FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:
The following are
a small sample of questions, asked and answered. I actually lost most of
my saved Netscape, ©, correspondence to the “Blaster Virus”, so I have very
limited resources for this task. I hope the following might be of help to
you, and I would welcome any decently phrased questions and do my best to
answer them. Please remember to set the subject line of your
correspondence to refer to my web page, (e.g. “RE WEBPAGE” so as not to have
your letter deleted, unread, as spam. I will protect the identities of my
correspondents unless they request otherwise.
(Note: I just located a printed version of my
initial submission correspondence with the Journal of Consciousness
Studies. It was turned down by Anthony
Freeman, (editor), after about 5 interchanges, but I think his early comments
are suggestive and actually represent my further experience with JCS in
subsequent submissions, (lost to Blaster Virus). No matter which particular “slice” of my
thesis I tried to present, (necessary because of the size limitations inherent
in such a journal), I was usually given a backhanded compliment on what seemed
obvious to the reviewers, but then was totally chastised for not answering the
other huge aspects of the problem. This
happened again and again –over the course of about 5 different article
submissions. It illustrated the problem,
(as Anthony Freeman initially saw clearly), of trying to compress a book into a
free-standing, limited journal article.
I will copy my scanner converted copies of that initial correspondence
immediately below. I think it is
relevant and instructive. It is causing
me to reorient my thinking and try it his way.
***Please note that I have given specific
answers to the JCS critiques in Chapter 11 of my 2nd edition: “Exotic Mathematics…” . Admittedly they
are hard answers, but whatever made
you think that the solution to this ancient and unrelenting problem would be
easy?***
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
MOST OF THE
ORIGINAL ANTHONY FREEMAN, (JCS), CORRESPONDENCE –SCANNED FROM SAVED PRINTED
EMAIL
NOTE: THERE IS
MUCH MORE CORRESPONDENCE –THIS ONE RELATES ONLY TO THE FIRST SUBMISSION. –LOST TO BLASTER VIRUS –WILL TRY TO RECOVER!!
From jshear@cabell.vcu.eduThu Jul 4
Date:
From:
Jonathan Shear <jshear@cabell.vcu.edu>
To: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Re: An
inquiry
Dear Jerry
Iglowitz,
I have passed
your interesting manuscript on to Anthony Freeman --Managing Editor, who for
now is handling all non-"hard problem" submissions.
Sincerely,
Jonathan Shear
Managing Editor, JCS
PS. For future emailings
to me, the following address will be by far the most efficient: jcs@richmond.infi.net
FROM FREEMAN BELOW:
FREEMAN 1
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukMon Jul 22
Jonathan shear
<jcs@richmond.infi.net> Subject: Re: A request
Dear Jerry
Iglowitz,
I write in
response to your recent message.
In message
<Pine.BSD/.3.91.960720182907.18707C-100000@nsl.foothill.net>, Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothi11.net>
writes
>Dr. Shear
informed me that he had
>forwarded
my MS to you because you handle all the "non-'hard >problem'
submissions" for the Journal of Consciousness Studies.
>
> If you have had a chance to look at it, you
will have seen that
>my
submission constitutes a precis of exactly that: a tenative
>solution of
the mind-body problem.
>
The papers
which Dr Shear is handling are those which are specific responses to Dave
Chalmers keynote 'hard problem' paper. There are obviously many papers which
are concerned with mind-body problem but are not part of that symposium. Your
submission is one such,
and has quite
properly been forwarded to me.
>
>
>P.S. Did you receive the comments on my thesis by
Dr. Walter
>Freeman,
(UC/Berkeley), which I sent to Dr. Shear?
Yes, thank you.
Now I turn to
your submission itself.
We have had a
number of people send us papers which are closely related to forthcoming books
or other much longer MSS, either in the form of an opening chapter, or an
introduction, or a summary. There is an obvious attraction to an author in
having a book "trailed" by means of such an article, but our experience has been that
these submissions simply do not "work" as papers for the Journal of
Consciousness Studies. Much time has been wasted by authors and editors alike,
trying to make a submission fit a format which is not appropriate. I fear that
your own example would become another of these.
As you yourself say, it *is* a very complicated thesis. If
we were to send the segment of chapter one and the abstract which you have sent
us out to referees, a host of questions would be raised by them which you would
only be able to answer by reference to other parts of the book. This is not satisfactory from anyone's point
of view.
My advice would be to get straight on and publish your
book. If, however, you do wish to submit an article to JCS, then it needs to be
a free-standing, fully referenced paper in its own right, quite separate from
your larger publication.
Yours sincerely,
Anthony Freeman.
Anthony Freeman (
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Emai1: anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 2
Dear Dr.
Freeman,
I have read your
response and see your point. I am including below what I believe is a
free-standing article based on the fragment I sent you and deleting all
reference to my MS. I think it addresses a major element of the question of
mind and does not cite nor require my book in any way.
Would it work
this way as an article, do you think? Jerry Iglowitz
A
NON-REPRESENTATIVE MODEL **************************
Jerome Iglowitz
jerryi@foothi11.net
Humberto
Maturana and Francisco Varela's "The Tree of Knowledge", (1987), is a
detailed and compelling argument, based in the very foundations of physical
science and biology, against even the _possibility_ of a biological organism's
possession of a representative model of its environment. (cf Freeman, 1995). These respected biologists
argue, moreover, against "information" itself. They maintain that information _never_passes_ between the environment and organisms; there
is only the "triggering" of structurally determinate organic
forms. I believe that theirs is the
inescapable conclusion of current science.
The present
paper is not intended to establish that conclusion, however. It is not primarily argumentative, but
constructive. It presents a specific and
constructive counterproposal for _another_ model, ("the schematic operative
model"), which, contrary to the case of the representative model, _does_
remain viable within the critical context of modern science. I believe that we as human organisms do, in
fact, embody a model. I believe it is
the stuff of mind!
THE SCHEMATIC
MODEL, (what is an "object"?):
1.
_Representative_ models are not the only possible kinds of models. Nor is
representation a model's only conceivable use. Consider the models of our
mundane training seminars, for instance. "'Motivation' plus 'technique' yields
'sales'.", we might hear at a sales meeting. Or, "'Self-awareness of
the masses' informed by 'Marxist-dialectic' produces 'revolution'!", we
might hear from our local revolutionary. Visual aids, (models), are ever
present. The lecturer stands at a chalkboard and asks us to accept drawings of
triangles, squares, cookies, horseshoes... _as__objects_
-with a calculus of relations between them- as standins
for concepts or processes like "motivation", "the nuclear
threat", "sexuality", "productivity", and "evolution".
In these representations, the objects do not stand in place of _entities_ in
objective reality, however. (What _is_ “a productivity" or “a
sexuality", for instance?) The function of the objects, _as_objects_, in these "schematic models" is, rather,
specifically to illustrate, to enable,to_crystallize_and_simplify_
the_very_calculus_ _of_relation_proposed
_between_them_! (cf Cassirer, 1953).
The objects are
an expression of the calculus, not the converse. The objects of these models
serve to organize process, (analysis or response); they are _not_
representations of actual objects or actual entities in reality. _These_
objects functionally bridge reality in a way that physical objects do not. They
are, in fact, metaphors. The rationale for using them, (as any good
"seminarian" would tell you), is clarity, organization and
efficiency.
2.
Instrumentation and control systems provide another example of the
non-representational use of models and "entities". Their objects need not mirror objective reality
either. A gauge, a readout display, a
control device, (the "objects" of such systems), need not mimic a
single parameter -or an actual physical entity.
Indeed, in the monitoring of a _complex_ or _critical_ process, it
should not. Rather, the readout, for
instance, should represent an efficacious synthesis of _just_those_aspects_
of the process which are relevant to response, and be crystallized around those
relevant responses! A warning light or a
status indicator, for instance, need not refer to just one parameter. It may refer to electrical overload and/or
excessive pressure and/or... Or it may
refer to an optimal relationship, (perhaps a _complexly_ _functional_ relationship),
between many parameters -to a relationship between temperature, volume, mass,
etc. in a chemical process, for instance.
The exactly
parallel case holds for its control devices.
A single control may orchestrate a multiplicity of (possibly disjoint)
objective responses. The accelerator
pedal in a modern automobile, as a simple example, may integrate fuel injection
volumes, spark timing, transmission gearing...
(Ideally
instrumentation and control would unify in the _same_ "object". We would manipulate "the object" of
the display itself and_it_ would be the control
device. Think about this in relation to
our ordinary "objects of perception" -in relation to the
sensory-motor coordination of the brain and the problem of naive realism!)
3. A "war
room", (a high-tech military command center resembling a computer game),
is a viable, though primitive, example of such a usage. It is specifically a schematic model,
expressly designed for maximized response.
The all-weather landing display in a jetliner supplies another example.
