FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS:

 

The following are a small sample of questions, asked and answered.  I actually lost most of my saved Netscape, ©, correspondence to the “Blaster Virus”, so I have very limited resources for this task.  I hope the following might be of help to you, and I would welcome any decently phrased questions and do my best to answer them.  Please remember to set the subject line of your correspondence to refer to my web page, (e.g. “RE WEBPAGE” so as not to have your letter deleted, unread, as spam.  I will protect the identities of my correspondents unless they request otherwise.  (Note:  I just located a printed version of my initial submission correspondence with the Journal of Consciousness Studies.  It was turned down by Anthony Freeman, (editor), after about 5 interchanges, but I think his early comments are suggestive and actually represent my further experience with JCS in subsequent submissions, (lost to Blaster Virus).  No matter which particular “slice” of my thesis I tried to present, (necessary because of the size limitations inherent in such a journal), I was usually given a backhanded compliment on what seemed obvious to the reviewers, but then was totally chastised for not answering the other huge aspects of the problem.  This happened again and again –over the course of about 5 different article submissions.  It illustrated the problem, (as Anthony Freeman initially saw clearly), of trying to compress a book into a free-standing, limited journal article.  I will copy my scanner converted copies of that initial correspondence immediately below.  I think it is relevant and instructive.  It is causing me to reorient my thinking and try it his way.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________

MOST OF THE ORIGINAL ANTHONY FREEMAN, (JCS), CORRESPONDENCE –SCANNED FROM SAVED PRINTED EMAIL

 

NOTE:  THERE IS MUCH MORE CORRESPONDENCE –THIS ONE RELATES ONLY TO THE FIRST SUBMISSION.  –LOST TO BLASTER VIRUS –WILL TRY TO RECOVER!!

 

From jshear@cabell.vcu.eduThu Jul  4 16:52:47 1996

Date: Wed, 3 Jul 96 16:41:48 EOT

From: Jonathan Shear <jshear@cabell.vcu.edu>

To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>

Subject: Re: An inquiry

Dear Jerry Iglowitz,

I have passed your interesting manuscript on to Anthony Freeman --Managing Editor, who for now is handling all non-"hard problem" submissions.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Shear Managing Editor, JCS

PS.  For future emailings to me, the following address will be by far the most efficient: jcs@richmond.infi.net

 

FROM FREEMAN BELOW:

 

FREEMAN 1

 

From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukMon Jul 22 16:35:46 1996 Date: Mon, 22 Jul 1996 12:55:12 +0100 From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk> To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>,

Jonathan shear <jcs@richmond.infi.net> Subject: Re: A request

Dear Jerry Iglowitz,

I write in response to your recent message.

In message <Pine.BSD/.3.91.960720182907.18707C-100000@nsl.foothill.net>, Jerry Iglowitz  <jerryi@foothi11.net> writes

>Dr. Shear informed me that he had

>forwarded my MS to you because you handle all the "non-'hard >problem' submissions" for the Journal of Consciousness Studies.

>

>   If you have had a chance to look at it, you will have seen that

>my submission constitutes a precis of exactly that: a tenative

>solution of the mind-body problem.

>

The papers which Dr Shear is handling are those which are specific responses to Dave Chalmers keynote 'hard problem' paper. There are obviously many papers which are concerned with mind-body problem but are not part of that symposium. Your submission is one such,

and has quite properly been forwarded to me.

>

>

>P.S.  Did you receive the comments on my thesis by Dr. Walter

>Freeman, (UC/Berkeley), which I sent to Dr. Shear?

 

 

Yes, thank you.

Now I turn to your submission itself.

We have had a number of people send us papers which are closely related to forthcoming books or other much longer MSS, either in the form of an opening chapter, or an introduction, or a summary. There is an obvious attraction to an author in having a book "trailed" by means of such an article, but our experience has been that these submissions simply do not "work" as papers for the Journal of Consciousness Studies. Much time has been wasted by authors and editors alike, trying to make a submission fit a format which is not appropriate. I fear that your own example would become another of these.

As you yourself say, it *is* a very complicated thesis. If we were to send the segment of chapter one and the abstract which you have sent us out to referees, a host of questions would be raised by them which you would only be able to answer by reference to other parts of the book.  This is not satisfactory from anyone's point of view.

My advice would be to get straight on and publish your book. If, however, you do wish to submit an article to JCS, then it needs to be a free-standing, fully referenced paper in its own right, quite separate from your larger publication.

