The Mind-Brain Problem -an
Introduction for Beginners
Jerome Iglowitz
(Revised January, 2006)
Introduction, (What are "facts"?)
I had a discussion with a friend awhile ago which I thought
might serve as a lead-in to someone trying to understand the rough outline of
the mind-brain problem. I have never talked to this friend about this
particular problem as it is not within his scope of interest, though he has a
naturally philosophical mind in other areas. It seems he had gotten into a
discussion with a co-worker at his job about "facts" and asked my
opinion. (Facts will be very much in our scope of concern here.)
My friend acknowledged that his co-worker was a very bright individual who had
argued that "facts" were solely a function of the person expressing
them. He said his co-worker had made a very strong argument and compared
the latter's position to what I had once described to him as
"solipsism". I told my friend that to understand the problem, we had
better look first at what it means to reason with another human being.
Reasoning does not start out from absolutes. Were I to reason with him or with
you, we must start out from some basis of common agreement . Without it,
we have absolutely no place to go!
"Solipsism" is the philosophical position that all that exists: you,
me, the car sitting in the driveway, the sun in the sky -exists only in my,
(your), head. This may seem a very strange viewpoint, but it is provably logically
consistent . The point is that if you were to express your belief in such
an idea to me, there would be no point in my continuing a conversation with you
about such things. My response would be to smile politely and switch the topic
of conversation to what we would like to have for lunch, for instance. The only
legitimate response, (and I once considered it seriously), would be a
"Zen-ish" one - to slap the believer across the face to make him deal
with the reality of it. What saved me from this (purely philosophical) response
was the realization that this individual was quite likely to call his
solipsistic police and have (solipsistic) me thrown into his solipsistic jail!
There is another fundamental, also consistent philosophical position contrary
to our normal beliefs: i.e. classical idealism. For it, all that exists are
ideas. There is nothing beyond. Again, because it is consistent, (and my
prospects hopeless), my only reasonable response is a question: "Soup or a
salad?" This is not to say that these positions are stupid or meaningless,
only that I could have no productive purpose in continuing a conversation -and
certainly not in debating about them. As I have acknowledged, they are
logically consistent. This does not automatically make them true however. We
have no basis of common agreement from which even to start.
Most
of us fall into the philosophical position called "realism", and this
is the context, (because we can agree on it), where you and I will carry
out our reasoning together. There must be a basis of common agreement to
even begin. There are many names for this "realism" and many
variations on it. Most of us belonged, at least in the beginning, to the
position of what has been called "naïve realism". This is the belief
that what is truly real outside of ourselves and including ourselves is our
normal experiential world. It is you and me, the car on the driveway, the sun
in the sky, salads and baseballs and all the things these things do. These
would constitute our first definition of "facts". If I were to turn
my head away from this baseball and then back again, it would still be
"round". (Or it would be a fact that somebody ran over it with a car
in the interim, let us say, -to make it otherwise).
But most of us in the modern world have been forced to modify this naïve
realistic view somewhat. Scientific experiment gives us new facts: positions of
needles on gauges, or digital readouts in certain experimental situations, or
photographic plates with nuclear tracks, or petri dishes showing certain growth
patterns of bacteria under certain conditions. These situations and the
extended body of experience which contains them, (to include the former, normal
experience -baseballs, et al as well ), force us to extend the worldview of
naïve realism. This is so mainly because these new facts simply don't fit
with such a simple, "solid" view of reality. We are forced to accept
the modified "scientific" reality they imply because it has produced
results, (the things they do), right at our normal, naïve scale. The predictability
of the motions of the planets, and the atomic bomb are verifiable facts, (for
realists). And so is radio, television, electricity, the transistor, lasers,
vaccines, and so on, and so on…
Most of us have modified our naïve realism, (because of our forced belief in
the miracles-that-work of science), to what some have called the
"Newtonian world", or the "billiard-ball world", (after
Roger Penrose's usage). This "Newtonian" view is the belief that what
truly is , absolute reality, (or "ontology" to use an old but
precise word), consists of some ultimate particles: atoms or subatomic
particles, quarks, etc. We can retain our normal view of reality within this
view however because we envision our ordinary objects, (baseballs, you, me, the
sun, etc.), as spatial containers in the new absolute reality we are
forced to believe in. If we had suitable eyes of extreme magnification, all the
ultimate things , (the ultimate particles), which constitute Harry Jones
would be next to each other in an ultimate spatial context, and separate from
those of his ex-wife's checkbook or her lawyer. There is a necessary belief in
a continuity, and a contiguity, ("next-to-ness"), in this belief
system. This is the "hierarchy" or "logical containment"
implicit in the Newtonian World and it is mirrored in the hierarchies of
contemporary mathematics and of logic. The ultimate "facts" of this
system, (atoms, molecules, the laws of Newtonian physics, et al), consist of
the ultimate objects, (and what they do), of the belief system of the science
which argued them. They are "facts" because our past experience has
agreed with what it has predicted and we expect that our future experience will
agree as well.