4. The
"object" in the graphic user interface, (GUI), of a computer is
perhaps the best example available. In
my simplistic manipulation of the schematic objects of a computer's GUI, I am,
in fact, effecting and coordinating quite diverse and disparate -and unbelievably
complex- operations at the physical level of the computer, operations
impossible, (in a practical sense), to accomplish directly. What that object represents and what its
manipulation does, at the physical level, can be exceedingly complex and
disjoint. The disparate voltages and
physical locations, (or operations), represented by a single
"object", and the (possibly different) ones effected by manipulating
it, correlate to "an object" only in this "schematic"
sense. _Its_efficacy_lies_in_the_simplicity_of_the_
_"calculus"_it_enables_!
5. Consider,
finally, a formal and abstract problem.
Consider the problem of designing instrumentation for the efficient
control of _both_ especially complex _and_ especially dangerous processes. In the general case, what kind of information
would you want to pass along and how would you best represent it? How would you
design your display and control system?
It would be
impossible, obviously, to represent _all_ information about the objective
physical reality of a, (any), process or its physical components, (objects). Where would you stop? Is the color of the
building in which it is housed, the specific materials of which it is
fabricated, that it is effected with gears rather than levers, -or its location
in the galaxy-necessarily relevant information?
(Contrarily, even its designer/s middle name might be relevant if it
involved a computer program and you were considering the possibility of a
hacker's "back door"!) It
would be counterproductive even if you could as relevant data would be obscured
and the "calculus" would be too complex and inefficient for rapid and
effective response. Even the use of
realistic _abstractions_ could produce enormous difficulties in that you might
be interested in many differing, (and, typically, conflicting), significant
abstractions and/or their interrelations.
This would produce severe difficulties in generating an intuitive and
efficient "calculus" geared towards maximal response.
For such a
complex and dangerous process, the "entities" you create must, (1)
necessarily, of course, be viable in relation to both data and control -i.e.
they must be comprehensive in their function.
But they would also, (2) need to be constructed with a primary intent
towards efficiency of response, (rather than realism), as well -the process _is_,
by stipulation, dangerous! They would need to be fashioned to optimize the
"calculus" while still fulfilling their (perhaps consequently
distributed!) operative role.
Your
"entities" would need to be fabricated in such a way as to
intrinsically define a _simple_ operative calculus of relationality between
them -analogous to the situation in our training seminar. Maximal efficiency, (and safety), therefore,
would demand crystallization into schematic _virtual_ "entities"
which would resolve
both demands at a single stroke. Your
objects would then distribute function so as to concentrate and simplify
control, (operation)! These virtual
entities would be in no necessarily simple (or hierarchical -i.e. via
abstraction) correlation with the objects of physical reality. But they _would_ allow rapid and effective
control of a process which, considered objectively, might not be simple at
all. It is clearly the optimization of
the process of response that is crucial here, not literal representation. We do not _care_ that the operator knows what
function(s) he is actually fulfilling, only that he does it (them) well!
6. Biological
survival is exactly such a problem -it is both especially complex _and_
especially dangerous. It is a moment by
moment confrontation with disaster. It
is a schematic model in just this sense that I propose that evolution
constructed, and I propose that it is the basis for both the
"percept" and the "mind".
But it is just the _converse_ of the argument made above that I propose
for evolution. It is not the
_distribution_ of function, but rather the _centralization_ of disparate atomic
biological function into efficacious schematic -and virtual-objects that
evolution effected while compositing the complex metacellular organism. (These are clearly just the complementary
perspectives on the same issue.)
But let's talk
about the "atomic" in the "atomic biological function" of
the previous statement. There is another
step in the argument, to be taken at the level of biology. The "engineering" argument, as made
above, deals specifically with the schematic manipulation of
"data". At the level of
primitive evolution, however, it is modular (reactive) process that is
significant to an organism, not data functions.
A given genetic accident corresponds to the addition or modification of
a given (behavioral/reactive) process which, for a primitive organism, is
clearly simply either beneficial or not.
But that process is itself informationally indeterminate to the organism
-i.e. it is a modular whole. No one can
presume that a particular, genetically determined response is informationally,
(rather than reactively), significant to a Paramecium or an Eschericia coli,
for example, (though _we_ may consider it so).
It is significant, rather, solely as a modular unit which either
increases survivability or not. Let me
therefore extend the prior argument to deal with the schematic organization of
atomic, (modular), process, rather than of primitive, (i.e. absolute),
data. It is my contention that the
cognitive model, and cognition itself, is solely constituted as an organization
of that atomic modular process, designed for computational and operational
efficiency. The atomic processes themselves remain, and will forever remain,
informationally indeterminate to the organism.
The purpose of
the model was computational simplicity!
The calculational simplicity of the schematic object for dealing with a
multifarious environment constitutes a clear and powerful evolutionary
rationale. Such a model, (the
"objects" and their "calculus"), allows rapid and efficient
response to what cannot be assumed, a priori, to be a simplistic
environment. From the viewpoint of the
sixty trillion or so cells that constitute the human cooperative enterprise,
_that_ assumption, (environmental simplicity), is implausible in the extreme!
But theirs,
(i.e. _that_ perspective), is the most natural perspective from which to
consider the problem. For five-sixths of
evolutionary history, (three billion years), it was the one-celled organism
which ruled alone. As Stephen Gould puts
it, metacellular organisms represent only occasional and instable spikes from
the stable "left wall", (the unicellulars), of evolutionary history.
"Progress
does not rule, (and is not even a primary thrust of) the evolutionary
process. For reasons of chemistry and
physics, life arises next to the 'left wall' of its simplest conceivable and
preservable complexity. This style of
life (bacterial) has remained most common and most successful. A few creatures occasionally move to the
right... "
"Therefore,
to understand the events and generalities of life's pathway, we must go beyond
principles of evolutionary theory to a paleontological examination of the
contingent pattern of life's history on our planet. ...Such a view of life's
history is highly contrary both to conventional deterministic models of Western
science and to the deepest social traditions and psychological hopes of Western
culture for a history culminating in humans as life's highest expression and
intended planetary steward."(Gould, 1994)
RETRODICTION:
Do you not find
it strange that the fundamental laws of the sciences, (or of logic), are _so_few_? Or that our (purportedly) accidentally and
evolutionarily acquired logic works _so_well_ to
manipulate the objects of our environment? From the standpoint of contemporary
science, this is a subject of wonder -or at least it _should_ be. (cf contra:
Minsky, 1985) It is, in fact, a
miracle! From the standpoint of the
schematic model, however, it is a
trivial, (obvious), and
necessary consequence. _It_is_precisely_the_rationale_for_the_model_itself!
Evolution, in
constructing a metacellular organism such »as ours, was confronted with the problem
of coordinating the physical structure of its thousands of billions of
individual cells. It also faced the
problem of coordinating the response of this colossus, this "Aunt
Hillary", (Hofstadter's
"sentient” ant colony . Hofstadter,
1979). It had to coordinate
their functional interaction with their environment, raising an organizational
problem of profound proportions.
Evolution was
forced to deal with exactly the problem/outline above. The brain, moreover, is universally accepted
as/an evolutionary organ of response. I
propose that a schematic entity, (and its corresponding schematic model), is by
far the most credible here -to efficiently orchestrate t coordination of the
ten million sensory neurons with/ the one million motor neurons, (Maturana and
Varela, 1987 )/ A realistic, (i.e. representational/informational),
"entity" would demand a concomitant "calculus" embodying
the very complexity of the objective reality in which the organism exists, and
this, I argue, is overwhelmingly implausible.
REFERENCES
:
1. Cassirer,
Ernst. "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms". (Translation by Ralph
Manheim) .
2. Freeman,
Walter. "Societies of Brains".
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 1995
3. Gould,
Stephen Jay. "The evolution of Life
on the Earth".
4. Hofstadter,
5. Maturana,
Humberto and Varela, Francisco. "The Tree of Knowledge". Shambala Press, 1987
6. Minsky,
Marvin. "The Society of
Mind". Touchstone, 1985
FREEMAN 3
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukTue Jul 23
Date:
From:
Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Re:
Would this work?
In message
<Pine.BSD/.3.91.960722175053.4363A-100000@nsl.foothill.net>,
Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
writes
>Dear
Dr. Freeman,
>
> I have
read your response and see your point. I
am including
>below what
I believe is a free-standing article based on the
>fragment I
sent you and deleting all reference to my MS.
I think
>it
addresses a major element of the question of mind and does not
>cite nor
require my book in any way.
>
> Would it work this way as an article, do you
think?
>
Dear Jerry,
So far as the form
of the paper is concerned, this is much more suitable, and I shall put it
through the normal review process. As for content, we shall have to see what
the referees have to say! I will convert the email version into a properly
word-processed document before sending it out.
Best wishes,
Anthony.
Anthony Freeman
(
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 4
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukSun Aug 18
Date:
From:
Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: A non-representational
model
Dear Jerry
I sent your
paper out to a reviewer I had reason to believe would be "friendly".