Yours sincerely,

Anthony Freeman.

 

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Emai1: anthony@imprint.co.uk

 

FREEMAN 2

 

Dear Dr. Freeman,

I have read your response and see your point. I am including below what I believe is a free-standing article based on the fragment I sent you and deleting all reference to my MS. I think it addresses a major element of the question of mind and does not cite nor require my book in any way.

Would it work this way as an article, do you think? Jerry Iglowitz

A NON-REPRESENTATIVE MODEL **************************

Jerome Iglowitz

jerryi@foothi11.net

Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela's "The Tree of Knowledge", (1987), is a detailed and compelling argument, based in the very foundations of physical science and biology, against even the _possibility_ of a biological organism's possession of a representative model of its environment.   (cf Freeman, 1995). These respected biologists argue, moreover, against "information" itself.  They maintain that information _never_passes_ between the environment and organisms; there is only the "triggering" of structurally determinate organic forms.  I believe that theirs is the inescapable conclusion of current science.

The present paper is not intended to establish that conclusion, however.  It is not primarily argumentative, but constructive.  It presents a specific and constructive counterproposal for _another_ model, ("the schematic operative model"), which, contrary to the case of the representative model, _does_ remain viable within the critical context of modern science.  I believe that we as human organisms do, in fact, embody a model.  I believe it is the stuff of mind!

THE SCHEMATIC MODEL, (what is an "object"?):

1. _Representative_ models are not the only possible kinds of models. Nor is representation a model's only conceivable use. Consider the models of our mundane training seminars, for instance. "'Motivation' plus 'technique' yields 'sales'.", we might hear at a sales meeting. Or, "'Self-awareness of the masses' informed by 'Marxist-dialectic' produces 'revolution'!", we might hear from our local revolutionary. Visual aids, (models), are ever present. The lecturer stands at a chalkboard and asks us to accept drawings of triangles, squares, cookies, horseshoes... _as__objects_ -with a calculus of relations between them- as standins for concepts or processes like "motivation", "the nuclear threat", "sexuality", "productivity", and "evolution". In these representations, the objects do not stand in place of _entities_ in objective reality, however. (What _is_ “a productivity" or “a sexuality", for instance?) The function of the objects, _as_objects_, in these "schematic models" is, rather, specifically to illustrate, to enable,to_crystallize_and_simplify_ the_very_calculus_ _of_relation_proposed _between_them_! (cf Cassirer, 1953).

The objects are an expression of the calculus, not the converse. The objects of these models serve to organize process, (analysis or response); they are _not_ representations of actual objects or actual entities in reality. _These_ objects functionally bridge reality in a way that physical objects do not. They are, in fact, metaphors. The rationale for using them, (as any good "seminarian" would tell you), is clarity, organization and efficiency.

2. Instrumentation and control systems provide another example of the non-representational use of models and "entities".  Their objects need not mirror objective reality either.  A gauge, a readout display, a control device, (the "objects" of such systems), need not mimic a single parameter -or an actual physical entity.  Indeed, in the monitoring of a _complex_ or _critical_ process, it should not.  Rather, the readout, for instance, should represent an efficacious synthesis of _just_those_aspects_ of the process which are relevant to response, and be crystallized around those relevant responses!  A warning light or a status indicator, for instance, need not refer to just one parameter.  It may refer to electrical overload and/or excessive pressure and/or...  Or it may refer to an optimal relationship, (perhaps a _complexly_ _functional_ relationship), between many parameters -to a relationship between temperature, volume, mass, etc. in a chemical process, for instance.

The exactly parallel case holds for its control devices.  A single control may orchestrate a multiplicity of (possibly disjoint) objective responses.  The accelerator pedal in a modern automobile, as a simple example, may integrate fuel injection volumes, spark timing, transmission gearing...

(Ideally instrumentation and control would unify in the _same_ "object".  We would manipulate "the object" of the display itself and_it_ would be the control device.  Think about this in relation to our ordinary "objects of perception" -in relation to the sensory-motor coordination of the brain and the problem of naive realism!)

3. A "war room", (a high-tech military command center resembling a computer game), is a viable, though primitive, example of such a usage.  It is specifically a schematic model, expressly designed for maximized response.  The all-weather landing display in a jetliner supplies another example.

