EMPIRICAL REALITY = ONTOLOGY??)
d'Espagnat also makes it crystal clear how physics has shown
this symbolic relationship with "reality" to extend, not only to
ordinary human-scale objects of perception, but down to the most
"fundamental" level of analysis available, even in principle. Whilst it is certainly possible that other
organisms might (and indeed, over the broad sweep of the biological kingdom,
do) "carve up" their empirical landscapes differently according to
their differently evolved needs, (SIDE COMMENT –THIS IS THE PROPOSED SUBJECT IN
MY PROMISED ESSAY IN THE “IN THE CLOSET” PAGE OF MY WEBSITE AS “AN ARGUMENT FOR
VEGETARIANISM”!) , all are limited by the same "uncertainty relation"
with an ontological "Real" that remains inescapably at an
epistemological distance. NOT BAD –BUT
THE LANGUAGE MUST BE CLEANED UP.
Of course, the point you rightly make is that the development
of biological organisms is shaped by survival needs, not "truth", but
it's still fascinating that this "design feature" extends all the way
down in our attempts to grasp external reality.
But how could it be
otherwise? THIS WAS MY
COMMENT THAT AT THE VERY SMALL SCALE AND THE VERY LARGE SCALE INDETERMINISM IS
THE RULE. I ARGUED THAT IT APPLIED AT
THE HUMAN SCALE AS WELL.
I'd certainly be grateful for any pointers from you as to
where to focus next.
Regards
David
David, I hope this helps some. I must apologize for the nonlinearity of the
answer, but I wanted to get my notes to you.
I am obviously playing with highlighting, et al but I hoped it might
help for clarification. Currently very
much exhausted with my physical work, but I think it is helping my mental state
vis a vis my daughter.
Best wishes,
Jerry
------------------------------END
CURRENT D.YORK INTERCHANGE-------------------------------
------------------------------LETTER
FROM B.L.----------------------------------------------------------
Here is an old letter
from a distinguished mathematician at the HEC in Lausanne, Switzerland, (since
retired). His specialty is multivariate statistical analysis. It's
kind of embarrassing in its praise, but I think he saved my life at a bad time
by the warmth he showed me. Nothing came of it however, as his wife came
down with Multiple Sclerosis and I think it destroyed him. I tried to
keep in touch for several years, but I think I can understand where he is coming
from. I feel that way about my wife as well.
"24-MAR-1995
Subj: deep regret
Dear Mr
Iglowitz
You are not under
misapprehension. I am VERY sympathetic with your scientific and philosophical viewpoints.
And after reading this morning your last message I feel sincerely concerned by
your personal situation. Unfortunately I am also under heavy constraints of
another kind (my wife's health) and that explains my lasting silence.
As a matter of fact, I
was preparing an answer containing detailed comments on the border of almost
every two pages of your manuscript. Please believe Mr. Iglowitz on my deep
sympathy with your ideas. I even suspect a kind of spiritual brotherhood among
us. This spontaneous manifestation does not sound like a very academic
statement or manifestation. But the hell with the academy in front of the
personal and intimate adventure of the few real men we have the fortune of
meeting from time to time.
My sincere regards
B.L."
---------------------------------------------END
B.L.------------------------------------------------
------------------------WALTER
J. FREEMAN CORRESPONDENCE------------------------
I have corresponded with
Dr. Walter Freeman , an original-thinking and highly respected neuroscientist
and biologist of international repute at U.C. Berkeley. (He held the
Spinoza Chair at the University of Amsterdam, amongst other things and is
highly published.) His response to a sketch of my first thesis was:
"Your arguments are
indeed compelling and should persuade some of the proponents of
representational AI of the feasibility of alternatively based models.... I
think it is remarkable how our separate programs have converged to shared
conclusions regarding nonrepresentational operations of brains....I wish you
good fortune in getting a responsive audience. Your ideas certainly
deserve that."
He was very helpful and
allowed me to use his remarks for promoting my ideas. He was unwilling to
pursue the very strong philosophical implications of the problem however,
preferring to "return to his rabbits". His own ideas produce
implications very similar to mine, though he has turned to "chaos
theory" as a preferred medium. I don't agree with him there, but I can see
the "attraction". :-)
He has been encouraging
over the years, but could not break me into publication. His most recent
comments, (2005), were: "I've received and enjoyed your
up-dated manuscript, including the new appendix on 'automorphism'... You continue
to strike pay dirt in searching for alternatives to
representationalism." "I wish you good fortune, Jerry "
-------------------------END
W.J. FREEMAN CORRESPONDENCE---------------------------
-------------------------G.C.
CORRESPONDENCE------------------------------------------------
#1. Letters from a
Ph.D. candidate: ~2006
G.C. wrote: My
name is G.C. I have just started research on a PhD thesis in
disembodiment in virtual reality at ****** University in New Zealand. One
giant block of work I have to work on is Consciousness (particularly the
problem of what is happening to our consciousness in a fully immersive model of
VR?). My background is in English and Literary Theory and so I do not
know much about the subject.
I read Dennett's
Consciousness Explained and Mind Children and Searle's Mystery of the Mind and
then I came across your page and downloaded your book a few days ago. I
must admit I find your theories very interesting and captivating yet I feel
rather stupid reading the book as I have to go over and over the same page X
times with a dictionary before I start to grasp what you intend, and as you
have fairly noted, one does need to have a good intertextual
understanding of the writers you mentioned, which I admit, I do not have.
I would nevertheless
like to engage with your work but doubt I will have the time, at
present to go through all the reading mentioned as this is only a small
part of my thesis. Is there a way around this problem?
Where, how and through
whom do you suggest I approach the issue of consciousness in relation to VR?
Thank you very much for
your time,
G.C.
Dear G.C.,
I
would be happy to open a discussion with you. My book is, as you say,
very difficult. This is not by intention, but, I think, because of the very
nature of the subject itself. The two online papers: "Mind: the
Argument from Evolutionary Biology" and "Consciousness: a Simpler
Approach" are recent refinements of my first 3 chapters, and are, I think,
considerably clearer. As I said in the "Apology", however, I
had intended, (and still do intend), to present my final, summarizing theme as
the third essay. Unfortunately, I had a series of strokes about a year
ago, and it has made writing difficult. Hopefully the situation will get
better. Also, I am looking at the problem of presentation anew, and am
reconsidering just how to break through the prejudices of my readers.
I
understand your time constraints. It is too bad because the classical
writers had important things to say on the problem. Kant and, more
importantly, Cassirer had brilliant ideas about it. I believe the
latter’s theory of "Symbolic Forms" is the keyway to the
problem. (His style however, in my opinion, is atrocious and difficult to
summarize. It is oblique in the extreme. Chapter 4 of my (ORIGINAL)
book is an attempt to linearize his ideas.)
Have
you read my "Introduction for Beginners"? It is meant for
everyone, and not "just beginners", though I must title it so.
The paper mentioned above "Mind: the Argument from Evolutionary
Biology" presents a rationale for something like what I think you are
describing -under the heading "Mind: an Explicit Model". It
shows how the brain could use an "immersive model", (using your
words), and it need not be representative. Again, it is not easy, -not
because it contains "arcane" references, but because of the
originality of the idea itself.
I
would be happy to entertain a dialogue. It is too bad your field of
interest is in English and Literary Theory, as the field of cognitive science
could use such open and receptive minds. This field belongs to the young.
Best wishes,
Jerry
(J.I. RESPONSE TO A SET
OF QUESTIONS): Dear G.,
I
will interleave my comments between your questions, and then continue below
them. I have found it helpful to carry on such a dialogue by placing my
comments in CAPS to distinguish them for clarity. There is no ulterior
implication in this -I might just as well have done so to your comments
instead. (Also it's easier typing that way. ;- )) )
G.C. wrote:
I read the response to
mind essay and found it very intriguing. I can’t say I understood it in
its entirety so I’m going to read the Consciousness: a Simpler Approach and
then return to it later on tonight. Here are a couple of questions and
comments:
1) Is there a link or
similarity between the term 'calculus' as used in the essay and Dennett's
concept of the Heterophenomenological world?
J.I. ANSWER:
"CALCULUS" IS USED IN ITS BASIC MATHEMATICAL SENSE, (I QUOTED THE
WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY IN A FOOTNOTE: I.E. "A SYSTEM OF CALCULATION USING
SYMBOLS"), AND AS DISTINGUISHED FROM "THE CALCULUS" -I.E.
DIFFERENTIAL AND INTEGRAL CALCULUS. IT IS THE MOST BASIC CONCEPTION OF
SYMBOLIC CALCULATION AND DOES NOT ENTAIL SPECIFIC PRESUMPTIONS. DENNETT'S
"HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY" IS NOT RELATED TO IT DIRECTLY. HIS TERM
REFERS TO THE PURE PHENOMENOLOGY, (HAPPENINGS), OF EVENTS AS ABSTRACTED FROM
ANY SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION OR METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS. IT'S BEEN A WHILE
SINCE I'VE READ DENNETT, BUT, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, HIS
"FEENOMINISTS", (??), ARE SUPPOSED TO BELIEVE IN MENTAL
PHENOMENA, BUT HE ARGUES THAT THIS IS UNNECESSARY. I HAVE AN
APPENDIX IN MY BOOK DIRECTLY DEALING WITH DENNETT, ("DENNETT
APPENDIX").
G.C. 2) In the following
part "These objects, I propose, are manifestations of the structure; the
structure is not a resolution of the objects", what is the term structure
referring to, which structure?