Here is his reply, just received:
Report on *A
non-representational model - Jerry Iglowitz*
Although I am sympathetic
to Iglowitz's approach, I find the MS very confusing and somewhat
contradictory. The argument needs to be fleshed-out with connecting ideas
included. As it stands now, it seems to be a jumble of ideas with (maybe) a
central theme, but what that is exactly is unclear.
I would advise
that you reject the paper as is and tell Iglowitz that if he wishes to
resubmit, he must prepare a longer, more linear and better argued MS. I'd be
happy to write a longer and more substantive review of a complete article.
In addition, I
would ask him the question: What
does this have to do with consciousness?
On the strength
of the above (which chimes in with my own reaction to your initial submission)
I invite you to revise the paper and re-submit it. This does not guarantee
publication, but at least you know
that you have
one sympathetic reviewer lined up who will take what you say seriously. The
revised paper would also be sent to an inhouse reader
and one further external referee.
Best wishes,
Anthony.
Anthony Freeman
(
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 5
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukThu Aug 29
Date:
From:
Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
Cc: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Re: A
few questions
Dear Jerry,
Thanks for your
queries.
>
> 1.
What is a reasonable top limit for length for a submission? >As you have said, mine is a *very*
complicated hypothesis, and to >flesh out this single aspect would take some
space.
9,000 words
(including notes and references) is our normal limit, but occasionally we print
something which is longer than this. If much more space is needed, we sometimes
suggest a two-part article, but we obviously have to be persuaded that the
argument presented warrants this much space. (If you are including any "heavy"
maths, this should be put into an appendix. It will still be included in the
word-count, but its breaching the 9,000 word limit will be less serious.) >
> 2.
Would it be possible for you to forward the "Extended
>Abstract" I sent you to this reviewer?
In it I dealt with his >specific
question: "What
does this have
to do with consciousness?"
I do not think
this is necessary. This reviewer
had that particular question asked of his own submission to JCS (which was
subsequently published) and I think his comment may have been slightly
tongue-in-cheek, and aimed more at me than at you!
>I feel I am
in a "catch-22" situation: I
couldn't refer to my MS, >(by fiat -yours! :-) ), and then am faulted for
not doing so. >Would this reviewer be interested in looking at the draft of
my >book which answers the question in full?
It would be a simple >matter to MIME-EMail
it to him. If he chose to retain his
>anonymity, I could send it to you and you could forward it. I >realize that articles must be self-standing,
and I intended this >one to be free-standing only *as an aspect* of the
problem of >consciousness.
It has always
been clear to me that your brief article (submitted in its present form by my
"fiat") will need to be fleshed out for publication. What I needed to
know from this referee was "whether there was "likely to be anything
worthwhile at the end of the process. The answer to that question that I hear
is "yes — time spent on the paper will not be wasted".
I do not,
however, think it would be a good idea to send him your draft book. Much better
to send him a MS in the form you intend for publication in JCS, so that it can
be judged on its own merits.
>
> 3.
Would you be willing to submit my article to another >reviewer -hopefully
one with a mathematical background? Those >seem to be the ones who
understand it best.
>
We should
certainly send the expanded MS to a second referee, and I shall be happy to
make it one of our mathematical reviewers. But remember that the majority of
your readers in JCS will not have a
maths
background.
>Thank you
for your response and kind efforts.
>
>Jerry
>
And thank *you*
for seeing my role as one which is intended to be helpful and supportive — even
if it does not always feel like that. Remember that my job depends upon
maintaining a flow of good articles for the journal, so I am as keen as you are
to see your paper published. And it is in all our interests to see that it is
as good as possible.
Best wishes,
Anthony.
Anthony Freeman
(
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 6
First let me
thank you for your kind and encouraging letter of August 29th. I am in the
middle of some very nasty personal, (economic), circumstances here and it made
my day brighter.
I am attaching
a copy of the first revision of my proposed article as a MIME EMail attachment. It is an IBM WordPerfect 4.1 binary file
and should be readable on any later version of WordPerfect or Microsoft Word.
(This is the latest version they produced for my old Amiga.) This will
hopefully save you the trouble of reformatting it.
As you will
see, I have added an introduction to place it in the context of the problem of
"consciousness", and have appended a brief statistical argument for
its plausibility. I don't really like statistical arguments very much, (as I
have noted), but think it is alright so far as it goes, and it fits the space
restrictions. (I had relegated this to an appendix in my MS.) I would
appreciate your's and your referee's comments on it.
So where do we
go from here? Will you and I "duel it out", ( :-) ), until we arrive
at a version that you think suitable for resubmission to the referee, or will
this version be passed on as is, (assuming you think it is not *too* terrible)?
I have been
having some trouble rectifying his objections to the original article though,
as I really, (literally), don't understand them. They are *very* general and
don't give specific instances. This is almost exactly the same text I sent to
Walter Freeman and which he characterized as "compelling". Apparently
*he* thought it was cogent. Perhaps it is a question of context? I am not
arguing with you or your referee, however -if it is not clear then it is *my*
fault and I will strive mightily to fix it. I just need the feedback to do so.
Would you please
convey to the referee that I have made a "good faith" effort towards
his objections in this draft but that I need more detailed and specific
feedback, (objections and citations)-which I truly desire -to do more. I see
this as a progressive process of refinement.
Incidentally, I
have purposely over-"!"'d, and used CAPS and underlines in
this version that I realize must be removed in the final version. I have left
them in for now to (hopefully) clarify my line of argument for you and the
referee. If you cannot see the statuary you are liable to break off an arm in
trying to polish it! :-)
Please look over
this revision and, if you think it is suitable, please forward it to your
referee.
Thanks again:-and let me know what you think.
Jerry
FREEMAN 7
From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukWed Jan 8
Date:
From:
Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject:
Referee's Report on your paper
Dear Jerry,
K
Here at last is my math reviewer's report on your paper.
As you will see, we are back with the problems (which I raised right at the
outset) of trying to adapt an introductory chapter to be free-standing paper.
Referee's
report on Iglowitz, "Mind as a non-representational
model"
[My convention:
double inverted commas are either actual quotations or "scare quotes"
; single inverted commas are used to form the name of a word.]
I enjoyed
reading what I took to be the introduction to this paper, until I found myself
reading the Conclusions and realised that this was
all there was. I cannot recommend publication, for reasons indicated below.
Sections I and
II are a defence of the philosophical position that mind cannot be regarded as
a representation of external reality (whatever supporters of this position
might mean by the last two words ) , and drawing out the consequence that ,
once this idea is abandoned, then the problem of intentionality - how it comes
about that a certain mental representation "means" a corresponding
external object - disappears, as does the homunculus and other related
problems. The idea that the mind is not representation is not original (as the
author, who makes clear his debt to Cassirer, would no doubt be happy to
admit). In view of its long pedigree, the author makes very heavy weather of
the idea: in referring to "terrible consequences" he expects his
readers to be shocked by the novelty of an idea that has in essence been around
since Kant.
Section
III is a "statistical" (actually,
combinatorial) argument
which is intended
to reinforce what has already been(convincingly-albeit ponderously, argued in
sections I and II. For me it tended to detract from the argument. I found it
difficult to follow, because the author was demolishing the representational
position without having explicitly enunciated, in detailed quantitative terms,
just what the representational position was. What the author is in fact
demolishing is the hypothesis that "Evolution would have had the problem
of progressively correlating a model with each, (or some significant portion),
of the possibilities of the sensory array - and with potential response as
well." As with any "Aunt Sally" type of argument, it is
necessary to be very precise about what it is that one is demolishing in order
to do the job well; and this then enables the opponent to reply that this was
not in fact what his position was. In the case in point here, the proponent of
representations might reply that, in order to achieve a representation that was
accurate most of the time, evolution would not have to check out "some
significant portion" of the sensory inputs, but it could instead adopt a
Monte Carlo approach and optimise performance with
respect to a large randomly chosen number of such inputs. The success of the
At this point,
after two unsurprising sections and one unconvincing section, the paper
essentially stops. No dent has yet been made, however, on the problems of
consciousness as they are likely to be perceived by the readers of JCS
(including myself). The adoption of a non-representational position shifts the
locus of these problems. Given that I have a world consisting of perceptual and
conceptual objects (i.e. operational constructs) which I denote by terms such
as 'trees', 'despair', 'redness', 'brains' etc, is it possible to envisage how
last mentioned of these constructs could itself embody a world analogous to
that of my own? If the answer is, no that can't be done because it would
involve a fundamental confusion of categories, then we encounter severe
difficulties of the "other minds" type of philosophical problem. If,
however, it is admitted that what I call a 'brain' might itself form
operational constructs and this might thereby explain what I am myself doing
all the time, then are we not back in almost exactly the same place as we
started? Namely, we have to explain how it is that a pattern of neuronal firing
can have the attributes that I designate by the word 'tree'. The only gain is
that we no longer have the additional problem of hooking it onto a postulated
external "real" tree, and this gain may in fact be a loss for those
who hold that the real tree may play a role in establishing the qualia of our
percepts. I make these remarks not to criticise the author's position, but
to sketch out the field into which some inroad must be made if the paper
is to become* publishable, and not read like an introduction to something
else.