4. The "object" in the graphic user interface, (GUI), of a computer is perhaps the best example available.  In my simplistic manipulation of the schematic objects of a computer's GUI, I am, in fact, effecting and coordinating quite diverse and disparate -and unbelievably complex- operations at the physical level of the computer, operations impossible, (in a practical sense), to accomplish directly.  What that object represents and what its manipulation does, at the physical level, can be exceedingly complex and disjoint.  The disparate voltages and physical locations, (or operations), represented by a single "object", and the (possibly different) ones effected by manipulating it, correlate to "an object" only in this "schematic" sense. _Its_efficacy_lies_in_the_simplicity_of_the_ _"calculus"_it_enables_!

5. Consider, finally, a formal and abstract problem.  Consider the problem of designing instrumentation for the efficient control of _both_ especially complex _and_ especially dangerous processes.  In the general case, what kind of information would you want to pass along and how would you best represent it? How would you design your display and control system?

It would be impossible, obviously, to represent _all_ information about the objective physical reality of a, (any), process or its physical components, (objects).  Where would you stop? Is the color of the building in which it is housed, the specific materials of which it is fabricated, that it is effected with gears rather than levers, -or its location in the galaxy-necessarily relevant information?  (Contrarily, even its designer/s middle name might be relevant if it involved a computer program and you were considering the possibility of a hacker's "back door"!)  It would be counterproductive even if you could as relevant data would be obscured and the "calculus" would be too complex and inefficient for rapid and effective response.  Even the use of realistic _abstractions_ could produce enormous difficulties in that you might be interested in many differing, (and, typically, conflicting), significant abstractions and/or their interrelations.  This would produce severe difficulties in generating an intuitive and efficient "calculus" geared towards maximal response.

For such a complex and dangerous process, the "entities" you create must, (1) necessarily, of course, be viable in relation to both data and control -i.e. they must be comprehensive in their function.  But they would also, (2) need to be constructed with a primary intent towards efficiency of response, (rather than realism), as well -the process _is_, by stipulation, dangerous! They would need to be fashioned to optimize the "calculus" while still fulfilling their (perhaps consequently distributed!) operative role.

Your "entities" would need to be fabricated in such a way as to intrinsically define a _simple_ operative calculus of relationality between them -analogous to the situation in our training seminar.  Maximal efficiency, (and safety), therefore, would demand crystallization into schematic _virtual_ "entities"

which would resolve both demands at a single stroke.  Your objects would then distribute function so as to concentrate and simplify control, (operation)!  These virtual entities would be in no necessarily simple (or hierarchical -i.e. via abstraction) correlation with the objects of physical reality.  But they _would_ allow rapid and effective control of a process which, considered objectively, might not be simple at all.  It is clearly the optimization of the process of response that is crucial here, not literal representation.  We do not _care_ that the operator knows what function(s) he is actually fulfilling, only that he does it (them) well!

6. Biological survival is exactly such a problem -it is both especially complex _and_ especially dangerous.  It is a moment by moment confrontation with disaster.  It is a schematic model in just this sense that I propose that evolution constructed, and I propose that it is the basis for both the "percept" and the "mind".  But it is just the _converse_ of the argument made above that I propose for evolution.  It is not the _distribution_ of function, but rather the _centralization_ of disparate atomic biological function into efficacious schematic -and virtual-objects that evolution effected while compositing the complex metacellular organism.  (These are clearly just the complementary perspectives on the same issue.)

But let's talk about the "atomic" in the "atomic biological function" of the previous statement.  There is another step in the argument, to be taken at the level of biology.  The "engineering" argument, as made above, deals specifically with the schematic manipulation of "data".  At the level of primitive evolution, however, it is modular (reactive) process that is significant to an organism, not data functions.  A given genetic accident corresponds to the addition or modification of a given (behavioral/reactive) process which, for a primitive organism, is clearly simply either beneficial or not.  But that process is itself informationally indeterminate to the organism -i.e. it is a modular whole.  No one can presume that a particular, genetically determined response is informationally, (rather than reactively), significant to a Paramecium or an Eschericia coli, for example, (though _we_ may consider it so).  It is significant, rather, solely as a modular unit which either increases survivability or not.  Let me therefore extend the prior argument to deal with the schematic organization of atomic, (modular), process, rather than of primitive, (i.e. absolute), data.  It is my contention that the cognitive model, and cognition itself, is solely constituted as an organization of that atomic modular process, designed for computational and operational efficiency. The atomic processes themselves remain, and will forever remain, informationally indeterminate to the organism.