J.I.: THE
STRUCTURE I AM REFERING TO IS THE ABSTRACT MATHEMATICAL ONE REFERRED TO ABOVE,
(I.E. OF A CALCULUS). IT IS LIKE A MATHEMATICAL AXIOMATIC STRUCTURE -ITS
RULES AND LAWS. ITS OBJECTS, I ULTIMATELY ARGUE, ARE IMPLICITLY DEFINED
BY THOSE RULES AND LAWS. THE "CONSCIOUSNESS: A SIMPLER APPROACH TO
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM” PAPER DETAILS THIS IN ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE. THIS,
(IMPLICIT DEFINITION), WAS DAVID HILBERT'S BRILLIANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PROBLEM. (HILBERT IS ONE OF THE MOST RESPECTED MATHEMATICIANS OF
OUR TIME). AS I NOTED IN THE PREFACE TO THAT PAPER, THE SERIES OF
EXAMPLES IS NOT INTENDED TO BE LINEAR, BUT LOGARITHMIC - THE COMPLEXITY
"TAKES OFF", BUT THE SEQUENCE SHOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE.
G.C.: 3) I
didn’t understand, no matter how many times over I read it, the
last part of the GUI - "But I assert that GUI’s and their “objects”,
(icons), have a deeper potentiality of “free formation”. They have the
potential to link to any selection across a substrate, i.e. they could “cross
party lines”. They could cross categories of “things in the world”, (Lakoff’s
“objectivist categories”), {17} ), and acquire thereby the possibility of
organizing on a different and the most pressing issue: i.e. urgency / risk.
They need preserve neither parallelism nor hierarchy."
J.I.: I AM A
LITTLE CONFUSED HERE -THIS MUST HAVE COME FROM THE "MIND: THE ARGUMENT
FROM EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY". O.K. THE GUI IS THE CASE OF
SCHEMATISM WHICH I ARGUE FOR MIND. TAKING MIND AS A REPRESENTATIVE MODEL,
(AS MOST COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS DO), THERE IS A NECESSARY PRESERVATION OF
CATEGORIES AND A HIERARCHICAL CONTAINMENT. IT IS WHAT ALLOWS YOU TO SEE
CHEMISTRY AS A SUBSET OF PHYSICS, FOR INSTANCE, AND BIOLOGY AS A SUBSET OF BOTH
OF THEM. ("PARTY LINES", (SET THEORETIC CONTAINMENT), ARE FOR
THEM NECESSARILY PRESERVED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PROCESS OF THE
BRAIN. "CROSSING PARTY LINES" IS AN (AMERICAN ?)
EXPRESSION OF THE CASE WHERE ALL DEMOCRATS OR REPUBLICANS, (INSERT YOUR LOCAL
BODIES), DO NOT VOTE AS A BLOCK. "CROSSING PARTY LINES" IS WHAT
ALLOWS US TO CONCEIVE THE BRAIN AS ORGANIZING ON A BASIS OF EFFICIENCY AS OPPOSED
TO INFORMATION.)
I ARGUE AGAINST THE
USUAL CONCEPTION. I ARGUE THAT THE BRAIN IS A PRODUCT OF EVOLUTION,
EVOLVING FROM THE "INSIDE OUT", (BASED IN THE OPTIMIZED,
SELF-ORGANIZING FUNCTIONALITY OF ORGANIC PROCESS), RATHER THAN FROM THE
"OUTSIDE IN", (I.E. "INFORMATION"). THIS IS BECAUSE
THE CRITERION FOR SURVIVAL OF AN ORGANISM IS BASED, (PURE DARWINISM, ALSO
MATURANA, ALSO EDELMAN, ALSO FREEMAN), -UPON SIMPLE ADEQUACY, NOT UPON INFORMED
RESPONSE. IT DOES NOT MATTER WHETHER YOU KILL THE FLY WHICH IS TORMENTING
YOU BY SMACKING IT WITH A FLYSWATTER, OR BY DEFECATING ON IT!
J WHATEVER WORKS! THE FINISHED BRAIN
IS THE END PRODUCT OF OPTIMALLY ORGANIZING SUCH SUCCESSFUL PROCESSES.
G.C.: 4)
Could you be patient enough to apply your overall theory to the following
example situations so that I may have an example to relate to when re-reading
the essay :
If there is no
representation, how do I see the 'images' I see while I am reading or hearing a
story?
J.I.: THIS WAS THE
BREAKTHROUGH I THINK I MADE IN THE "MIND:....EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY". (I WILL HAVE TO ENLARGE THIS THEME LATER TO PUT IT IN A
MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXT.) FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BIOLOGY, (AS OPPOSED
TO OTHER "SYMBOLIC FORMS" - SEE CHAPTER 4 OF MY BOOK, AND HOPEFULLY
THE SUBJECT OF MY THIRD -"APOLOGY" ESSAY), THESE 'IMAGES",
(NO QUOTES REALLY NECESSARY), ARE SYMBOLS, (BIOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS), IN THE
TOPOBIOLOGICAL MAPS OF THE CORTEX. IN THE SECTION "AN EXPLICIT
MODEL", I ARGUE THAT THEY ARE THE IMMENSELY SOPHISTICATED ARTIFACTS OF CORTEX
WHICH EXIST TO TIE RE-ENTRANT OUTPUT BACK INTO THE NON-LINEAR TRANSFORM, (INTO
THE REST OF THE BRAIN), THAT FREEMAN DESCRIBES. MERLEAU-PONTY TALKS ABOUT
SENSATIONS AS THE RESULT OF AN ORGANISM ACTING INTO THE WORLD WITH
FEEDBACK. I SAY THAT THESE TOPOBIOLOGICAL OBJECTS ARE THE OPTIMIZERS,
(LIKE THE GUI'S OF COMPUTERS), THAT ALLOW HUGELY MULTIPLE MAPPINGS OF INPUT
BACK INTO THE REST OF THE BRAIN. BUT THEY ARE GROUNDED IN THE PROCESS
OF INTERNAL OPTIMIZATION, (OF ADEQUATE FUNCTION), NOT IN INFORMATION.
I.E. THEY ARE PURELY PRACTICAL ENTITIES. THE APPENDIX TO THIS PAPER TALKS
ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT REUSE SUCH OBJECTS AND HOW WE INTERACT WITH THEM.
G.C.: How am I
conscious of an abstract feeling such as the pleasure derived from a piece of
music?
J.I.: THIS IS
HARDER. PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT I VIEW MY WORK AS SCIENCE, NOT AS
PHILOSOPHY. AS SUCH, IT WILL RAISE MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERS.
I HAVE IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT I AM SOMEWHAT SHY ABOUT EXPOSING THEM.
I FEEL I MUST COMPLETE THE LEVEL I HAVE BEGUN BEFORE GOING FURTHER AND
CONFUSING MY READERS EVEN MORE. AS A HINT, I THINK THAT CASSIRER'S
SYMBOLIC FORMS IS DEEPER THAN EVEN HE SUSPECTED.
G.C.: How would
the schematic theory be implemented in a situation of fully sensorially
immersive VR (similar to the fictional Gibsonesque
Matrix or the virtual world in The Matrix)?
J.I.: O.K.
YOU WANT HELP ON YOUR THESIS! :-) I'M WILLING TO TRY. HOW
WOULD YOU MAKE SUCH A THING? THERE ARE A COUPLE OF WAYS, IT SEEMS TO ME -
NONE OF THEM EASY.
1. YOU COULD SPEND
A FEW BILLION YEARS OF EVOLUTION TO ALLOW A MULTICELLULAR BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM
TO SELF-ORGANIZE ITSELF FOR OPTIMAL PERFORMANCE IN THE WORLD, (THIS IS NOT A
CONTRADICTION - SEE MY CHAPTER 4). THIS DOES NOT MEAN INFORMED, "PERFECT"
PERFORMANCE HOWEVER, BUT ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE. AT SOME POINT, YOU WOULD
ALLOW CORTEX TO EVOLVE IN THE FEEDBACK LOOP FROM BEHAVIORAL OUTPUT BACK INTO
INPUT SENSORS, MEDIATING BETWEEN THE TWO AND DISPERSIVELY MAPPING INTO BRAIN AS
A WHOLE.. IT IS THE "OBJECTS" OF THE CORTEX, (THESE PURELY
PRAGMATIC ARTIFACTS), WHICH I ARGUE ARE THE "COMBINED-IN-ONE"
ICONS I DISCUSSED IN THE ENGINEERING ARGUMENT.
2. YOU COULD MAKE
A COMPUTER PROGRAM THAT SIMULATES THE OPTIMIZING FUNCTION OF SUCH A
PROCESS. THE LOGIC OF THAT PROGRAM WOULD BE A SPECIFIC PROBLEM HOWEVER,
AS MOST CURRENT LOGIC IS SET-BASED AND HIERARCHICAL -AND THIS WOULD CONSTRAIN
THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITIES OF THE PROGRAM ITSELF. AGAIN I MUST COME BACK
TO CASSIRER -AND HIS OTHER BRILLIANT CONCEPTION: "THE FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT
OF MATHEMATICS". THIS WAS A START TOWARDS A RADICALLY NEW CONCEPTION
OF THE LOGICAL "CONCEPT" ITSELF, ONE THAT ALLOWS NEW POSSIBILITIES IN
MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC. SOME WRITERS ON THIS SUBJECT LIKE TO DISCUSS THE "MASSIVELY
PARALLEL" ASPECTS OF THE "HUMAN COMPUTER", (THE BRAIN). I
THINK THEY ARE WRONG. IT IS NOT MASSIVELY "PARALLEL", BUT
MASSIVELY DIFFUSIVE -IN FREEMAN'S SENSE.