==========;===
Anthony Freeman
(
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Emai1: anthony@ imprint.co.uk
FREEMAN 7
From
jerryi@foothi11.netThu Jan
9
Date: Thu,
From:
Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothi11.net>
To: "Revd. Anthony Freeman" <anthony@imprint.co.uk>
I have just
received your letter and the response from your Mathematical Reviewer. I am disappointed, of course.
I am in
somewhat of a quandry. If this were a published review of my
published article, I do not think that I would have much trouble in answering
it as I do not consider it a very perceptive reading. But this is *your* reviewer, so I must ask how
it is you wish me to respond. I
certainly do not wish to be ungracious or to put you "in the middle".
I shall,
therefore, await your desires, (do you wish me to comment at this time?), and those
of the original referee before I reply and only wish you a Happy New Year
-which I most sincerely do.
Best wishes,
Jerry.
P.S. When do you expect the original referee will
respond?
FREEMAN 8
From anthony@imprint. zynet. co. ukSat
Date:
From:
Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint . zynet .co.uk>
To: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill .net>
Subject: JCS
Submission
In messag <Pine. BSD/. 3. 91. 970109010802.
5387A-100000@nsl . foothill .net> , Jerry Iglowitz < jerryi@f
oothill .net> writes
> I am in
somewhat of a quandry. If this were a published
review >of my published article, I do not think that I would have much
>trouble in answering it as I do not consider it a very perceptive
>reading. But this is *your* reviewer, so I must ask how it is you wish
>me to respond. I certainly do not wish to be ungracious or to put you
>"in the middle".
He is my
reviewer but it is your paper. By all means answer his challenges (bearing in
mind also what is said below) and send me a further revision, if you wish. ~~~
>P.S. >
When do you
expect the original referee will respond?
He replied so
long ago that I had forgotten that I had not passed on his(brief) comments,
viz:
"I actually like Iglowitz' ideas, but not his style
and method of presentation. He thinks the reader knows (or should know) what he
is talking about and so leaves a whole lot unsaid. In consequence much of his
argument is left undone, with apparent non sequitors etc. If he will re-write
it with proper deference to his readers, I will gladly look at it again, but in
its present/form it is not publishable."
Best wishes/
Anthony. /
Anthony Freeman
(
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600 j
Fax. +44
(0)1392 841478
Email:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
of Consciousness
5YX,
FREEMAN 9
» Let's see what the sympathetic reviewer
has to say.
»
» I am very
interested in his response.
>I have now heard from the reviewer. The relevant
part of his
>response is as follows:
>
>"... this is not a matter of tenor, but
continuity. There are
>fragments of very original thinking there, but not
the connective
>tissue which allows me to evaluate it. I don't understand what
>he is driving at in the way that I need to evaluate
a paper."
>
>I am afraid that I really must draw a line at this
point, and say
>that we cannot accept the paper for JCS.
>
>Best
wishes,
>
>Anthony.
Dear Anthony,
I am, of course, disappointed but I would
like to express my appreciation to you for your efforts in my behalf. I will
not try to argue either with you or your "sympathetic reviewer". Your
decisions are your decisions.
Since this may be my last words with you, however, let
me try to give, as objectively and calmly as possible, my opinions in the
matter.
I think the real problem is that this is a very new and
different idea and just doesn't fit into the old molds. Is that megalomania?
Perhaps, and perhaps not. I have twice asked for a single illustration -a
specific case- where I have not served the needs of my readers, assumed that
they know what I am talking about or seemed to commit a non sequitor.
What I have been answered is generalities only. His final response is another
exact instance of this. I feel he is doing to me exactly what he says I am
doing to my reader.
If, indeed, he thinks with Walter Freeman and others
that I have something original and valuable to say, then a proper response
would have been a question, or a specific, pointed objection to at least one
physical place in my paper that would have allowed an answer or illustrated a
deficiency or discontinuity.
I can sympathize with his difficulty, but not with his
unwillingness to expose it to view. This is an analytic conception,
analytically argued -very much in the spirit of Kant. I had hoped to expand it
in a dialogue within your pages. That there are many questions to be answered,
I fully realize. But they must be asked first.
Let me close
this letter with a very different response to my ideas. It is from Dr. Blaise Lara, a respected mathematician at the
"Dear Mr
Iglowitz
You are not
under misapprehension. I am VERY sympathetic with your scientific and
philosophical viewpoints. And after reading this morning your last message I
feel sincerely concerned by your personal situation. Unfortunately I am also
under heavy constraints of another kind (my wife's health) and that explains my
lasting silence.
As a matter of
fact, I was preparing an answer containing detailed comments on the border of
almost every two pages of your manuscript.
Please believe Mr Iglowitz on my deep sympathy with your ideas. I even
suspect a kind of spiritual brotherhood among us. This spontaneous manifestation
does not sound like a very academic statement or manifestation. But the hell
with the academy in front of the personal and intimate adventure of the few
real men we have the fortune of meeting from time to time.
My sincere
regards
Blaise Lara"
With my warmest
thanks, Jerry
FREEMAN 9
Frqm anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukTue Jan 28
Date:
From:
Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>
To: Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
Subject: Draw a
line
Dear Jerry,
In message
<Pine.BSD/.3.91.970113214109.16484C-100000@nsl.foothill.net>, Jerry
Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>
writes
> Let's see
what the sympathetic reviewer has to say.
>
> I am very
interested in his response.
I have now heard
from the reviewer. The relevant part of his response is as follows:
"... this
is not a matter of tenor, but continuity. There are fragments of very original
thinking there, but not the connective tissue which allows me to evaluate it. I
don't understand what he is driving at in the way that I need to evaluate a
paper."
I am afraid
that I really must draw a line at this point, and say that we cannot accept the
paper for JCS.
Best wishes,
Anthony.
Anthony Freeman
(
Studies)
Imprint
Academic,
Tel. +44 (0)1392 841600
Fax. +44 (0)1392 841478
Emai1:
anthony@imprint.co.uk
______________________________________________________________________________________
End JCS Correspondence
Here is an old
letter from a distinguished mathematician at the HEC in
"
Subj: deep regret
Dear Mr Iglowitz
You are not under
misapprehension. I am VERY sympathetic with your scientific and philosophical
viewpoints. And after reading this morning your last message I feel sincerely
concerned by your personal situation. Unfortunately I am also under heavy
constraints of another kind (my wife's health) and that explains my lasting
silence.
As a matter of fact, I was
preparing an answer containing detailed comments on the border of almost every
two pages of your manuscript. Please believe Mr Iglowitz on my deep sympathy
with your ideas. I even suspect a kind of spiritual brotherhood among us. This
spontaneous manifestation does not sound like a very academic statement or
manifestation. But the hell with the academy in front of the personal and
intimate adventure of the few real men we have the fortune of meeting from time
to time.
My sincere regards
Blaise Lara"
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I have corresponded with Dr. Walter Freeman ,
an original-thinking and highly respected neuroscientist and biologist of
international repute at U.C. Berkeley. (He held the Spinoza Chair at the
"Your arguments are indeed compelling and should persuade some of the proponents of representational AI of the feasibility of alternatively based models.... I think it is remarkable how our separate programs have converged to shared conclusions regarding nonrepresentational operations of brains....I wish you good fortune in getting a responsive audience. Your ideas certainly deserve that."
He was very helpful and allowed me to use his remarks for promoting my ideas. He was unwilling to pursue the very strong philosophical implications of the problem however, preferring to "return to his rabbits". His own ideas produce implications very similar to mine, though he has turned to "chaos theory" as a preferred medium. I don't agree with him there, but I can see the "attraction". :-)
He has been encouraging over the years, but
could not break me into publication. His most recent comments, (2005),
were: "I've received and enjoyed your up-dated manuscript,
including the new appendix on 'automorphism'... You continue to strike
pay dirt in searching for alternatives to representationalism."
"I wish you good fortune, Jerry "
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Answered Email Correspondence Below:
#1. Letters from a Ph.D. candidate:
G.C. wrote:
My name is
G.C. I have just started research on a PhD thesis in disembodiment in virtual
reality at ****** University in
I
read Dennett's Consciousness Explained and Mind Children and Searle's Mystery
of the Mind and then I came across your page and downloaded your book a few
days ago. I must admit I find your theories very interesting and
captivating yet I feel rather stupid reading the book as I have to go over and
over the same page X times with a dictionary before I start to grasp what you
intend, and as you have fairly noted, one does need to have a good intertextual
understanding of the writers you mentioned, which I admit, I do not have.