The purpose of the model was computational simplicity!  The calculational simplicity of the schematic object for dealing with a multifarious environment constitutes a clear and powerful evolutionary rationale.  Such a model, (the "objects" and their "calculus"), allows rapid and efficient response to what cannot be assumed, a priori, to be a simplistic environment.  From the viewpoint of the sixty trillion or so cells that constitute the human cooperative enterprise, _that_ assumption, (environmental simplicity), is implausible in the extreme!

But theirs, (i.e. _that_ perspective), is the most natural perspective from which to consider the problem.  For five-sixths of evolutionary history, (three billion years), it was the one-celled organism which ruled alone.  As Stephen Gould puts it, metacellular organisms represent only occasional and instable spikes from the stable "left wall", (the unicellulars), of evolutionary history.

"Progress does not rule, (and is not even a primary thrust of) the evolutionary process.  For reasons of chemistry and physics, life arises next to the 'left wall' of its simplest conceivable and preservable complexity.  This style of life (bacterial) has remained most common and most successful.  A few creatures occasionally move to the right... "

"Therefore, to understand the events and generalities of life's pathway, we must go beyond principles of evolutionary theory to a paleontological examination of the contingent pattern of life's history on our planet. ...Such a view of life's history is highly contrary both to conventional deterministic models of Western science and to the deepest social traditions and psychological hopes of Western culture for a history culminating in humans as life's highest expression and intended planetary steward."(Gould, 1994)

RETRODICTION:

Do you not find it strange that the fundamental laws of the sciences, (or of logic), are _so_few_? Or that our (purportedly) accidentally and evolutionarily acquired logic works _so_well_ to manipulate the objects of our environment? From the standpoint of contemporary science, this is a subject of wonder -or at least it _should_ be. (cf contra: Minsky, 1985)   It is, in fact, a miracle!  From the standpoint of the schematic model, however, it is a  trivial,  (obvious),  and  necessary  consequence. _It_is_precisely_the_rationale_for_the_model_itself!

Evolution, in constructing a metacellular organism such »as ours, was confronted with the problem of coordinating the physical structure of its thousands of billions of individual cells.  It also faced the problem of coordinating the response of this colossus, this "Aunt Hillary", (Hofstadter's  "sentient” ant colony  .   Hofstadter,  1979).   It had to coordinate their functional interaction with their environment, raising an organizational problem of profound proportions. 

Evolution was forced to deal with exactly the problem/outline above.  The brain, moreover, is universally accepted as/an evolutionary organ of response.  I propose that a schematic entity, (and its corresponding schematic model), is by far the most credible here -to efficiently orchestrate t coordination of the ten million sensory neurons with/ the one million motor neurons, (Maturana and Varela, 1987 )/ A realistic, (i.e. representational/informational), "entity" would demand a concomitant "calculus" embodying the very complexity of the objective reality in which the organism exists, and this, I argue, is overwhelmingly implausible.

REFERENCES :

1. Cassirer, Ernst. "The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms". (Translation by Ralph Manheim) .  Yale University Press. 1953

2. Freeman, Walter.  "Societies of Brains". Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  1995

3. Gould, Stephen Jay.  "The evolution of Life on the Earth".

4. Hofstadter, Douglas.  "Goedel, Escher, Bach".  Vintage, 1979

5. Maturana, Humberto and Varela, Francisco. "The Tree of Knowledge".  Shambala Press, 1987

6. Minsky, Marvin.  "The Society of Mind".  Touchstone, 1985

 

FREEMAN 3

From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukTue Jul 23 14:43:00 1996

Date: Tue, 23 Jul 1996 08:28:17 +0100

From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>

To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>

Subject: Re: Would this work?

In message

<Pine.BSD/.3.91.960722175053.4363A-100000@nsl.foothill.net>,

Jerry Iglowitz  <jerryi@foothill.net> writes

>Dear Dr.   Freeman,

>

> I have read your response and see your point.  I am including

>below what I believe is a free-standing article based on the

>fragment I sent you and deleting all reference to my MS.  I think

>it addresses a major element of the question of mind and does not

>cite nor require my book in any way.

>

>  Would it work this way as an article, do you think?

>

Dear Jerry,

So far as the form of the paper is concerned, this is much more suitable, and I shall put it through the normal review process. As for content, we shall have to see what the referees have to say! I will convert the email version into a properly word-processed document before sending it out.