3. I HATE TO
MENTION "CHAOS THEORY", BUT IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT IT COULD PROVIDE THE
LINK BETWEEN CORTICAL OBJECTS AND THE SUBSTRATE OF THE BRAIN.
CHANGING SUBJECTS:
IN "MATRIX", THE ACTUAL REALITY WAS THAT THIS WAS A TOTALLY
"TUBED-UP" ORGANISM LIVING IN A NURTURING POD. HIS MENTAL
REALITY, HOWEVER, WAS LIFE IN THE 20TH CENTURY, (??), FULLY MOBILE AND
FUNCTIONAL. AND YET HE WAS ABLE TO EFFECT CHANGES IN HIS ACTUAL
ENVIRONMENT. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE COMPUTER PROGRAM ITSELF, THESE
WERE PROFOUNDLY COMPLEX. HE IS THE "HERO" I MENTIONED IN MY
"MIND-BRAIN: AN INTRODUCTION FOR BEGINNERS".
G.C.: Ok, now for
the hardest part. Can I in my own words try to explain where I’ve gotten
to so far in my understanding of the essay? I’m probably going to make a
total fool out of myself, but you can't expect to learn to walk without bruising
your knees a bit on hard tarmac.
There is as such,
no ultimate objective reality we can ever perceive. This
is because we are part of that system of symbols we weave to function
efficiently in a very complicated environment, through a very complicated
vessel. We can never attain a point of view which allows us to see the
objective reality (if there is indeed such a thing)
J.I.: BECAUSE WE
ARE JOINTLY, (?), REALISTS, WE DO ASSUME THERE IS SUCH A THING. THIS IS
PART OF OUR REALIST POSTURE AND I HAVE TERMED IT THE "AXIOM OF
EXTERNALITY". IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS A BELIEF,
HOWEVER, AND NOT A FACT! I ARGUE THAT SCIENCE FORCES US TO THE
REALIZATION THAT WE CAN NEVER KNOW THE "WHAT" OR THE "HOW" OF
IT.
G.C. (continues): as
separate from the tools we have of perceiving it. More importantly, the
environment we are in is too complicated for us to fully take in all the data,
so instead we enact a system of meaning through symbols to operate our vessel
and interpret [J.I.: SUBSTITUTE INTERACT WITH] this environment.
Perceiving and reacting are in fact not separate but part of an ongoing loop of
input/output processes that give us an optimized way of surviving.
J.I.: THIS ISN'T
BAD.
G.C.: That is a
sort of crude summary of what I have grasped so far (if indeed I have). I
hope I haven’t offended you by distorting your views in my simplistic
understanding.
Since you mentioned that
you wanted to find a way how to present ideas in a way to get through to more
reader's here is my own subjective experience of engaging with the text :
The material being
covered is complex. The ideas need to, as you said, break through some
very deeply ingrained prejudices. Thus the language needs to be as
accessible and as plain as possible. I found myself going through it with
an Oxford dictionary on one side and a Webster dictionary on the other and
checking up on a lot of words because a lot depended on some phrases and
words. I read and re read and re read nth times every paragraph and sort
of rewrote it in notes I could understand. In the first part where you
give examples and relate them to your theory I found myself understanding
things much easier.
DEAR G., YOU ARE TRYING
TO UNDERSTAND A RADICALLY NEW, VERY COMPLEX CONCEPTION WHICH HAS TAKEN ME
ALMOST 50 YEARS TO EVOLVE -AND IN A VERY SHORT TIME. YOU ARE ACTUALLY
DOING PRETTY WELL FOR THE TIME YOU HAVE SPENT. MY PROBLEM IS HOW TO COVER
ALL THE BASES, (YANK-TALK FOR MEET EVERY CONCEIVABLE OBJECTION, AND STILL
PRESENT THE OVERALL CONCEPTION. BECAUSE IT IS ONLY AS A WHOLE THAT IT
MAKES SENSE.
G.C.: Maybe the
concepts can be presented in a less summarized fashion, building the points in
more steps for idiots like me who needed to reassemble much of the text in
order to just understand the possible signifieds that
the signifiers were relating to, taking up much of the effort needed to engage
with the concept itself.
J.I.: THIS IS GOOD
FEEDBACK -AND PART OF THE ONGOING DIALOGUE I CONSTANTLY HAVE WITH MYSELF.
IT IS HARDER THAN YOU THINK, HOWEVER. ("TOO MANY NOTES"
-PRINCE'S COMMENT TO MOZART IN THE MOVIE “AMADEUS”.)
G.C.: It could be
just me, but I could not grasp any of the diagrams at all. I could not
make heads or tails as to the labeling and the symbols inside them or to where the
arrows were pointing and why. Again this is probably due to my not being
a particularly bright receiver.
J.I.:
NONSENSE. PICK A DIAGRAM AND I WILL TRY TO EXPLAIN IT.
G.C.: A small note
as to the meaning of some central terms such as global mapping, topology and so
on might make it clearer for those that are unclear so to their meaning within
the context of the essay.
J.I.: THESE ARE
MATHEMATICAL TERMS. EDELMAN'S "GLOBAL MAPPING", (I THOUGHT I
HAD CLARIFIED THIS IN THE TEXT), REFERS TO A NON-TOPOLOGICAL MAPPING FROM THE
CORTICES TO THE BRAIN AS A WHOLE. WHAT IS THIS
"TOPOLOGY"? IT IS THE FIELD OF MATHEMATICS, (GEOMETRY), WHICH
DEALS WITH THOSE MATHEMATICAL MAPPINGS WHICH PRESERVE CONTIGUITY. THE
STANDARD EXAMPLE IS THAT OF A RUBBER SHEET. WE MAY STRETCH IT OR BEND IT,
AND STILL PRESERVE THE SAME RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN POINTS WHICH ARE CLOSE TO ONE
ANOTHER. THESE CASES WOULD BE "TOPOLOGICALLY EQUIVALENT".
WE ARE NOT ALLOWED, HOWEVER, TO CUT IT OR PASTE IT TO CLOSELY RELATE DISTANT OR
UNRELATED POINTS.
G.C.: One last
thing. I find it much easier to follow when practical applications of
complex theories are given as the argument is being developed so that I can
relate them to my, using Dennett's term, heterophenomenological world.
Now I don’t know if I
should send this mail or not for fear of being offensive.
I hope you don’t think
I’m criticizing your work in any way. Far from it. I just wanted to
contribute by offering some sort of feedback of an average reader, (although
you might have other audiences in mind).
Thanks again for taking
time to read my mails, and once again I apologize if you found my comments
offensive.
G.C.
NOT AT ALL.
BEST REGARDS,
JERRY
Dear G.,
Just
a note to see how you are doing. I hope you found my response
helpful. There are things I could add, and I think I misunderstood one of
your questions, but I hope you are doing well.
Take care,
Jerry
G.C. Hi, thanks
for that. which question was it ?
your response was VERY
helpful. In a months time I have to present a paper at the annual *******
conference so I had to put my thesis/consciousness stuff on hold till I’m done
with that.
The paper I’ll be
writing will propose a bridge between posthumanism
and hypertextuality, posing hypertextuality
(and non linear ways of thinking) as a possible mode of being for future
generations who will be immersed in hypertextual
technology such as the net and other electronic media.
I have not however given
up on the consciousness issue and will resume my engaging with your work once
this hurdle is overcome.
Thanks for your interest
and help.
G.C.
-------------------------END
G.C. INTERCHANGE------------------------------------------------
-------------------------M.B.
CORRESPONDENCE------------------------------------------------
#3: Here is a
letter, (the first of several I received from this correspondent. The
subsequent letters and responses were lost to the virus. I am citing it
to show the difficulty of meaningful recognition of my ideas.
Dear Mr. Iglowitz,
At the outset, let me
express my deep feelings of admiration for the devotion and determination
you've proved in the bearing and begetting of your huge piece of work on a
possible explanation of consciousness.
I'm a graduate student
in Cognitive Psychology (and a software developer in ###NAME###), about to
finish my own thesis on chess expertise. I ran across your work accidentally a
week ago, when performing one of my associative searches on the web.
As you well know, it is
not, unfortunately, so simple to intake such a work which hasn't been admitted
for publication, nor to cite it in a formal academic work, (MY EMPHASIS).
I do, however, find your
ideas interesting - which may elevate your spirits but not help in any practical
way since I'm in no status whatsoever to help you about it. Nor can I say
anything about your ideas being right or wrong - since I do think that your
theory is in the same danger as Freud's theory - if you create a closed system,
than within the philosophy realm it's fine, but I think that you could do more
to make your work more widespreadly known, namely to
begin showing how it applies to well defined cognitive domains. This would help
people who are less focused on deep philosophical ideas but who are more
empirically oriented integrate your ideas into the regular scientific paradigm.
In short, you must put your ideas to the test! It hasn't been on your side to
be so self-assured about the importance of your work; people are only human and
the sociological makeup of academy, well, it's not so "politically
correct" to knock on the expert's door and tell him: "Hey, you
don't know anything
about it! But I do!".
There is, nevertheless,
one thing that I've been trying to think seriously about in the light of your
work. Ever since I've started to research chess skill I more than suspected
something fundamental is missing in the mainstream of cognitive science.