I
would nevertheless like to engage with your work but doubt I will have the
time, at present to go through all the reading mentioned as this is only a
small part of my thesis. Is there a way around this problem?
Where,
how and through whom do you suggest I approach the issue of consciousness in
relation to VR?
Thank you very much for your time,
G.C.
Dear G.,
I would be happy to open a discussion with you. My book
is, as you say, very difficult. This is not by intention, but, I think,
because of the very nature of the subject itself. The two online papers: "Mind: the Argument
from Evolutionary Biology" and "Consciousness: a
Simpler Approach" are recent refinements of my first 3 chapters, and
are, I think, considerably clearer. As I said in the "Apology",
however, I had intended, (and still do intend), to present my final,
summarizing theme as the third essay. Unfortunately, I had a series of
strokes about a year ago, and it has made writing difficult. Hopefully the
situation will get better. Also, I am looking at the problem of
presentation anew, and am reconsidering just how to break through the
prejudices of my readers.
I understand your time constraints. It is too bad
because the classical writers had important things to say on the problem.
Kant and, more importantly, Cassirer had brilliant ideas about it. I
believe the latter’s theory of "Symbolic Forms" is the keyway to the
problem. (His style however, in my opinion, is atrocious and difficult to
summarize. It is oblique in the extreme. Chapter 4 of my book is an
attempt to linearize his ideas.)
Have you read my "Introduction for
Beginners"? It is meant for everyone, and not "just
beginners", though I must title it so. The paper mentioned above
"Mind: the Argument from Evolutionary Biology" presents a rationale
for something like what I think you are describing -under the heading
"Mind: an Explicit Model". It shows how the brain could use an
"immersive model", (using your words), and it need not be
representative. Again, it is not easy, -not because it contains
"arcane" references, but because of the originality of the idea
itself.
I would be happy to entertain a dialogue. It is too
bad your field of interest is in English and Literary Theory, as the field of
cognitive science could use such open and receptive minds. This field
belongs to the young.
Best wishes,
Jerry
(J.I. RESPONSE TO
A SET OF QUESTIONS): Dear G.,
I will interleave my comments between your questions, and
then continue below them. I have found it helpful to carry on such a
dialogue by placing my comments in CAPS to distinguish them for clarity.
There is no ulterior implication in this -I might just as well have done so to your
comments instead. (Also it's easier typing that way. ;- )) )
G.C. wrote:
I
read the response to mind essay and found it very intriguing. I can’t say
I understood it in its entirety so I’m going to read the Consciousness: a
Simpler Approach and then return to it later on tonight. Here are a
couple of questions and comments:
1)
Is there a link or similarity between the term 'calculus' as used in the essay
and Dennett's concept of the Heterophenomenological world?
J.I. ANSWER: "CALCULUS"
IS USED IN ITS BASIC MATHEMATICAL SENSE, (I QUOTED THE WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY IN A FOOTNOTE: I.E. "A SYSTEM OF CALCULATION USING
SYMBOLS"), AND AS DISTINGUISHED FROM "THE CALCULUS" -I.E.
DIFFERENTIAL AND INTEGRAL CALCULUS. IT IS THE MOST BASIC CONCEPTION OF
SYMBOLIC CALCULATION AND DOES NOT ENTAIL SPECIFIC PRESUMPTIONS. DENNETT'S
"HETEROPHENOMENOLOGY" IS NOT RELATED TO IT DIRECTLY. HIS TERM
REFERS TO THE PURE PHENOMENOLOGY, (HAPPENINGS), OF EVENTS AS ABSTRACTED FROM
ANY SPECIFIC INTERPRETATION OR METAPHYSICAL BELIEFS. IT'S BEEN A WHILE
SINCE I'VE READ DENNETT, BUT, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, HIS
"FEENOMINISTS", (??), ARE SUPPOSED TO BELIEVE IN MENTAL PHENOMENA,
BUT HE ARGUES THAT THIS IS UNNECESSARY. I HAVE AN APPENDIX IN MY
BOOK DIRECTLY DEALING WITH DENNETT, ("DENNETT APPENDIX").
G.C.
2) In the following part "These objects, I propose, are manifestations of the
structure; the structure is not a resolution of the objects", what is the
term structure referring to, which structure?
J.I.: THE STRUCTURE I AM
REFERING TO IS THE ABSTRACT MATHEMATICAL ONE REFERRED TO ABOVE, (I.E. OF A
CALCULUS). IT IS LIKE A MATHEMATICAL AXIOMATIC STRUCTURE -ITS RULES AND
LAWS. ITS OBJECTS, I ULTIMATELY ARGUE, ARE IMPLICITLY DEFINED BY THOSE
RULES AND LAWS. THE "CONSCIOUSNESS: A SIMPLER APPROACH TO THE
MIND-BODY PROBLEM” PAPER DETAILS THIS IN ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE. THIS,
(IMPLICIT DEFINITION), WAS DAVID HILBERT'S BRILLIANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PROBLEM. (HILBERT IS ONE OF THE MOST RESPECTED MATHEMATICIANS OF
OUR TIME). AS I NOTED IN THE PREFACE TO THAT PAPER, THE SERIES OF
EXAMPLES IS NOT INTENDED TO BE LINEAR, BUT LOGARITHMIC - THE COMPLEXITY
"TAKES OFF", BUT THE SEQUENCE SHOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE.
G.C.:
3) I didn’t understand, no matter how many times over I read it, the
last part of the GUI - "But I assert that GUI’s and their “objects”, (icons), have
a deeper potentiality of “free formation”. They have the potential to link to any
selection across a substrate, i.e. they could “cross party lines”. They could
cross categories of “things in the world”, (Lakoff’s “objectivist categories”), {17} ), and acquire thereby the possibility of
organizing on a different and the most pressing issue: i.e. urgency / risk.
They need preserve neither parallelism nor hierarchy."
J.I.: I AM A LITTLE CONFUSED
HERE -THIS MUST HAVE COME FROM THE "MIND: THE ARGUMENT FROM EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY". O.K. THE GUI IS THE CASE OF SCHEMATISM WHICH I ARGUE
FOR MIND. TAKING MIND AS A REPRESENTATIVE MODEL, (AS MOST COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS
DO), THERE IS A NECESSARY PRESERVATION OF CATEGORIES AND A HIERARCHICAL
CONTAINMENT. IT IS WHAT ALLOWS YOU TO SEE CHEMISTRY AS A SUBSET OF
PHYSICS, FOR INSTANCE, AND BIOLOGY AS A SUBSET OF BOTH OF THEM.
("PARTY LINES", (SET THEORETIC CONTAINMENT), ARE FOR THEM NECESSARILY
PRESERVED THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PROCESS OF THE BRAIN. "CROSSING
PARTY LINES" IS AN (AMERICAN ?) EXPRESSION OF THE CASE WHERE ALL DEMOCRATS
OR REPUBLICANS, (INSERT YOUR LOCAL BODIES), DO NOT VOTE AS A BLOCK.
"CROSSING PARTY LINES" IS WHAT ALLOWS US TO CONCEIVE THE BRAIN AS
ORGANIZING ON A BASIS OF EFFICIENCY AS OPPOSED TO INFORMATION.)
I ARGUE AGAINST THE USUAL CONCEPTION. I ARGUE THAT THE BRAIN IS A PRODUCT
OF EVOLUTION, EVOLVING FROM THE "INSIDE OUT", (BASED IN THE OPTIMIZED,
SELF-ORGANIZING FUNCTIONALITY OF ORGANIC PROCESS), RATHER THAN FROM THE
"OUTSIDE IN", (I.E. "INFORMATION"). THIS IS BECAUSE
THE CRITERION FOR SURVIVAL OF AN ORGANISM IS BASED, (PURE DARWINISM, ALSO
MATURANA, ALSO EDELMAN, ALSO FREEMAN), -UPON SIMPLE ADEQUACY, NOT UPON
INFORMED RESPONSE. IT DOES NOT MATTER WHETHER YOU KILL THE FLY WHICH IS
TORMENTING YOU BY SMACKING IT WITH A FLYSWATTER, OR BY DEFECATING ON IT! J
WHATEVER WORKS! THE FINISHED BRAIN
IS THE END PRODUCT OF OPTIMALLY ORGANIZING SUCH SUCCESSFUL PROCESSES.
G.C.:
4) Could you be patient enough to apply your overall theory to the
following example situations so that I may have an example to relate to when
re-reading the essay :
If
there is no representation, how do I see the 'images' I see while I am reading
or hearing a story?