Best wishes, Anthony.

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk

 

FREEMAN 4

From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukSun Aug 18 03:03:24 1996

Date: Fri, 16 Aug 1996 11:34:29 +0100

From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>

To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>

Subject: A non-representational model

Dear Jerry

I sent your paper out to a reviewer I had reason to believe would be "friendly". Here is his reply, just received:

Report on *A non-representational model - Jerry Iglowitz*

Although I am sympathetic to Iglowitz's approach, I find the MS very confusing and somewhat contradictory. The argument needs to be fleshed-out with connecting ideas included. As it stands now, it seems to be a jumble of ideas with (maybe) a central theme, but what that is exactly is unclear.

I would advise that you reject the paper as is and tell Iglowitz that if he wishes to resubmit, he must prepare a longer, more linear and better argued MS. I'd be happy to write a longer and more substantive review of a complete article.

In addition, I would ask him the question: What does this have to do with consciousness?

On the strength of the above (which chimes in with my own reaction to your initial submission) I invite you to revise the paper and re-submit it. This does not guarantee publication, but at least you know

that you have one sympathetic reviewer lined up who will take what you say seriously. The revised paper would also be sent to an inhouse reader and one further external referee.

Best wishes, Anthony.

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk

 

FREEMAN 5

From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukThu Aug 29 02:05:22 1996

Date: Tue, 27 Aug 1996 10:42:35 +0100

From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>

Cc: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>

Subject: Re: A few questions

Dear Jerry,

Thanks for your queries.

>

>     1.   What is a reasonable top limit for length for a submission?   >As you have said, mine is a *very* complicated hypothesis, and to >flesh out this single aspect would take some space.

 

9,000 words (including notes and references) is our normal limit, but occasionally we print something which is longer than this. If much more space is needed, we sometimes suggest a two-part article, but we obviously have to be persuaded that the argument presented warrants this much space. (If you are including any "heavy" maths, this should be put into an appendix. It will still be included in the word-count, but its breaching the 9,000 word limit will be less serious.) >

>  2.  Would it be possible for you to forward the "Extended >Abstract" I sent you to this reviewer?  In it I dealt with his >specific  question:  "What  does  this  have  to  do  with consciousness?"

I do not think this is necessary. This reviewer had that particular question asked of his own submission to JCS (which was subsequently published) and I think his comment may have been slightly tongue-in-cheek, and aimed more at me than at you!

>I feel I am in a "catch-22" situation:  I couldn't refer to my MS, >(by fiat -yours! :-) ), and then am faulted for not doing so. >Would this reviewer be interested in looking at the draft of my >book which answers the question in full?  It would be a simple >matter to MIME-EMail it to him.  If he chose to retain his >anonymity, I could send it to you and you could forward it.  I >realize that articles must be self-standing, and I intended this >one to be free-standing only *as an aspect* of the problem of >consciousness.

It has always been clear to me that your brief article (submitted in its present form by my "fiat") will need to be fleshed out for publication. What I needed to know from this referee was "whether there was "likely to be anything worthwhile at the end of the process. The answer to that question that I hear is "yes — time spent on the paper will not be wasted".

I do not, however, think it would be a good idea to send him your draft book. Much better to send him a MS in the form you intend for publication in JCS, so that it can be judged on its own merits.

>

>  3.  Would you be willing to submit my article to another >reviewer -hopefully one with a mathematical background? Those >seem to be the ones who understand it best.

>

We should certainly send the expanded MS to a second referee, and I shall be happy to make it one of our mathematical reviewers. But remember that the majority of your readers in JCS will not have a

maths background.

>Thank you for your response and kind efforts.

>

>Jerry

>

And thank *you* for seeing my role as one which is intended to be helpful and supportive — even if it does not always feel like that. Remember that my job depends upon maintaining a flow of good articles for the journal, so I am as keen as you are to see your paper published. And it is in all our interests to see that it is as good as possible.

Best wishes, Anthony.

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk

 

FREEMAN 6

September 1, 1996 Dear Anthony,

First let me thank you for your kind and encouraging letter of August 29th. I am in the middle of some very nasty personal, (economic), circumstances here and it made my day brighter.

I am attaching a copy of the first revision of my proposed article as a MIME EMail attachment. It is an IBM WordPerfect 4.1 binary file and should be readable on any later version of WordPerfect or Microsoft Word. (This is the latest version they produced for my old Amiga.) This will hopefully save you the trouble of reformatting it.