Researchers talked about memory based, recognition-action models on one hand
(e.g., Chase & Simon, 1972, etc.), and search, computational-evaluative
models on the other (Holding, 1985; Holding & Reynolds, 1982, etc.), but
neither of them excluded the other completely. I know you've not engaged in
empirical research, so I won't bombard you with findings from this field.
I've begun to try to conceptualise the game of chess according to your
framework. The problem I'm seeing is that I'm feeling that it directs my
thoughts in a way that I'm able to explain everything, which is the same as not
explaining anything. I'm not sure about this.
If I've got your thesis
right, then the game of chess has no "real" existence but in the
"heads" of the players. The physical board and pieces are implicitly
defined by functions (the rules of the game), and the players are not separate
from the game; they do not play a game, they live in it! (i.e., the game is
virtual.) There is, however, something that is bothering me. The main
theoretical problem of chess (as in life) is the one of selectivity of the contents
of thought (Saariluoma, 1995). I know that the
concept of selectivity faces huge problems within a strictly algorithmic,
mechanistic view of the human mind. Chess experts are highly selective as to
the base moves they begin their thinking from. It is a real problem of
"chicken-and-egg" because to be able to select they need some sort of
filter, i.e., function. But the models assert that the player would begin his
search from these (seemingly more promising) moves, but how in the world he
could know these moves were more promising, when this could be known only by
looking at possible outcomes? The argument raised by recognition-action models
is that the mere percept activates patterns or templates in LTM to which
previous evaluations and possible strategies or even continuations are attached
(associated). It doesn't explain too good, though, creativity in chess, for
instance.
If you're willing, I'd
be grateful to have your insights on these matters.
Sincerely Yours,
M.
-------------------------END
M.B. CORRESPONDENCE-----------------------------------------
-------------------------S.I
CORRESPONDENCE---------------------------------------------------
Here is some very
recent correspondence. I quote it to show the change in attitude -from
very enthusiastic to a snubbing "stonewall". He should be
ashamed of himself. If he really saw all these good things in my writings
-but then stonewalled me -I presume because he saw my lack of credentials, then
he is a coward. I might at least have received a letter of
explanation. This would be common courtesy.
(Incidentally, he
published a paper of his own in the Journal of Consciousness studies which had
rejected my submissions.)
This was the same case
for D.C. in 1995 -he told me he was told by his Ph.D. advisor that he would
have to drop any correspondence with me: aka “Internet Freak” I can only
assume that this correspondent stood in like case. Why is academia so
cowardly in its convictions? I think Kuhn had it right! Either you have a mind and use it for
yourself or you are a child playing with dynamite. The world needs real men, (persons –no sexist
intent).
////~2007Dear Dr.
Iglowitz, (He made the assumption of title -I do not have a Ph.D. and
never said I did.)
I am writing this e-mail
to you with joy, because your worldview (including the “reality” and the
solution to the mind-body problem) is quite similar to mine.
My name is S.I.,
Japanese. I am a research veterinarian (pathologist), also studying
philosophy at the graduate school of Letters, Hokkaido University, Sapporo,
Hokkaido, Japan. My major in philosophy is epistemology (including
philosophy of perception), based on cognitive biology.
Recently I had
been searching on the Google for articles that discussed both Maturana and Kant,
and I fortunately found out your book: “Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really
Explained.”
I have been studying
Maturana’s biology of cognition, and reached the same opinion with you:
“Maturana and Varela's profound heuristic principle reduces their premise to
absurdity -i.e. the metaphysical certitude of the ordinary Naturalist
world-view from which they started. (p.107, Chapter 3)
Although I read
only your homepage and the précis, abstract, and Chapter 3 of your book,
I think they can sufficiently convince me that your solutions to the
problems related to the external world and the mind-body relation are almost
the same with me. I felt, “Oh, here’s my friend!”
I have attached my
three papers written in English, which are all related to Maturana more or
less.
I hope you will be able
to find some similarities in our worldview.
With all the best
wishes,
S. I.
______________________________________________________________________________
Dear S…,
I have managed to print your PDF files and
have been reading them with interest. I
think your "handle" on Maturana is the correct one -we agree.
You might want to note a passage in the
"Mind-Brain: the Argument from
Evolutionary Biology" paper I referred you to on the issue of the
"world as causes for our perceptual processes":
Quote:
"3.2 THE SPECIFIC
CASE OF BIOLOGY
……….
But let’s talk about the
“atomic” in the “atomic biological function” of the previous statement. There
is another step in the argument to be taken at the level of biology. The
“engineering” argument, (made above), deals specifically with the schematic
manipulation of “data”. At the level of primitive evolution, however, it is
modular (reactive) process that is significant to an organism, not data
functions. A given genetic accident corresponds to the addition or modification
of a given (behavioral/reactive) process which, for a primitive organism, is
clearly and simply merely beneficial or not. The process itself is
informationally indeterminate to the organism however -i.e. it is a modular
whole. No one can presume that a particular, genetically determined response is
informationally, (rather than reactively), significant to a Paramecium or an
Escherichia coli, for example, (though we may consider it so). It is
significant, rather, solely as a modular unit which either increases
survivability or not. Let me therefore extend the prior argument to deal with
the schematic organization of atomic, (modular), process, rather than of
primitive, (i.e. absolute), data. It is my contention that the cognitive model,
and cognition itself, is solely constituted as an organization of that atomic
modular process, designed for computational and operational efficiency. The
atomic processes themselves remain, and will forever remain, informationally
indeterminate to the organism. "
Walter Freeman's and Edelmans's writings on the subject, (cited in the same
paper), are also particularly relevant.
There is another passage
in my book that might interest you -it occurs on P.73. I quote:
"A crucial turning
point in my argument:
This, I maintain, constitutes the final
physical answer to the mind-body problem.
Naturalists can accept this answer as complete, (and the problem as
solved), if they like and dismiss any further questions. But inherent in my thesis as well is the
assertion that our objects are not representative and informational. To believe that they could still remain so
becomes, (under my thesis), equivalent to a hypothesis of "divine
harmony", (possible but implausible).
This, (right here then), is a crucial turning point in my argument. I hereby reorient the whole of my argument up
to this point and declare it as a
reductio ad absurdum of ordinary Naturalism .
By this, I most definitely do not reject the relationality of Naturalism or of Naturalist science. But I do maintain that I have demonstrated
the implausibility of absolute reference and absolute information. The next chapters will elaborate this point
explicitly and invoke a variation of Cassirer's scientific epistemological
relativism, which preserves Naturalist science in a deeper realism. The argument up to this point has been in the
demonstration of a counterexample, -a significantly better counterexample I
think- which fits the presumptions of Naturalism and the facts of the problem
as seen from the Naturalist perspective.
The unity of
consciousness, the unity of mind is a logical, a conceptual and operational,
rather than a spatial unity. The paradoxes
of the Cartesian Theater do not derive from an innate flaw -or fantasy- in
"mind"; they derive from a deficiency of ordinary logic.
"
But my problem is much larger than just that
one aspect. Perhaps the most relevant of
my papers for you would deal with Ernst Cassirer whom I consider to be the true
heir of Immanuel Kant. His "Theory
of Symbolic Forms", (which I equate with ontic indeterminacy), allows a
scientific statement of the deeper problem which you have correctly recognized.
The problem with Cassirer's writing has to
do with his "oblique" style, (as opposed with Kant's which I have
always considered to be very direct and clear).
I have attempted to summarize Cassirer's "Theory of Symbolic
Forms", (and enlarge it), in Chapter 4 of my book. That chapter exists as a separate pdf file for download on my web page. I attempted a simplification and alternative
reinterpretation of Cassirer's ideas in the essay "Mind-Brain: an
Introduction for Beginners" which I think worked pretty well. This is at the end of that paper which treats
the subject from the standpoint of mathematical "ideals" which may be
a whole lot easier to understand for most people.
You might want to look at these papers
as I think they would add a significant dimension to your ideas. The problem we have set ourselves is huge.
About 4 years ago I suffered a whole series
of strokes. I am reasonably intact now,
but with a lessened capacity. I have
been able to do some original and interesting work recently -e.g. the papers I
have referred to you, but I would really like to make a second edition to my
book. We will see. Perhaps I could use some help.
All in all, I liked your
papers. You have a good mind.
Best wishes,
Jerry
_______________________________________________________________________________
Dear Jerry,
I am very glad
that you have read my papers and thank you for your kind and accurate comments
on them, which have encouraged me so much.
I am now preparing to
read Hilbert’s “implicit definition,” which I got to know from your work. I
think this would be revolutionarily important to our way of thinking and
writing, as you correctly indicated. I will write you again after reading
the articles you mentioned in the mail.
Are you in Honolulu now?
I hope you enjoy sunny days!
Keep in touch, please!
With all the best,
S.
-------------------------END
S.I.CORRESPONDENCE--------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------BEGIN
JCS CORRESPONDENCE------------------------------
(Note: I just located a printed version of my
initial submission correspondence with the Journal of Consciousness
Studies. It was turned down by Anthony
Freeman, (editor), after about 5 interchanges, but I think his early comments
are suggestive and actually represent my further experience with JCS in
subsequent submissions, (lost to Blaster Virus). No matter which particular “slice” of my
thesis I tried to present, (necessary because of the size limitations inherent
in such a journal), I was usually given a backhanded compliment on what seemed
obvious to the reviewers, but then was totally chastised for not answering the
other huge aspects of the problem. This
happened again and again –over the course of about 5 different article
submissions. It illustrated the problem,
(as Anthony Freeman initially saw clearly), of trying to compress a book into a
free-standing, limited journal article.