J.I.: THIS WAS THE BREAKTHROUGH I THINK I MADE IN THE "MIND:....EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY". (I WILL HAVE TO ENLARGE THIS THEME LATER TO PUT IT IN A MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONTEXT.) FROM THE STANDPOINT OF BIOLOGY, (AS OPPOSED TO OTHER "SYMBOLIC FORMS" - SEE CHAPTER 4 OF MY BOOK, AND HOPEFULLY THE SUBJECT OF MY THIRD -"APOLOGY" ESSAY), THESE 'IMAGES", (NO QUOTES REALLY NECESSARY), ARE SYMBOLS, (BIOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS), IN THE TOPOBIOLOGICAL MAPS OF THE CORTEX. IN THE SECTION "AN EXPLICIT MODEL", I ARGUE THAT THEY ARE THE IMMENSELY SOPHISTICATED ARTIFACTS OF CORTEX WHICH EXIST TO TIE RE-ENTRANT OUTPUT BACK INTO THE NON-LINEAR TRANSFORM, (INTO THE REST OF THE BRAIN), THAT FREEMAN DESCRIBES. MERLEAU-PONTY TALKS ABOUT SENSATIONS AS THE RESULT OF AN ORGANISM ACTING INTO THE WORLD WITH FEEDBACK. I SAY THAT THESE TOPOBIOLOGICAL OBJECTS ARE THE OPTIMIZERS, (LIKE THE GUI'S OF COMPUTERS), THAT ALLOW HUGELY MULTIPLE MAPPINGS OF INPUT BACK INTO THE REST OF THE BRAIN. BUT THEY ARE GROUNDED IN THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL OPTIMIZATION, (OF ADEQUATE FUNCTION), NOT IN INFORMATION. I.E. THEY ARE PURELY PRACTICAL ENTITIES. THE APPENDIX TO THIS PAPER TALKS ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT REUSE SUCH OBJECTS AND HOW WE INTERACT WITH THEM.
G.C.: How am I conscious of an abstract feeling such as the pleasure
derived from a piece of music?
J.I.: THIS IS HARDER.
PART OF THE PROBLEM IS THAT I VIEW MY WORK AS SCIENCE, NOT AS PHILOSOPHY.
AS SUCH, IT WILL RAISE MORE QUESTIONS THAN IT ANSWERS. I HAVE IDEAS ON
THIS SUBJECT, BUT I AM SOMEWHAT SHY ABOUT EXPOSING THEM. I FEEL I MUST
COMPLETE THE LEVEL I HAVE BEGUN BEFORE GOING FURTHER AND CONFUSING MY READERS
EVEN MORE. AS A HINT, I THINK THAT CASSIRER'S SYMBOLIC FORMS IS DEEPER
THAN EVEN HE SUSPECTED.
G.C.: How would the schematic theory be implemented in a situation of
fully sensorially immersive VR (similar to the fictional Gibsonesque Matrix or
the virtual world in The Matrix)?
J.I.: O.K. YOU WANT HELP
ON YOUR THESIS! :-) I'M WILLING
TO TRY. HOW WOULD YOU MAKE SUCH A THING? THERE ARE A COUPLE OF
WAYS, IT SEEMS TO ME - NONE OF THEM EASY.
1. YOU COULD SPEND A FEW BILLION YEARS OF EVOLUTION TO ALLOW A
MULTICELLULAR BIOLOGICAL ORGANISM TO SELF-ORGANIZE ITSELF FOR OPTIMAL
PERFORMANCE IN THE WORLD, (THIS IS NOT A CONTRADICTION - SEE MY CHAPTER
4). THIS DOES NOT MEAN INFORMED, "PERFECT" PERFORMANCE HOWEVER,
BUT ADEQUATE PERFORMANCE. AT SOME POINT, YOU WOULD ALLOW CORTEX TO EVOLVE
IN THE FEEDBACK
2. YOU COULD MAKE A COMPUTER PROGRAM THAT SIMULATES THE OPTIMIZING
FUNCTION OF SUCH A PROCESS. THE LOGIC OF THAT PROGRAM WOULD BE A SPECIFIC
PROBLEM HOWEVER, AS MOST CURRENT LOGIC IS SET-BASED AND HIERARCHICAL -AND THIS
WOULD CONSTRAIN THE LOGICAL POSSIBILITIES OF THE PROGRAM ITSELF. AGAIN I
MUST COME BACK TO CASSIRER -AND HIS OTHER BRILLIANT CONCEPTION: "THE
FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT OF MATHEMATICS". THIS WAS A START TOWARDS A
RADICALLY NEW CONCEPTION OF THE LOGICAL "CONCEPT" ITSELF, ONE THAT
ALLOWS NEW POSSIBILITIES IN MATHEMATICS AND LOGIC. SOME WRITERS ON THIS
SUBJECT LIKE TO DISCUSS THE "MASSIVELY PARALLEL" ASPECTS OF THE
"HUMAN COMPUTER", (THE BRAIN). I THINK THEY ARE WRONG. IT
IS NOT MASSIVELY "PARALLEL", BUT MASSIVELY DIFFUSIVE -IN FREEMAN'S
SENSE.
3. I HATE TO MENTION "CHAOS THEORY", BUT IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT
IT COULD PROVIDE THE LINK BETWEEN CORTICAL OBJECTS AND THE SUBSTRATE OF THE
BRAIN.
CHANGING SUBJECTS: IN "MATRIX", THE ACTUAL REALITY WAS
THAT THIS WAS A TOTALLY "TUBED-UP" ORGANISM LIVING IN A NURTURING
POD. HIS MENTAL REALITY, HOWEVER, WAS LIFE IN THE 20TH CENTURY, (??),
FULLY MOBILE AND FUNCTIONAL. AND YET HE WAS ABLE TO EFFECT CHANGES IN HIS
ACTUAL ENVIRONMENT. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE COMPUTER PROGRAM ITSELF,
THESE WERE PROFOUNDLY COMPLEX. HE IS THE "HERO" I MENTIONED IN
MY "MIND-BRAIN: AN INTRODUCTION FOR BEGINNERS".
G.C.:
Ok, now for the hardest part. Can I in my own words try to explain where
I’ve gotten to so far in my understanding of the essay? I’m probably
going to make a total fool out of myself, but you can't expect to learn to walk
without bruising your knees a bit on hard tarmac.
There
is as such, no ultimate objective reality we can ever perceive. This
is because we are part of that system of symbols we weave to function
efficiently in a very complicated environment, through a very complicated
vessel. We can never attain a point of view which allows us to see the
objective reality (if there is indeed such a thing)
J.I.: BECAUSE WE ARE JOINTLY, (?), REALISTS, WE DO ASSUME THERE IS SUCH A THING. THIS IS PART OF OUR REALIST POSTURE AND I HAVE TERMED IT THE "AXIOM OF EXTERNALITY". IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS A BELIEF, HOWEVER, AND NOT A FACT! I ARGUE THAT SCIENCE FORCES US TO THE REALIZATION THAT WE CAN NEVER KNOW THE "WHAT" OR THE "HOW" OF IT.
G.C. (continues): as separate from the tools we have of perceiving it.
More importantly, the environment we are in is too complicated for us to fully
take in all the data, so instead we enact a system of meaning through symbols
to operate our vessel and interpret [J.I.: SUBSTITUTE INTERACT WITH]
this environment. Perceiving and reacting are in fact not separate but
part of an ongoing loop of input/output processes that give us an optimized way
of surviving.
J.I.: THIS ISN'T BAD.
G.C.:
That is a sort of crude summary of what I have grasped so far (if indeed I
have). I hope I haven’t offended you by distorting your views in my
simplistic understanding.
Since
you mentioned that you wanted to find a way how to present ideas in a way to
get through to more reader's here is my own subjective experience of engaging
with the text :
The
material being covered is complex. The ideas need to, as you said, break
through some very deeply ingrained prejudices. Thus the language needs to
be as accessible and as plain as possible. I found myself going through
it with an
DEAR G., YOU ARE TRYING TO UNDERSTAND A RADICALLY NEW, VERY COMPLEX CONCEPTION WHICH HAS TAKEN ME ALMOST 50 YEARS TO EVOLVE -AND IN A VERY SHORT TIME. YOU ARE ACTUALLY DOING PRETTY WELL FOR THE TIME YOU HAVE SPENT. MY PROBLEM IS HOW TO COVER ALL THE BASES, (YANK-TALK FOR MEET EVERY CONCEIVABLE OBJECTION, AND STILL PRESENT THE OVERALL CONCEPTION. BECAUSE IT IS ONLY AS A WHOLE THAT IT MAKES SENSE.
G.C.: Maybe the concepts can be presented in a less summarized fashion, building
the points in more steps for idiots like me who needed to reassemble much of
the text in order to just understand the possible signifieds that the
signifiers were relating to, taking up much of the effort needed to engage with
the concept itself.
J.I.: THIS IS GOOD FEEDBACK -AND PART OF THE ONGOING DIALOGUE I CONSTANTLY HAVE WITH MYSELF. IT IS HARDER THAN YOU THINK, HOWEVER. ("TOO MANY NOTES" -PRINCE'S COMMENT TO MOZART IN “AMADEUS”.)
G.C.: It could be just me, but I could not grasp any of the diagrams at
all. I could not make heads or tails as to the labeling and the symbols
inside them or to where the arrows were pointing and why. Again this is
probably due to my not being a particularly bright receiver.