As you will see, I have added an introduction to place it in the context of the problem of "consciousness", and have appended a brief statistical argument for its plausibility. I don't really like statistical arguments very much, (as I have noted), but think it is alright so far as it goes, and it fits the space restrictions. (I had relegated this to an appendix in my MS.) I would appreciate your's and your referee's comments on it.

So where do we go from here? Will you and I "duel it out", ( :-) ), until we arrive at a version that you think suitable for resubmission to the referee, or will this version be passed on as is, (assuming you think it is not *too* terrible)?

I have been having some trouble rectifying his objections to the original article though, as I really, (literally), don't understand them. They are *very* general and don't give specific instances. This is almost exactly the same text I sent to Walter Freeman and which he characterized as "compelling". Apparently *he* thought it was cogent. Perhaps it is a question of context? I am not arguing with you or your referee, however -if it is not clear then it is *my* fault and I will strive mightily to fix it. I just need the feedback to do so.

Would you please convey to the referee that I have made a "good faith" effort towards his objections in this draft but that I need more detailed and specific feedback, (objections and citations)-which I truly desire -to do more. I see this as a progressive process of refinement.

Incidentally, I have purposely over-"!"'d, and used CAPS and underlines in this version that I realize must be removed in the final version. I have left them in for now to (hopefully) clarify my line of argument for you and the referee. If you cannot see the statuary you are liable to break off an arm in trying to polish it! :-)

Please look over this revision and, if you think it is suitable, please forward it to your referee.

 

Thanks again:-and let me know what you think.

 

Jerry

 

FREEMAN 7

From anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukWed Jan  8 17:14:54 1997

Date: Wed, 8 Jan 1997 16:24:26 +0000

From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>

To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>

Subject: Referee's Report on your paper

Dear Jerry,

K

Here at last is my math reviewer's report on your paper. As you will see, we are back with the problems (which I raised right at the outset) of trying to adapt an introductory chapter to be free-standing paper.

Referee's report on Iglowitz,  "Mind as a non-representational model"

[My convention: double inverted commas are either actual quotations or "scare quotes" ; single inverted commas are used to form the name of a word.]

I enjoyed reading what I took to be the introduction to this paper, until I found myself reading the Conclusions and realised that this was all there was. I cannot recommend publication, for reasons indicated below.

Sections I and II are a defence of the philosophical position that mind cannot be regarded as a representation of external reality (whatever supporters of this position might mean by the last two words ) , and drawing out the consequence that , once this idea is abandoned, then the problem of intentionality - how it comes about that a certain mental representation "means" a corresponding external object - disappears, as does the homunculus and other related problems. The idea that the mind is not representation is not original (as the author, who makes clear his debt to Cassirer, would no doubt be happy to admit). In view of its long pedigree, the author makes very heavy weather of the idea: in referring to "terrible consequences" he expects his readers to be shocked by the novelty of an idea that has in essence been around since Kant.

Section III is a "statistical"  (actually, combinatorial) argument

which is intended to reinforce what has already been(convincingly-albeit ponderously, argued in sections I and II. For me it tended to detract from the argument. I found it difficult to follow, because the author was demolishing the representational position without having explicitly enunciated, in detailed quantitative terms, just what the representational position was. What the author is in fact demolishing is the hypothesis that "Evolution would have had the problem of progressively correlating a model with each, (or some significant portion), of the possibilities of the sensory array - and with potential response as well." As with any "Aunt Sally" type of argument, it is necessary to be very precise about what it is that one is demolishing in order to do the job well; and this then enables the opponent to reply that this was not in fact what his position was. In the case in point here, the proponent of representations might reply that, in order to achieve a representation that was accurate most of the time, evolution would not have to check out "some significant portion" of the sensory inputs, but it could instead adopt a Monte Carlo approach and optimise performance with respect to a large randomly chosen number of such inputs. The success of the Monte Carlo approach to simulation lies in the fact that the probability of failure depends not on the size of the space that is being sampled from, but on the size of the sample. Good success could be achieved with a sample size well below the l0A102 allowed by the author's maximal evolutionary model,