I will copy my scanner converted copies of that initial correspondence
immediately below. I think it is
relevant and instructive. It is causing
me to reorient my thinking and try it his way.
***Please note that I
have given specific answers to one of the better JCS critiques in Chapter 12 of
my 3rd edition: “Virtual Reality:
Consciousness Really Explained”.
THE ORIGINAL ANTHONY
FREEMAN, (JCS), CORRESPONDENCE –SCANNED FROM SAVED PRINTED EMAIL
FREEMAN 1
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukMon
Jul 22 16:35:46 1996 Date: Mon, 22 Jul 1996 12:55:12 +0100 From: Anthony
Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk> To: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothill.net>,
Jonathan shear
<jcs@richmond.infi.net> Subject: Re: A request
Dear Jerry Iglowitz,
I write in response to
your recent message.
In message
<Pine.BSD/.3.91.960720182907.18707C-100000@nsl.foothill.net>, Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothi11.net>
writes
>Dr. Shear informed
me that he had
>forwarded my MS to
you because you handle all the "non-'hard >problem' submissions"
for the Journal of Consciousness Studies.
> If you have had a chance to look at it, you
will have seen that my submission constitutes a precis
of exactly that: a tenative
>solution of the
mind-body problem.
>
The papers which Dr
Shear is handling are those which are specific responses to Dave Chalmers
keynote 'hard problem' paper. There are obviously many papers which are
concerned with mind-body problem but are not part of that symposium. Your
submission is one such, and has quite properly been forwarded to me.
>
>P.S. Did you receive the comments on my thesis by
Dr. Walter Freeman, (UC/Berkeley), which I sent to Dr. Shear?
Yes, thank you.
Now I turn to your
submission itself.
We have had a number of
people send us papers which are closely related to forthcoming books or other
much longer MSS, either in the form of an opening chapter, or an introduction,
or a summary. There is an obvious attraction to an author in having a book
"trailed" by means of such an article, but our experience has been
that these submissions simply do not "work" as papers for the Journal
of Consciousness Studies. Much time has been wasted by authors and editors
alike, trying to make a submission fit a format which is not appropriate. I
fear that your own example would become another of these.
As you yourself say, it *is*
a very complicated thesis. If we were to send the segment of chapter one and
the abstract which you have sent us out to referees, a host of questions would
be raised by them which you would only be able to answer by reference to other
parts of the book. This is not
satisfactory from anyone's point of view.
My advice would be to
get straight on and publish your book. If, however, you do wish to submit an
article to JCS, then it needs to be a free-standing, fully referenced paper in
its own right, quite separate from your larger publication.
Yours sincerely,
Anthony Freeman.
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Emai1:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 2
Dear Dr. Freeman,
I have read your
response and see your point. I am including below what I believe is a
free-standing article based on the fragment I sent you and deleting all
reference to my MS. I think it addresses a major element of the question of
mind and does not cite nor require my book in any way.
Would it work this way
as an article, do you think? Jerry Iglowitz
**********************A
NON-REPRESENTATIVE MODEL ***********************
Jerome Iglowitz
jerryi@foothi11.net
Humberto Maturana and
Francisco Varela's "The Tree of Knowledge", (1987), is a detailed and
compelling argument, based in the very foundations of physical science and
biology, against even the _possibility_ of a biological organism's possession
of a representative model of its environment.
(cf Freeman, 1995). These respected biologists argue, moreover, against
"information" itself. They
maintain that information _never passes_ between the environment and organisms;
there is only the "triggering" of structurally determinate organic
forms. I believe that theirs is the
inescapable conclusion of current science.
The present paper is not
intended to establish that conclusion, however.
It is not primarily argumentative, but constructive. It presents a specific and constructive
counterproposal for _another_ model, ("the schematic operative
model"), which, contrary to the case of the representative model, _does_
remain viable within the critical context of modern science. I believe that we as human organisms do, in
fact, embody a model. I believe it is
the stuff of mind!
THE SCHEMATIC MODEL,
(what is an "object"?):
1. _Representative_
models are not the only possible kinds of models. Nor is representation a
model's only conceivable use. Consider the models of our mundane training
seminars, for instance. "'Motivation' plus 'technique' yields
'sales'.", we might hear at a sales meeting. Or, "'Self-awareness of
the masses' informed by 'Marxist-dialectic' produces 'revolution'!", we
might hear from our local revolutionary. Visual aids, (models), are ever
present. The lecturer stands at a chalkboard and asks us to accept drawings of
triangles, squares, cookies, horseshoes... _as objects_ -with a calculus of
relations between them- as standins for concepts or
processes like "motivation", "the nuclear threat",
"sexuality", "productivity", and "evolution". In
these representations, the objects do not stand in place of _entities_ in
objective reality, however. (What _is_ “a productivity" or “a
sexuality", for instance?) The function of the objects, _as_objects_, in these "schematic models" is,
rather, specifically to illustrate, to enable,to_crystallize_and_simplify_
the_very_calculus_ _of_relation_proposed
_between_them_! (cf Cassirer, 1953).
The objects are an
expression of the calculus, not the converse. The objects of these models serve
to organize process, (analysis or response); they are _not_ representations of
actual objects or actual entities in reality. _These_ objects functionally bridge
reality in a way that physical objects do not. They are, in fact, metaphors.
The rationale for using them, (as any good "seminarian" would tell
you), is clarity, organization and efficiency.
2. Instrumentation and
control systems provide another example of the non-representational use of
models and "entities". Their
objects need not mirror objective reality either. A gauge, a readout display, a control device,
(the "objects" of such systems), need not mimic a single parameter
-or an actual physical entity. Indeed,
in the monitoring of a _complex_ or _critical_ process, it should not. Rather, the readout, for instance, should
represent an efficacious synthesis of _just_those_aspects_
of the process which are relevant to response, and be crystallized around those
relevant responses! A warning light or a
status indicator, for instance, need not refer to just one parameter. It may refer to electrical overload and/or
excessive pressure and/or... Or it may
refer to an optimal relationship, (perhaps a _complexly_ _functional_
relationship), between many parameters -to a relationship between temperature,
volume, mass, etc. in a chemical process, for instance.
The exactly parallel
case holds for its control devices. A
single control may orchestrate a multiplicity of (possibly disjoint) objective
responses. The accelerator pedal in a
modern automobile, as a simple example, may integrate fuel injection volumes,
spark timing, transmission gearing...
(Ideally instrumentation
and control would unify in the _same_ "object". We would manipulate "the object" of
the display itself and_it_ would be the control
device. Think about this in relation to
our ordinary "objects of perception" -in relation to the
sensory-motor coordination of the brain and the problem of naive realism!)
3. A "war
room", (a high-tech military command center resembling a computer game),
is a viable, though primitive, example of such a usage. It is specifically a schematic model,
expressly designed for maximized response.
The all-weather landing display in a jetliner supplies another example.
4. The
"object" in the graphic user interface, (GUI), of a computer is
perhaps the best example available. In
my simplistic manipulation of the schematic objects of a computer's GUI, I am,
in fact, effecting and coordinating quite diverse and disparate -and
unbelievably complex- operations at the physical level of the computer,
operations impossible, (in a practical sense), to accomplish directly. What that object represents and what its
manipulation does, at the physical level, can be exceedingly complex and
disjoint. The disparate voltages and
physical locations, (or operations), represented by a single
"object", and the (possibly different) ones effected by manipulating
it, correlate to "an object" only in this "schematic"
sense. _Its_efficacy_lies_in_the_simplicity_of_the_
_"calculus"_it_enables_!
5. Consider, finally, a
formal and abstract problem. Consider
the problem of designing instrumentation for the efficient control of _both_
especially complex _and_ especially dangerous processes. In the general case, what kind of information
would you want to pass along and how would you best represent it? How would you
design your display and control system?
It would be impossible,
obviously, to represent _all_ information about the objective physical reality
of a, (any), process or its physical components, (objects). Where would you stop? Is the color of the
building in which it is housed, the specific materials of which it is
fabricated, that it is effected with gears rather than levers, -or its location
in the galaxy-necessarily relevant information?
(Contrarily, even its designer/s middle name might be relevant if it
involved a computer program and you were considering the possibility of a
hacker's "back door"!) It
would be counterproductive even if you could as relevant data would be obscured
and the "calculus" would be too complex and inefficient for rapid and
effective response. Even the use of
realistic _abstractions_ could produce enormous difficulties in that you might
be interested in many differing, (and, typically, conflicting), significant
abstractions and/or their interrelations.
This would produce severe difficulties in generating an intuitive and efficient
"calculus" geared towards maximal response.
For such a complex and
dangerous process, the "entities" you create must, (1) necessarily,
of course, be viable in relation to both data and control -i.e. they must be
comprehensive in their function. But they
would also, (2) need to be constructed with a primary intent towards efficiency
of response, (rather than realism), as well -the process _is_, by stipulation,
dangerous! They would need to be fashioned to optimize the "calculus"
while still fulfilling their (perhaps consequently distributed!) operative
role.