J.I.: NONSENSE. PICK A DIAGRAM AND I WILL TRY TO EXPLAIN IT.
G.C.: A small note as to the meaning of some central terms such as global
mapping, topology and so on might make it clearer for those that are unclear so
to their meaning within the context of the essay.
J.I.: THESE ARE MATHEMATICAL
TERMS. EDELMAN'S "GLOBAL MAPPING", (I THOUGHT I HAD CLARIFIED
THIS IN THE TEXT), REFERS TO A NON-TOPOLOGICAL MAPPING FROM THE CORTICES TO THE
BRAIN AS A WHOLE. WHAT IS THIS "TOPOLOGY"? IT IS THE
FIELD OF MATHEMATICS, (GEOMETRY), WHICH DEALS WITH THOSE MATHEMATICAL MAPPINGS
WHICH PRESERVE CONTIGUITY. THE STANDARD EXAMPLE IS THAT OF A RUBBER
SHEET. WE MAY STRETCH IT OR BEND IT, AND STILL PRESERVE THE SAME
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN POINTS WHICH ARE CLOSE TO ONE ANOTHER. THESE CASES
WOULD BE "TOPOLOGICALLY EQUIVALENT". WE ARE NOT ALLOWED,
HOWEVER, TO CUT IT OR PASTE IT TO CLOSELY RELATE DISTANT OR UNRELATED POINTS.
G.C.:
One last thing. I find it much easier to follow when practical
applications of complex theories are given as the argument is being developed
so that I can relate them to my, using Dennett's term, heterophenomenological
world.
Now
I don’t know if I should send this mail or not for fear of being
offensive.
I
hope you don’t think I’m criticizing your work in any way. Far from it.
I just wanted to contribute by offering some sort of feedback of an average
reader, (although you might have other audiences in mind).
Thanks
again for taking time to read my mails, and once again I apologize if you found
my comments offensive.
G.C.
NOT AT ALL.
BEST REGARDS,
JERRY
Dear G.,
Just a note to see how you are doing. I hope you found
my response helpful. There are things I could add, and I think I
misunderstood one of your questions, but I hope you are doing well.
Take care,
Jerry
G.C.
Hi, thanks for that. which question was it ?
your
response was VERY helpful. In a months time I have to present a paper at
the annual ******* conference so I had to put my thesis/consciousness stuff on
hold till I’m done with that.
The
paper I’ll be writing will propose a bridge between posthumanism and
hypertextuality, posing hypertextuality (and non linear ways of thinking) as a
possible mode of being for future generations who will be immersed in
hypertextual technology such as the net and other electronic media.
I
have not however given up on the consciousness issue and will resume my
engaging with your work once this hurdle is overcome.
Thanks
for your interest and help.
G.C.
#2. The following is a set of excerpts from an
anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Consciousness Studies in response to one
of my submissions. I was frankly unable to properly respond in the time
frame as I am not merely citing or enlarging someone else’s theories, but must
frame original ideas to meet specific questions and this is harder than you
think. His critique would clearly apply to anyone else with views similar
to mine. I will simply quote his comments verbatim and interleave short
answers to his objections.
“No dent has yet been made,
however, on the problems of consciousness as they are likely to be perceived by
the readers of JCS (including myself). The adoption of a
non-representational position shifts the locus of these problems. Given
that I have a world consisting of perceptual and conceptual objects (i.e.
operational constructs) which I denote by terms such as 'trees', 'despair',
'redness', 'brains' etc, is it possible to envisage how [the] last mentioned of
these constructs", [the brain], "could itself embody a world
analogous to that of my own?”
(Short form answer: It is in fact quite
possible through the Edelman/Freeman/Merleau-Ponty
feedback loop described in the “Mind: the Argument…” paper. The key
concept is “reafferance”. See the appendix to that paper. A
pictorial version of this answer is contained in that paper, and exists on my
web site as “A Compound Perspective: Freeman and Beyond”. Reafferance
allows preexisting cortical objects to be reused, (as “a-d converters”
so to speak, and reaffirmed), by subsequent feedback leading to more
sophisticated response and comparison with theoretical predictions. It does
not, however, imply anything further about the absolute world –i.e.
ontology. But how can we describe it thusly? The thesis of symbolic
forms will provide the answer. (See my Chapter 4.)
“If the answer is, no that
can't be done,” he answers himself, “because it would involve a fundamental
confusion of categories”,
(Short form answer -this is a "straw man"
argument: I do not in fact answer “no”, but rather “yes” it can be done if we
accept Ernst Cassirer’s, (Neo-Kantian), thesis of “Symbolic Forms” which is a
scientific thesis of absolute epistemological relativism. This goes quite beyond Kant’s original conceptions
which I presume this critic assumed I held. Cassirer’s thesis preserves
science as organization only while necessarily relegating the
ontological object itself to become “a mere X” –i.e. an existent, but
unknowable quantity.)
“ then we encounter severe
difficulties of the "other minds" type of philosophical problem.”
( Short form answer: This is a totally separate
subject which I have addressed and will again address later. Remember: I
answered “yes”, not “no”. We both posit “other minds”: he as deductively
logical necessities, myself as necessary components of realist belief, -i.e. of
the necessary intentional “axioms” of realism itself which I have expounded).
“If, however, it is
admitted”, he continues his dialogue with himself, “that what I call a
'brain' might itself form operational constructs and this might thereby explain
what I am myself doing all the time, then are we not back in almost exactly the
same place as we started?
(Short form answer: This is again an instance of
‘reafferance’. In the Appendix to the “Mind: the Argument…”, I argued
that in the brain “reafferance” feeds back through the same loop and the
same evolutionary cortical constructs to yield a working tool –i.e. it
is a purely pragmatic tool for the non-hierarchical distribution of input.)
“Namely, we have to explain
how it is that a pattern of neuronal firing can have the attributes that I
designate by the word 'tree'. The only gain is that we no longer have the
additional problem of hooking it onto a postulated external "real"
tree, and this gain may in fact be a loss for those who hold that the real tree
may play a role in establishing the qualia of our percepts. “
(Short form answer: The “real tree”, under my thesis
would correspond, I think, to something like one of Eleanor Rosch’s
“prototypes”. Those prototypes, I believe, are evolutionarily defined
(and pragmatic) cortical constructs. The problem, which still
remains, is how we are able to use such ontological language at all, (e.g.
“cortical constructs”). Cassirer’s theory of “Symbolic Forms” provides a
plausible and, for the first time, a truly scientific rationale. A
legitimate counterquestion would ask if the allowance
of an actual mind -e.g. a viable Cartesian theatre might be worth the price I
asked of him? Our ordinary world gets strange, I admit, but our mental
world begins to be approachable. But our ordinary world has already
gottent quite strange if you are, (he were), to
believe the physicists!
“I make these remarks not
to criticize the author's position, but to sketch out the field into which some
inroad must be made if the paper is to become publishable, and not read like an
introduction to something else.”
I have quoted this intelligent and apparently damning
critique to present the profound difficulty of the answer. I think I can
plausibly answer each and every point raised however. That plausibility,
moreover, is much compounded by the plausibility of my prior answers to the
specific problems of the mind and of the brain. These are more plausible
answers –even from the perspective of Naturalism- , I think, than any
previously suggested.
#3: Here is a letter, (the first of several I received from this
correspondent. The subsequent letters and responses were lost to the
virus. I am citing it to show the difficulty of meaningful recognition of
my ideas.
Dear Mr. Iglowitz,
At the outset, let me express my deep feelings of admiration for the devotion
and determination you've proved in the bearing and begetting of your huge piece
of work on a possible explanation of consciousness.
I'm a graduate student in Cognitive Psychology (and a software developer in
###NAME###), about to finish my own thesis on chess expertise. I ran across
your work accidentally a week ago, when performing one of my associative
searches on the web.
As you well know, it is
not, unfortunately, so simple to intake such a work which hasn't been admitted
for publication, nor to cite it in a formal academic work.
I do, however, find your ideas interesting - which may elevate your spirits but
not help in any practical way since I'm in no status whatsoever to help you
about it. Nor can I say anything about your ideas being right or wrong -
since I do think that your theory is in the same danger as Freud's theory - if
you create a closed system, than within the philosophy realm it's fine, but I
think that you could do more to make your work more widespreadly
known, namely to begin showing how it applies to well defined cognitive
domains. This would help people who are less focused on deep philosophical
ideas but who are more empirically oriented integrate your ideas into the
regular scientific paradigm. In short, you must put your ideas to the test! It
hasn't been on your side to be so self-assured about the importance of your
work; people are only human and the sociological makeup of academy, well, it's
not so "politically correct" to knock on the expert's door and tell
him: "Hey, you
don't know anything about it! But I do!".