At this point, after two unsurprising sections and one unconvincing section, the paper essentially stops. No dent has yet been made, however, on the problems of consciousness as they are likely to be perceived by the readers of JCS (including myself). The adoption of a non-representational position shifts the locus of these problems. Given that I have a world consisting of perceptual and conceptual objects (i.e. operational constructs) which I denote by terms such as 'trees', 'despair', 'redness', 'brains' etc, is it possible to envisage how last mentioned of these constructs could itself embody a world analogous to that of my own? If the answer is, no that can't be done because it would involve a fundamental confusion of categories, then we encounter severe difficulties of the "other minds" type of philosophical problem. If, however, it is admitted that what I call a 'brain' might itself form operational constructs and this might thereby explain what I am myself doing all the time, then are we not back in almost exactly the same place as we started? Namely, we have to explain how it is that a pattern of neuronal firing can have the attributes that I designate by the word 'tree'. The only gain is that we no longer have the additional problem of hooking it onto a postulated external "real" tree, and this gain may in fact be a loss for those who hold that the real tree may play a role in establishing the qualia of our percepts. I make these remarks not to criticise the author's position, but to sketch out the field into which some inroad must be made if the paper is to become* publishable, and not read like an introduction to something else.

==========;===

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Emai1: anthony@ imprint.co.uk

 

 

FREEMAN 7

From jerryi@foothi11.netThu Jan  9 17:10:42 1997

Date: Thu, 9 Jan 1997 17:10:03 +0000 (GMT)

From: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothi11.net>

To: "Revd. Anthony Freeman" <anthony@imprint.co.uk>

January 9, 1997 Dear Anthony,

I have just received your letter and the response from your Mathematical Reviewer.  I am disappointed, of course.

I am in somewhat of a quandry.  If this were a published review of my published article, I do not think that I would have much trouble in answering it as I do not consider it a very perceptive reading.   But this is *your* reviewer, so I must ask how it is you wish me to respond.  I certainly do not wish to be ungracious or to put you "in the middle".

I shall, therefore, await your desires, (do you wish me to comment at this time?), and those of the original referee before I reply and only wish you a Happy New Year -which I most sincerely do.

Best wishes,

Jerry.

P.S.  When do you expect the original referee will respond?

 

FREEMAN 8

From anthony@imprint. zynet. co. ukSat Jan 11 00:43:09 1997

Date: Fri , 10 Jan 1997 16:10:40 +0000

From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint . zynet .co.uk>

To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill .net>

Subject: JCS Submission

In messag <Pine. BSD/. 3. 91. 970109010802. 5387A-100000@nsl . foothill .net> , Jerry Iglowitz < jerryi@f oothill .net> writes

> I am in somewhat of a quandry. If this were a published review >of my published article, I do not think that I would have much >trouble in answering it as I do not consider it a very perceptive >reading. But this is *your* reviewer, so I must ask how it is you wish >me to respond. I certainly do not wish to be ungracious or to put you >"in the middle".

He is my reviewer but it is your paper. By all means answer his challenges (bearing in mind also what is said below) and send me a further revision, if you wish. ~~~

>P.S. >

When do you expect the original referee will respond?

He replied so long ago that I had forgotten that I had not passed on his(brief) comments, viz:

"I actually like Iglowitz' ideas, but not his style and method of presentation. He thinks the reader knows (or should know) what he is talking about and so leaves a whole lot unsaid. In consequence much of his argument is left undone, with apparent non sequitors etc. If he will re-write it with proper deference to his readers, I will gladly look at it again, but in its present/form it is not publishable."

Best wishes/ Anthony. /

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journa

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600 j

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Email: anthony@imprint.co.uk

of Consciousness 5YX, UK

 

FREEMAN 9

 

» Let's see what the sympathetic reviewer has to say.

»

» I am very interested in his response.

>I have now heard from the reviewer. The relevant part of his

>response is as follows:

>

>"... this is not a matter of tenor, but continuity. There are

>fragments of very original thinking there, but not the connective

>tissue which allows me to evaluate it.  I don't understand what

>he is driving at in the way that I need to evaluate a paper."

>

>I am afraid that I really must draw a line at this point, and say

>that we cannot accept the paper for JCS.

>

>Best wishes,

>

>Anthony.

Dear Anthony,

I am, of course, disappointed but I would like to express my appreciation to you for your efforts in my behalf. I will not try to argue either with you or your "sympathetic reviewer". Your decisions are your decisions.

Since this may be my last words with you, however, let me try to give, as objectively and calmly as possible, my opinions in the matter.