Your
"entities" would need to be fabricated in such a way as to
intrinsically define a _simple_ operative calculus of relationality between
them -analogous to the situation in our training seminar. Maximal efficiency, (and safety), therefore,
would demand crystallization into schematic _virtual_ "entities"
which would resolve both
demands at a single stroke. Your objects
would then distribute function so as to concentrate and simplify control,
(operation)! These virtual entities would
be in no necessarily simple (or hierarchical -i.e. via abstraction) correlation
with the objects of physical reality.
But they _would_ allow rapid and effective control of a process which,
considered objectively, might not be simple at all. It is clearly the optimization of the process
of response that is crucial here, not literal representation. We do not _care_ that the operator knows what
function(s) he is actually fulfilling, only that he does it (them) well!
6. Biological survival
is exactly such a problem -it is both especially complex _and_ especially
dangerous. It is a moment by moment
confrontation with disaster. It is a
schematic model in just this sense that I propose that evolution constructed,
and I propose that it is the basis for both the "percept" and the
"mind". But it is just the
_converse_ of the argument made above that I propose for evolution. It is not the _distribution_ of function, but
rather the _centralization_ of disparate atomic biological function into
efficacious schematic -and virtual-objects that evolution effected while
compositing the complex metacellular organism.
(These are clearly just the complementary perspectives on the same
issue.)
But let's talk about the
"atomic" in the "atomic biological function" of the previous
statement. There is another step in the
argument, to be taken at the level of biology.
The "engineering" argument, as made above, deals specifically
with the schematic manipulation of "data". At the level of primitive evolution, however,
it is modular (reactive) process that is significant to an organism, not data
functions. A given genetic accident
corresponds to the addition or modification of a given (behavioral/reactive)
process which, for a primitive organism, is clearly simply either beneficial or
not. But that process is itself
informationally indeterminate to the organism -i.e. it is a modular whole. No one can presume that a particular,
genetically determined response is informationally, (rather than reactively),
significant to a Paramecium or an Eschericia coli,
for example, (though _we_ may consider it so).
It is significant, rather, solely as a modular unit which either
increases survivability or not. Let me
therefore extend the prior argument to deal with the schematic organization of
atomic, (modular), process, rather than of primitive, (i.e. absolute),
data. It is my contention that the
cognitive model, and cognition itself, is solely constituted as an organization
of that atomic modular process, designed for computational and operational
efficiency. The atomic processes themselves remain, and will forever remain,
informationally indeterminate to the organism.
The purpose of the model
was computational simplicity! The
calculational simplicity of the schematic object for dealing with a
multifarious environment constitutes a clear and powerful evolutionary
rationale. Such a model, (the
"objects" and their "calculus"), allows rapid and efficient
response to what cannot be assumed, a priori, to be a simplistic
environment. From the viewpoint of the
sixty trillion or so cells that constitute the human cooperative enterprise,
_that_ assumption, (environmental simplicity), is implausible in the extreme!
But theirs, (i.e. _that_
perspective), is the most natural perspective from which to consider the
problem. For five-sixths of evolutionary
history, (three billion years), it was the one-celled organism which ruled
alone. As Stephen Gould puts it,
metacellular organisms represent only occasional and instable spikes from the
stable "left wall", (the unicellulars), of evolutionary history.
"Progress does not
rule, (and is not even a primary thrust of) the evolutionary process. For reasons of chemistry and physics, life
arises next to the 'left wall' of its simplest conceivable and preservable
complexity. This style of life
(bacterial) has remained most common and most successful. A few creatures occasionally move to the
right... "
"Therefore, to
understand the events and generalities of life's pathway, we must go beyond
principles of evolutionary theory to a paleontological examination of the
contingent pattern of life's history on our planet. ...Such a view of life's
history is highly contrary both to conventional deterministic models of Western
science and to the deepest social traditions and psychological hopes of Western
culture for a history culminating in humans as life's highest expression and
intended planetary steward."(Gould, 1994)
RETRODICTION:
Do you not find it
strange that the fundamental laws of the sciences, (or of logic), are _so_few_? Or that our (purportedly) accidentally and
evolutionarily acquired logic works _so_well_ to
manipulate the objects of our environment? From the standpoint of contemporary
science, this is a subject of wonder -or at least it _should_ be. (cf contra:
Minsky, 1985) It is, in fact, a
miracle! From the standpoint of the
schematic model, however, it is a
trivial, (obvious), and
necessary consequence. _It_is_precisely_the_rationale_for_the_model_itself!
Evolution, in
constructing a metacellular organism such »as ours, was confronted with the
problem of coordinating the physical structure of its thousands of billions of
individual cells. It also faced the
problem of coordinating the response of this colossus, this "Aunt
Hillary", (Hofstadter's
"sentient” ant colony . Hofstadter,
1979). It had to coordinate
their functional interaction with their environment, raising an organizational
problem of profound proportions.
Evolution was forced to
deal with exactly the problem/outline above.
The brain, moreover, is universally accepted as/an evolutionary organ of
response. I propose that a schematic
entity, (and its corresponding schematic model), is by far the most credible
here -to efficiently orchestrate t coordination of the ten million sensory
neurons with/ the one million motor neurons, (Maturana and Varela, 1987 )/ A
realistic, (i.e. representational/informational), "entity" would
demand a concomitant "calculus" embodying the very complexity of the
objective reality in which the organism exists, and this, I argue, is
overwhelmingly implausible.
REFERENCES :
1. Cassirer, Ernst.
"The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms". (Translation by Ralph Manheim)
. Yale University Press. 1953
2. Freeman, Walter. "Societies of Brains". Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 1995
3. Gould, Stephen
Jay. "The evolution of Life on the
Earth".
4. Hofstadter,
Douglas. "Goedel,
Escher, Bach". Vintage, 1979
5. Maturana, Humberto
and Varela, Francisco. "The Tree of Knowledge". Shambala Press, 1987
6. Minsky, Marvin. "The Society of Mind". Touchstone, 1985
FREEMAN 3
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukTue
Jul 23 14:43:00 1996
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996
08:28:17 +0100
From: Anthony Freeman
<anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Re: Would this
work?
In message
<Pine.BSD/.3.91.960722175053.4363A-100000@nsl.foothill.net>,
Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net> writes
>Dear Dr. Freeman,
>
> I have read your
response and see your point. I am
including below what I believe is a free-standing article based on the
>fragment I sent you and deleting all reference to my MS. I think it addresses a major element of the
question of mind and does not cite nor require my book in any way.
> Would it work this way as an article, do you
think?
Dear Jerry,
So far as the form of
the paper is concerned, this is much more suitable, and I shall put it through
the normal review process. As for content, we shall have to see what the
referees have to say! I will convert the email version into a properly
word-processed document before sending it out.
Best wishes, Anthony.
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 4
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukSun
Aug 18 03:03:24 1996
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 1996
11:34:29 +0100
From: Anthony Freeman
<anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: A non-representational
model
Dear Jerry
I sent your paper out to
a reviewer I had reason to believe would be "friendly". Here is his
reply, just received:
“Report on *A
non-representational model - Jerry Iglowitz*
Although I am
sympathetic to Iglowitz's approach, I find the MS very confusing and somewhat
contradictory. The argument needs to be fleshed-out with connecting ideas
included. As it stands now, it seems to be a jumble of ideas with (maybe) a
central theme, but what that is exactly is unclear.
I would advise that you
reject the paper as is and tell Iglowitz that if he wishes to resubmit, he must
prepare a longer, more linear and better argued MS. I'd be happy to write a
longer and more substantive review of a complete article.”
In addition, I would ask
him the question: What does this have to do with consciousness?
On the strength of the
above (which chimes in with my own reaction to your initial submission) I
invite you to revise the paper and re-submit it. This does not guarantee
publication, but at least you know that you have one sympathetic reviewer lined
up who will take what you say seriously. The revised paper would also be sent
to an inhouse reader and one further external
referee.
Best wishes, Anthony.
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 5
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukThu
Aug 29 02:05:22 1996
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 1996
10:42:35 +0100
From: Anthony Freeman
<anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
Cc: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Re: A few
questions
Dear Jerry,
Thanks for your queries.
>
> 1.
What is a reasonable top limit for length for a submission? >As you have said, mine is a *very*
complicated hypothesis, and to >flesh out this single aspect would take some
space.
9,000 words (including
notes and references) is our normal limit, but occasionally we print something
which is longer than this. If much more space is needed, we sometimes suggest a
two-part article, but we obviously have to be persuaded that the argument
presented warrants this much space. (If you are including any "heavy"
maths, this should be put into an appendix. It will
still be included in the word-count, but its breaching the 9,000 word limit
will be less serious.) >
> 2.
Would it be possible for you to forward the "Extended
>Abstract" I sent you to this reviewer?
In it I dealt with his >specific
question: "What does
this have to
do with consciousness?"
I do not think this is
necessary. This reviewer had that particular question asked of his own
submission to JCS (which was subsequently published) and I think his comment
may have been slightly tongue-in-cheek, and aimed more at me than at you!
>I feel I am in a
"catch-22" situation: I
couldn't refer to my MS, >(by fiat -yours! :-) ), and then am faulted for
not doing so. >Would this reviewer be interested in looking at the draft of
my >book which answers the question in full?
It would be a simple >matter to MIME-EMail
it to him. If he chose to retain his
>anonymity, I could send it to you and you could forward it. I >realize that articles must be
self-standing, and I intended this >one to be free-standing only *as an aspect*
of the problem of >consciousness.
It has always been clear
to me that your brief article (submitted in its present form by my
"fiat") will need to be fleshed out for publication. What I needed to
know from this referee was "whether there was "likely to be anything
worthwhile at the end of the process. The answer to that question that I hear
is "yes — time spent on the paper will not be wasted".