There is, nevertheless, one thing that I've been trying to think seriously
about in the light of your work. Ever since I've started to research chess
skill I more than suspected something fundamental is missing in the mainstream
of cognitive science. Researchers talked about memory based, recognition-action
models on one hand (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1972, etc.), and search,
computational-evaluative models on the other (Holding, 1985; Holding &
Reynolds, 1982, etc.), but neither of them excluded the other completely. I
know you've not engaged in empirical research, so I won't bombard you with
findings from this field.
I've begun to try to conceptualise the game of chess
according to your framework. The problem I'm seeing is that I'm feeling that it
directs my thoughts in a way that I'm able to explain everything, which is the
same as not explaining anything. I'm not sure about >> this.
If I've got your thesis right, then the game of chess has no "real"
existence but in the "heads" of the players. The physical board and
pieces are implicitly defined by functions (the rules of the game), and the
players are not separate from the game; they do not play a game, they live in
it! (i.e., the game is virtual.) There is, however, something that is bothering
me. The main theoretical problem of chess (as in life) is the one of
selectivity of the contents of thought (Saariluoma,
1995). I know that the concept of selectivity faces huge problems within a
strictly algorithmic, mechanistic view of the human mind. Chess experts are
highly selective as to the base moves they begin their thinking from. It is a
real problem of "chicken-and-egg" because to be able to select they
need some sort of filter, i.e., function. But the models assert that the player
would begin his search from these (seemingly more promising) moves, but how in
the world he could know these moves were more promising, when this could be
known only by looking at possible outcomes? The argument raised by
recognition-action models is that the mere percept activates patterns or
templates in LTM to which previous evaluations and possible strategies or even
continuations are attached (associated). It doesn't explain too good, though,
creativity in chess, for instance.
If you're willing, I'd be grateful to have your insights on these matters.
Sincerely Yours,
M.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here is some very recent correspondence. I quote it to show the change in attitude -from very enthusiastic to a snubbing "stonewall". He should be ashamed of himself. If he really saw all these good things in my writings -but then stonewalled me -I presume because he saw my lack of credentials, then he is a coward. I might at least have received a letter of explanation. This would be common courtesy.
(Incidentally, he published a paper of his own in the Journal of Consciousness studies which had rejected my submissions.)
This was the same case for David Casacuberta -he told me he was told by his Ph.D. advisor that he would have to drop any correspondence with me: aka “Internet Freak” I can only assume that this correspondent stood in like case. Why is academia so cowardly in its convictions? I think Kuhn had it right! Either you have a mind and use it for yourself or you are a child playing with dynamite. The world needs real men, (persons –no sexist intent).
Dear Dr. Iglowitz, (He made the assumption of title -I do not have a Ph.D. and never said I did.)
I am writing this e-mail to you with joy, because your worldview (including the
“reality” and the solution to the mind-body problem) is quite similar to mine.
My name is S..I.., Japanese. I
am a research veterinarian (pathologist), also studying philosophy at the
graduate school of Letters, Hokkaido University, Sapporo,
Recently I had been
searching on the Google for articles that discussed both Maturana and Kant, and
I fortunately found out your book: “Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really
Explained.”
I have been studying
Maturana’s biology of cognition, and reached the same opinion with you: “Maturana and
Varela's profound heuristic principle reduces their premise to absurdity -i.e.
the metaphysical certitude of the ordinary Naturalist world-view from which
they started. (p.107, Chapter 3)
Although I read only
your homepage and the précis, abstract, and Chapter 3 of your book, I
think they can sufficiently convince me that your solutions to the problems
related to the external world and the mind-body relation are almost the same
with me. I felt, “Oh, here’s my friend!”
I have attached my
three papers written in English, which are all related to Maturana more or
less.
I hope you will be able to
find some similarities in our worldview.
With all the best
wishes,
S… I…
______________________________________________________________________________
Dear S…,
I have managed to print your pdf files and have been reading them with interest. I think your "handle" on Maturana
is the correct one -we agree.
You might want to note a passage in the
"Mind-Brain: the Argument from
Evolutionary Biology" paper I referred you to on the issue of the
"world as causes for our perceptual processes":
Quote:
"3.2 THE SPECIFIC CASE
OF BIOLOGY
……….
But let’s talk about the
“atomic” in the “atomic biological function” of the previous statement. There
is another step in the argument to be taken at the level of biology. The
“engineering” argument, (made above), deals specifically with the schematic
manipulation of “data”. At the level of primitive evolution, however, it is modular
(reactive) process that is significant to an organism, not data functions. A
given genetic accident corresponds to the addition or modification of a given
(behavioral/reactive) process which, for a primitive organism, is clearly and
simply merely beneficial or not. The process itself is informationally
indeterminate to the organism however -i.e. it is a modular whole. No one can
presume that a particular, genetically determined response is informationally,
(rather than reactively), significant to a Paramecium or an Escherichia coli,
for example, (though we may consider it so). It is significant, rather, solely
as a modular unit which either increases survivability or not. Let me therefore
extend the prior argument to deal with the schematic organization of atomic,
(modular), process, rather than of primitive, (i.e. absolute), data. It is my
contention that the cognitive model, and cognition itself, is solely
constituted as an organization of that atomic modular process, designed for
computational and operational efficiency. The atomic processes themselves
remain, and will forever remain, informationally indeterminate to the organism.
"
Walter Freeman's and Edelmans's writings on the subject, (cited in the same
paper), are also particularly relevant.
There is another passage in
my book that might interest you -it occurs on P.73. I quote:
"A crucial turning point
in my argument:
9. This, I maintain, constitutes the final
physical answer to the mind-body problem.
Naturalists can accept this answer as complete, (and the problem as
solved), if they like and dismiss any further questions. But inherent in my thesis as well is the
assertion that our objects are not representative and informational. To believe that they could
still remain so becomes, (under my thesis), equivalent to a hypothesis of
"divine harmony", (possible but implausible). This, (right here then), is a crucial turning
point in my argument. I hereby reorient
the whole of my argument up to this point and declare it as a reductio ad absurdum of ordinary
Naturalism . By this, I most definitely
do not reject the relationality of Naturalism or of Naturalist
science. But I do maintain that I have
demonstrated the implausibility of absolute reference and absolute
information. The next chapters will
elaborate this point explicitly and invoke a variation of Cassirer's scientific
epistemological relativism, which preserves Naturalist science in a deeper
realism. The argument up to this point
has been in the demonstration of a counterexample, -a significantly better
counterexample I think- which fits the presumptions of Naturalism and the facts
of the problem as seen from the Naturalist perspective.
The unity of consciousness,
the unity of mind is a logical, a conceptual and operational, rather than a
spatial unity. The paradoxes of the
Cartesian Theater do not derive from an innate flaw -or fantasy- in
"mind"; they derive from a deficiency of ordinary logic.
"
But my problem is much larger than just that
one aspect. Perhaps the most relevant of
my papers for you would deal with Ernst Cassirer whom I consider to be the true
heir of Immanuel Kant. His "Theory
of Symbolic Forms", (which I equate with ontic indeterminacy), allows a
scientific statement of the deeper problem which you have correctly recognized.
The problem with Cassirer's writing has to
do with his "oblique" style, (as opposed with Kant's which I have
always considered to be very direct and clear).
I have attempted to summarize Cassirer's "Theory of Symbolic
Forms", (and enlarge it), in Chapter 4 of my book. That chapter exists as a separate pdf file for download on my web page. I attempted a simplification and alternative
reinterpretation of Cassirer's ideas in the essay "Mind-Brain: an
Introduction for Beginners" which I think worked pretty well. This is at the end of that paper which treats
the subject from the standpoint of mathematical "ideals" which may be
a whole lot easier to understand for most people.
You might want to look at these papers
as I think they would add a significant dimension to your ideas. The problem we have set ourselves is huge.
About 4 years ago I suffered a whole series
of strokes. I am reasonably intact now,
but with a lessened capacity. I have
been able to do some original and interesting work recently -e.g. the papers I
have referred to you, but I would really like to make a second edition to my
book. We will see. Perhaps I could use some help.
All
in all, I liked your papers. You have a
good mind.
Best wishes,
Jerry
_______________________________________________________________________________
Dear Jerry,
I am very
glad that you have read my papers, and thank you for your kind and accurate
comments on them, which have encouraged me so much.
I am now preparing to read Hilbert’s “implicit
definition,” which I got to know from your work. I think this would be
revolutionarily important to our way of thinking and writing, as you correctly
indicated. I will write you again after reading the articles you
mentioned in the mail.
Are you in Honolulu now? I hope you enjoy
sunny days!
Keep in touch, please!
With all the best,
S…
These are four of the correspondences I
still possess. There are others, from both the Freemans
and other professionals, (not negative -see "About the Author" on my
homepage).
If you have further questions, please feel
free to ask them. Please remember to set a subject line reflecting that
you are responding to my web page.
Best Regards,
Jerry Iglowitz
jiglowitz@rcsis.com