I think the real problem is that this is a very new and different idea and just doesn't fit into the old molds. Is that megalomania? Perhaps, and perhaps not. I have twice asked for a single illustration -a specific case- where I have not served the needs of my readers, assumed that they know what I am talking about or seemed to commit a non sequitor. What I have been answered is generalities only. His final response is another exact instance of this. I feel he is doing to me exactly what he says I am doing to my reader.

If, indeed, he thinks with Walter Freeman and others that I have something original and valuable to say, then a proper response would have been a question, or a specific, pointed objection to at least one physical place in my paper that would have allowed an answer or illustrated a deficiency or discontinuity.

I can sympathize with his difficulty, but not with his unwillingness to expose it to view. This is an analytic conception, analytically argued -very much in the spirit of Kant. I had hoped to expand it in a dialogue within your pages. That there are many questions to be answered, I fully realize. But they must be asked first.

 

Let me close this letter with a very different response to my ideas. It is from Dr. Blaise Lara, a respected mathematician at the University of Lausanne, much involved in information theory and the mind-brain problem:

"Dear Mr Iglowitz

You are not under misapprehension. I am VERY sympathetic with your scientific and philosophical viewpoints. And after reading this morning your last message I feel sincerely concerned by your personal situation. Unfortunately I am also under heavy constraints of another kind (my wife's health) and that explains my lasting silence.

As a matter of fact, I was preparing an answer containing detailed comments on the border of almost every two pages of your manuscript.  Please believe Mr Iglowitz on my deep sympathy with your ideas. I even suspect a kind of spiritual brotherhood among us. This spontaneous manifestation does not sound like a very academic statement or manifestation. But the hell with the academy in front of the personal and intimate adventure of the few real men we have the fortune of meeting from time to time.

My sincere regards

Blaise Lara" With my warmest thanks, Jerry

 

FREEMAN 9

Frqm anthony@imprint.zynet.co.ukTue Jan 28 18:29:04 1997

Date: Tue, 28 Jan 1997 09:26:34 +0000

From: Anthony Freeman <anthony@imprint.zynet.co.uk>

To: Jerry Iglowitz <jerryi@foothill.net>

Subject: Draw a line

Dear Jerry,

In message <Pine.BSD/.3.91.970113214109.16484C-100000@nsl.foothill.net>, Jerry Iglowitz  <jerryi@foothill.net> writes

> Let's see what the sympathetic reviewer has to say.

>

> I am very interested in his response.

I have now heard from the reviewer. The relevant part of his response is as follows:

"... this is not a matter of tenor, but continuity. There are fragments of very original thinking there, but not the connective tissue which allows me to evaluate it. I don't understand what he is driving at in the way that I need to evaluate a paper."

I am afraid that I really must draw a line at this point, and say that we cannot accept the paper for JCS.

Best wishes, Anthony.

Anthony Freeman (UK Managing Editor, Journal of Consciousness

Studies)

Imprint Academic, PO Box 1, Thorverton, Devon EX5 5YX, UK

Tel.   +44 (0)1392 841600

Fax.   +44 (0)1392 841478

Emai1: anthony@imprint.co.uk

 

 

______________________________________________________________________________________

End JCS Correspondence

 

Here is an old letter from a distinguished mathematician at the HEC in Lausanne, Switzerland, (since retired).  His specialty is multivariate statistical analysis.   It's kind of embarrasing in its praise, but I think he saved my life at a bad time by the warmth he showed me.  Nothing came of it however, as his wife came down with Multiple Sclerosis and I think it destroyed him.  I tried to keep in touch for several years, but I think I can understand where he is coming from.  I feel that way about my wife as well.


"24-MAR-1995 05:19:23.90

 

From: "Blaise.Lara@hec.unil.ch"

To:    "JERRYI@delphi.com"

 

Subj: deep regret

 


Dear Mr Iglowitz

You are not under misapprehension. I am VERY sympathetic with your scientific and philosophical viewpoints. And after reading this morning your last message I feel sincerely concerned by your personal situation. Unfortunately I am also under heavy constraints of another kind (my wife's health) and that explains my lasting silence.

As a matter of fact, I was preparing an answer containing detailed comments on the border of almost every two pages of your manuscript. Please believe Mr Iglowitz on my deep sympathy with your ideas. I even suspect a kind of spiritual brotherhood among us. This spontaneous manifestation does not sound like a very academic statement or manifestation. But the hell with the academy in front of the personal and intimate adventure of the few real men we have the fortune of meeting from time to time.


My sincere regards

Blaise Lara"