I do not, however, think
it would be a good idea to send him your draft book. Much better to send him a
MS in the form you intend for publication in JCS, so that it can be judged on
its own merits.
>
> 3.
Would you be willing to submit my article to another reviewer -hopefully
one with a mathematical background? Those >seem to be the ones who
understand it best.
>
We should certainly send
the expanded MS to a second referee, and I shall be happy to make it one of our
mathematical reviewers. But remember that the majority of your readers in JCS
will not have a maths background.
>Thank you for your
response and kind efforts.
>
>Jerry
>
And thank *you* for
seeing my role as one which is intended to be helpful and supportive — even if
it does not always feel like that. Remember that my job depends upon
maintaining a flow of good articles for the journal, so I am as keen as you are
to see your paper published. And it is in all our interests to see that it is
as good as possible.
Best wishes, Anthony.
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 6
September 1, 1996 Dear
Anthony,
First let me thank you
for your kind and encouraging letter of August 29th. I am in the middle of some
very nasty personal, (economic), circumstances here and it made my day
brighter.
I am attaching a copy of
the first revision of my proposed article as a MIME EMail
attachment. It is an IBM WordPerfect 4.1 binary file and should be readable on
any later version of WordPerfect or Microsoft Word. (This is the latest version
they produced for my old Amiga.) This will hopefully save you the trouble of
reformatting it.
As you will see, I have
added an introduction to place it in the context of the problem of "consciousness",
and have appended a brief statistical argument for its plausibility. I don't
really like statistical arguments very much, (as I have noted), but think it is
alright so far as it goes, and it fits the space restrictions. (I had relegated
this to an appendix in my MS.) I would appreciate your's
and your referee's comments on it.
So where do we go from
here? Will you and I "duel it out", ( :-) ), until we arrive at a
version that you think suitable for resubmission to the referee, or will this version
be passed on as is, (assuming you think it is not *too* terrible)?
I have been having some
trouble rectifying his objections to the original article though, as I really,
(literally), don't understand them. They are *very* general and don't give specific
instances. This is almost exactly the same text I sent to Walter Freeman and
which he characterized as "compelling". Apparently *he* thought it
was cogent. Perhaps it is a question of context? I am not arguing with you or
your referee, however -if it is not clear then it is *my* fault and I will
strive mightily to fix it. I just need the feedback to do so.
Would you please convey
to the referee that I have made a "good faith" effort towards his
objections in this draft but that I need more detailed and specific feedback,
(objections and citations)-which I truly desire -to do more. I see this as a
progressive process of refinement.
Incidentally, I have
purposely over-"!"'d, and used CAPS and underlines in this version
that I realize must be removed in the final version. I have left them in for
now to (hopefully) clarify my line of argument for you and the referee. If you
cannot see the statuary you are liable to break off an arm in trying to polish
it! :-)
Please look over this
revision and, if you think it is suitable, please forward it to your referee.
Thanks again:-and let me
know what you think.
Jerry
FREEMAN 7
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukWed
Jan 8 17:14:54 1997
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 1997
16:24:26 +0000
From: Anthony Freeman
<anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Referee's
Report on your paper
Dear Jerry,
K
Here at last is my math
reviewer's report on your paper. As you will see, we are back with the problems
(which I raised right at the outset) of trying to adapt an introductory chapter
to be free-standing paper.
Referee's report on
Iglowitz, "Mind as a
non-representational model"
[My convention: double
inverted commas are either actual quotations or "scare quotes" ;
single inverted commas are used to form the name of a word.]
I enjoyed reading what I
took to be the introduction to this paper, until I found myself reading the
Conclusions and realised that this was all there was.
I cannot recommend publication, for reasons indicated below.
Sections I and II are a defence of the philosophical position that mind cannot be
regarded as a representation of external reality (whatever supporters of this
position might mean by the last two words ) , and drawing out the consequence
that , once this idea is abandoned, then the problem of intentionality - how it
comes about that a certain mental representation "means" a
corresponding external object - disappears, as does the homunculus and other
related problems. The idea that the mind is not representation is not original
(as the author, who makes clear his debt to Cassirer, would no doubt be happy
to admit). In view of its long pedigree, the author makes very heavy weather of
the idea: in referring to "terrible consequences" he expects his
readers to be shocked by the novelty of an idea that has in essence been around
since Kant.
Section III is a
"statistical" (actually,
combinatorial) argument
which is intended to
reinforce what has already been(convincingly-albeit ponderously, argued in
sections I and II. For me it tended to detract from the argument. I found it
difficult to follow, because the author was demolishing the representational
position without having explicitly enunciated, in detailed quantitative terms,
just what the representational position was. What the author is in fact
demolishing is the hypothesis that "Evolution would have had the problem
of progressively correlating a model with each, (or some significant portion),
of the possibilities of the sensory array - and with potential response as
well." As with any "Aunt Sally" type of argument, it is
necessary to be very precise about what it is that one is demolishing in order
to do the job well; and this then enables the opponent to reply that this was not
in fact what his position was. In the case in point here, the proponent of
representations might reply that, in order to achieve a representation that was
accurate most of the time, evolution would not have to check out "some
significant portion" of the sensory inputs, but it could instead adopt a
Monte Carlo approach and optimise performance with
respect to a large randomly chosen number of such inputs. The success of the
Monte Carlo approach to simulation lies in the fact that the probability of
failure depends not on the size of the space that is being sampled from, but on
the size of the sample. Good success could be achieved with a sample size well
below the l0A102 allowed by the author's maximal evolutionary model,
At this point, after two
unsurprising sections and one unconvincing section, the paper essentially
stops. No dent has yet been made, however, on the problems of consciousness as
they are likely to be perceived by the readers of JCS (including myself). The
adoption of a non-representational position shifts the locus of these problems.
Given that I have a world consisting of perceptual and conceptual objects (i.e.
operational constructs) which I denote by terms such as 'trees', 'despair',
'redness', 'brains' etc, is it possible to envisage how last mentioned of these
constructs could itself embody a world analogous to that of my own? If the
answer is, no that can't be done because it would involve a fundamental
confusion of categories, then we encounter severe difficulties of the
"other minds" type of philosophical problem. If, however, it is
admitted that what I call a 'brain' might itself form operational constructs
and this might thereby explain what I am myself doing all the time, then are we
not back in almost exactly the same place as we started? Namely, we have to
explain how it is that a pattern of neuronal firing can have the attributes
that I designate by the word 'tree'. The only gain is that we no longer have
the additional problem of hooking it onto a postulated external "real"
tree, and this gain may in fact be a loss for those who hold that the real tree
may play a role in establishing the qualia of our percepts. I make these
remarks not to criticise the author's position, but
to sketch out the field into which some inroad must be made if the paper is to
become* publishable, and not read like an introduction to something else.
==========;===
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Emai1: anthony@ imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 7
From
jerryi@foothi11.netThu Jan 9 17:10:42
1997
Date: Thu, 9 Jan 1997
17:10:03 +0000 (GMT)
From: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothi11.net>
To: "Revd. Anthony Freeman" <anthony@imprint.co.uk>
January 9, 1997 Dear
Anthony,
I have just received
your letter and the response from your Mathematical Reviewer. I am disappointed, of course.
I am in somewhat of a quandry. If this
were a published review of my published article, I do not think that I would
have much trouble in answering it as I do not consider it a very perceptive
reading. But this is *your* reviewer,
so I must ask how it is you wish me to respond.
I certainly do not wish to be ungracious or to put you "in the
middle".
I shall, therefore,
await your desires, (do you wish me to comment at this time?), and those of the
original referee before I reply and only wish you a Happy New Year -which I
most sincerely do.
Best wishes,
Jerry.
P.S. When do you expect the original referee will
respond?
FREEMAN 8
From anthony@imprint.
zynet. co. ukSat Jan 11
00:43:09 1997
Date: Fri , 10 Jan 1997
16:10:40 +0000
From: Anthony Freeman
<anthony@imprint . zynet
.co.uk>
To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill .net>
Subject: JCS Submission
In messag
<Pine. BSD/. 3. 91. 970109010802. 5387A-100000@nsl . foothill .net> ,
Jerry Iglowitz < jerryi@f oothill
.net> writes
> I am in somewhat of
a quandry. If this were a published review >of my
published article, I do not think that I would have much >trouble in
answering it as I do not consider it a very perceptive >reading. But this is
*your* reviewer, so I must ask how it is you wish >me to respond. I
certainly do not wish to be ungracious or to put you >"in the
middle".
He is my reviewer but it
is your paper. By all means answer his challenges (bearing in mind also what is
said below) and send me a further revision, if you wish. ~~~
>P.S. >
When do you expect the
original referee will respond?
He replied so long ago
that I had forgotten that I had not passed on his(brief) comments, viz:
"I actually like
Iglowitz' ideas, but not his style and method of presentation. He thinks the
reader knows (or should know) what he is talking about and so leaves a whole
lot unsaid. In consequence much of his argument is left undone, with apparent
non sequitors etc. If he will re-write it with proper deference to his readers,
I will gladly look at it again, but in its present/form it is not
publishable."
Best wishes/ Anthony. /
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journa
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600 j
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
of Consciousness 5YX,
FREEMAN 9
» Let's see what the sympathetic
reviewer has to say.
»
» I am very interested
in his response.
>I have now heard
from the reviewer. The relevant part of his
>response is as
follows:
>
>"... this is
not a matter of tenor, but continuity. There are
>fragments of very
original thinking there, but not the connective
>tissue which allows
me to evaluate it. I don't understand
what
>he is driving at in
the way that I need to evaluate a paper."
>
>I am afraid that I
really must draw a line at this point, and say
>that we cannot accept
the paper for JCS.
>
>Best wishes,
>
>Anthony.
Dear Anthony,
I am, of course,
disappointed but I would like to express my appreciation to you for your
efforts in my behalf. I will not try to argue either with you or your
"sympathetic reviewer". Your decisions are your decisions.
Since this may be my
last words with you, however, let me try to give, as objectively and calmly as
possible, my opinions in the matter.
I think the real problem
is that this is a very new and different idea and just doesn't fit into the old
molds. Is that megalomania? Perhaps, and perhaps not. I have twice asked for a
single illustration -a specific case- where I have not served the needs of my
readers, assumed that they know what I am talking about or seemed to commit a
non sequitor. What I have been answered is
generalities only. His final response is another exact instance of this. I feel
he is doing to me exactly what he says I am doing to my reader.
If, indeed, he thinks
with Walter Freeman and others that I have something original and valuable to
say, then a proper response would have been a question, or a specific, pointed
objection to at least one physical place in my paper that would have allowed an
answer or illustrated a deficiency or discontinuity.
I can sympathize with his
difficulty, but not with his unwillingness to expose it to view. This is an
analytic conception, analytically argued -very much in the spirit of Kant. I
had hoped to expand it in a dialogue within your pages. That there are many
questions to be answered, I fully realize. But they must be asked first.
Let me close this letter
with a very different response to my ideas. It is from Dr. Blaise Lara, a
respected mathematician at the University of Lausanne, much involved in
information theory and the mind-brain problem:
"Dear Mr Iglowitz
You are not under
misapprehension. I am VERY sympathetic with your scientific and philosophical
viewpoints. And after reading this morning your last message I feel sincerely
concerned by your personal situation. Unfortunately I am also under heavy
constraints of another kind (my wife's health) and that explains my lasting
silence.
As a matter of fact, I
was preparing an answer containing detailed comments on the border of almost
every two pages of your manuscript.
Please believe Mr Iglowitz on my deep sympathy
with your ideas. I even suspect a kind of spiritual brotherhood among us. This
spontaneous manifestation does not sound like a very academic statement or
manifestation. But the hell with the academy in front of the personal and
intimate adventure of the few real men we have the fortune of meeting from time
to time.
My sincere regards
Blaise Lara"
With my warmest thanks,
Jerry
FREEMAN 9
Frqm anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukTue
Jan 28 18:29:04 1997
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997
09:26:34 +0000
From: Anthony Freeman
<anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry Iglowitz
<jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Draw a line
Dear Jerry,
In message
<Pine.BSD/.3.91.970113214109.16484C-100000@nsl.foothill.net>, Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
writes
> Let's see what the
sympathetic reviewer has to say.
>
> I am very
interested in his response.
I have now heard from
the reviewer. The relevant part of his response is as follows:
"... this is not a
matter of tenor, but continuity. There are fragments of very original thinking
there, but not the connective tissue which allows me to evaluate it. I don't
understand what he is driving at in the way that I need to evaluate a
paper."
I am afraid that I
really must draw a line at this point, and say that we cannot accept the paper
for JCS.
Best wishes, Anthony.
Anthony Freeman (UK
Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness
Studies)
Imprint Academic, PO Box
1, Thorverton,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Emai1:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
_________________________
End JCS Correspondence ______________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
A PROPOSED RESPONSE TO
ONE (FOUND) JCS REVIEW BELOW:
(NOTE: I INCORPORATED MUCH OF THIS MATERIAL IN
CHAPTER 12 OF MY NEW BOOK: “Virtual
Reality: Consciousness…”, (Third Edition)).
The following is
a set of excerpts from an anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Consciousness
Studies in response to one of my submissions. I was frankly unable to
properly respond in the time frame as I am not merely citing or enlarging
someone else’s theories, but must frame original ideas to meet specific
questions and this is harder than you think. His critique would clearly
apply to anyone else with views similar to mine. I will simply quote his
comments verbatim and interleave short answers to his objections.
“No dent has yet been
made, however, on the problems of consciousness as they are likely to be
perceived by the readers of JCS (including myself). The adoption of a
non-representational position shifts the locus of these problems. Given
that I have a world consisting of perceptual and conceptual objects (i.e.
operational constructs) which I denote by terms such as 'trees', 'despair',
'redness', 'brains' etc, is it possible to envisage how [the] last mentioned of
these constructs", [the brain], "could itself embody a world
analogous to that of my own?”
(Short form
answer: It is in fact quite possible through the Edelman/Freeman/Merleau-Ponty
feedback loop described in the “Mind: the Argument…” paper. The key
concept is “reafferance”. See the appendix to that paper. A
pictorial version of this answer is contained in that paper, and exists on my
web site as “A Compound Perspective: Freeman and Beyond”. Reafferance
allows preexisting cortical objects to be reused, (as “a-d converters” so to
speak, and reaffirmed), by subsequent feedback leading to more sophisticated
response and comparison with theoretical predictions. It does not, however,
imply anything further about the absolute world –i.e. ontology. But how
can we describe it thusly? The thesis of symbolic forms will provide the
answer. (See my Chapter 4.)
“If the answer is, no
that can't be done,” he answers himself, “because it would involve a
fundamental confusion of categories”,
(Short form answer -this
is a "straw man" argument: I do not in fact answer “no”, but rather
“yes” it can be done if we accept Ernst Cassirer’s, (Neo-Kantian), thesis of
“Symbolic Forms” which is a scientific thesis of absolute epistemological
relativism. This goes quite beyond Kant’s original conceptions
which I presume this critic assumed I held. Cassirer’s thesis preserves
science as organization only while necessarily relegating the ontological
object itself to become “a mere X” –i.e. an existent, but unknowable quantity.)
“ then we encounter
severe difficulties of the "other minds" type of philosophical
problem.”
( Short form
answer: This is a totally separate subject which I have addressed and
will again address later. Remember: I answered “yes”, not “no”. We
both posit “other minds”: he as deductively logical necessities, myself as
necessary components of realist belief, -i.e. of the necessary intentional
“axioms” of realism itself which I have expounded).
“If, however, it is
admitted”, he continues his dialogue with himself, “that what I call a
'brain' might itself form operational constructs and this might thereby explain
what I am myself doing all the time, then are we not back in almost exactly the
same place as we started?
(Short form
answer: This is again an instance of ‘reafferance’. In the Appendix
to the “Mind: the Argument…”, I argued that in the brain “reafferance” feeds
back through the same loop and the same evolutionary cortical constructs to
yield a working tool –i.e. it is a purely pragmatic tool for the
non-hierarchical distribution of input.)
“Namely, we have to
explain how it is that a pattern of neuronal firing can have the attributes
that I designate by the word 'tree'. The only gain is that we no longer have
the additional problem of hooking it onto a postulated external
"real" tree, and this gain may in fact be a loss for those who hold
that the real tree may play a role in establishing the qualia of our
percepts. “
(Short form
answer: The “real tree”, under my thesis would correspond, I think, to
something like one of Eleanor Rosch’s “prototypes”. Those prototypes, I
believe, are evolutionarily defined (and pragmatic) cortical constructs. The
problem, which still remains, is how we are able to use such ontological
language at all, (e.g. “cortical constructs”). Cassirer’s theory of
“Symbolic Forms” provides a plausible and, for the first time, a truly
scientific rationale. A legitimate counterquestion
would ask if the allowance of an actual mind -e.g. a viable Cartesian theatre
might be worth the price I asked of him? Our ordinary world gets strange,
I admit, but our mental world begins to be approachable. But our ordinary
world has already gotten quite strange if you are, (he were), to believe the
physicists!
“I make these remarks
not to criticize the author's position, but to sketch out the field into which
some inroad must be made if the paper is to become publishable, and not read
like an introduction to something else.”
I have quoted this
intelligent and apparently damning critique to present the profound difficulty
of the answer. I think I can plausibly answer each and every point raised
however. That plausibility, moreover, is much compounded by the
plausibility of my prior answers to the specific problems of the mind and of
the brain. These are more plausible answers –even from the perspective of
Naturalism- , I think, than any previously suggested.
-----------------------------------------------END
FAQS--------------------------------------------
If you have further
questions, please feel free to ask them. I will respond to any serious
question. Please remember to set a
subject line reflecting that you are responding to my web page.
Best Regards,
Jerry Iglowitz
jiglowitz@rcsis.com
2 Everywhere, where Cassirer uses
"idealism", it must be understood as "critical idealism" in
the sense that Kant used it. This is
very different from ordinary idealism, and, as I discussed in Chapter 3, is a
real misnomer. I have suggested
"ontic indeterminism" as a more modern alternative, and one I think
both Kant and Cassirer would have been happy with. Also compare the "mere X", (below),
with my discussion in Chapter 3.
5 But even within Cassirer's primary "natural forms" -in
physics, for instance, I argue -beyond Cassirer- that the exact parallel
obtains. There are arguably alternative
Hertzian formulations of the problem.
Alternative objects and alternative calculi are possible. Fine suggests that Relativity and Quantum
Mechanics may represent such alternatives, and certainly Schroedinger's and
Heisenberg's conceptions of quantum theory illustrate the plausibility.