Modern
science, or rather the science of the twentieth century, (which is not so new
any more), was forced to modify its picture of ultimate reality, however. It
was forced to do so because the Newtonian world picture simply didn't work to
explain actual new scientific experience. (Note: Roger Penrose's
"Emperor's New Mind" contains a succinct and lucid discussion of this
topic without prerequisites. It is not easy, but it is very good.) Quantum
theory, our scientific deepest "smallness" for instance, does not
believe in, (cannot believe in), the existence at a specific place, -nor
even in a specific region of its fundamental particles, the ultimate
objects of its realistic reality. These particles -each particle even-
exist(s) across the whole of reality, and the whole of space! The ultimate
facts of Harry Jones are no longer discrete and separate from his wife's
checkbook -and not even from her lawyers! Quantum theorists did not adopt this
position out of choice or whim, but because they had to - to explain
experimental evidence. The Newtonian worldview simply could not be made
to fit the facts of scientific experiment. Ultimate space, (the
"aether" wherein they were to exist and move), was challenged long
ago by Galileo, and euthanized, finally by Einstein.
On another tack, the renowned and seminal thinker Immanuel Kant argued that
because we, (and specifically our experience), is part of whatever it is
that ultimate reality may eventually turn out to be, then even our cognition,
(experience), must be considered relativistically! He reasoned that it is
impossible to separate out the parts that make up our personal experiencing
from the parts that are "outside". What reality ultimately and
specifically is by itself, ("the facts"), he concluded, we can never
know. (Kant is sometimes very wrongly labeled an "idealist". The
definition of "idealism" above, Kant's own, shows the error of that
label).
What then, is a "fact" now? It has certainly become a much looser and more abstract thing than we had supposed, even for us realists. As realists, conversely and by agreement, we must believe in some ultimate reality beyond ourselves. We also believe that this ultimate reality must be consistent with our personal experience and the laboratory experience of experimental science. These are the basic presuppositions of our dialogue.
What then, (again), is a "fact"? Let me suggest a definition. "Facts", (alternatively "the phenomena"), are that which all consistent and comprehensive theoretical descriptions of reality must account for. And yet they are not necessarily the same as the way that these theories account for them. "Facts" are those "things" that the solipsist, the idealist, and all forms of realists must account for. They constitute "experience" in its most general sense and they must be consistent with both the past and the future. The squashed baseball is a fact that all good theories must explain. What "the baseball" is, however, (and what "squashing" is), are elements of the theory that explains them. "Fact" is not the same as theory; nor is it the same as "ontology". By agreement as realists however, we must assume some connection.
The problem of "facts" is very much a part of the Mind-Brain problem. Indeed, it is very much a part of the theories proposed to solve any problem. Our particular "take" on it determines the whole of our context of possibility and limits our consideration to just those theories consistent with it.
The Mind-Brain Problem:
The real war today is between dogmatic materialists and
anybody else. Within the belief system of the former, all that exists is
material and the relationships between it. Part of that belief system is also
heavily vested in the descendant of Aristotelian logic -the logic of classes
-and in the "hierarchy" implicit in it. Dogmatic materialism has an
admittedly long and very successful history in science. In fact, it is a spectacularly
successful history. It has actually produced the miracles that religion once
promised. Democritus' descendants seem to have won the field. But there are
gaps in their line. Most of modern physics -the part of physics which is
modern - just doesn't fit. In the case of the Mind-Brain problem, I think they
will ultimately fall. Does this mean that I think they are wrong? Not exactly.
It is a subtle point, but, crudely put, I think that theirs is a system that
works, (mostly), but that it is necessarily only one of several. I
believe it does not describe "what is"; it simply, (superbly),
predicts future. It is a wonderful predictive mechanism, but it does not
describe ontology. What is wrong with it is the "dogmatic" part. It
limits the possibility of new theories to its own dogmatic assumptions,
assumptions unnecessary to its function and limiting our explanatory power.
The mind-body problem consists in finding
some way that each, (the mind or the brain), could legitimately exist given the
actual existence of the other. It sounds pretty easy, but, surprisingly, it is
not. Actually the biggest problem for someone approaching this issue for the
first time is to realize just how difficult it really is. Science today is
actively attempting to fully explain the workings of the human brain. Its
conclusions will be affected by its presuppositions. Those conclusions will
profoundly affect the whole course of future civilization.
The real beginning to the modern formulation of the mind-brain problem began
with Descartes. Following his vision of analytical geometry, he was the first
to envision a modern, geometrical physics encompassing the whole of the world.
Because of it, (successful or no), he was forced to deal with the dilemmas of
physical determinism.
It was clear from the start that the physical brain was part of the physical
universe, and, given an actual deterministic physics of the latter, was subject
to the same physical laws. Given that the brain is the final arbiter of the
actions of the body, it was further clear that the whole of human action must
be physically determinist. Daniel Dennett -in the most honest statement of
modern dogmatic materialism -argues that mind cannot exist within this belief
system. True, there are less forceful statements of its implications, but I
think Dennett had it right --physically and temporally discrete process can
only produce other physically and temporally discrete process. Nowhere is the
integration and "understanding" demanded by our conceptions of mind
possible.
Surely all of us believe that the brain exists. We have seen actual brains, (or
pictures at least), and know its gross shape. We have seen drawings or
photographs of actual nerves inside it and are prepared to believe scientists
when they tell us of actual, provable biological processes within it. Most of us
are prepared to believe that these nerves, chemicals and physical processes
within the brain cause all of the function of that brain. The brain is a pretty
well defined physical thing -at least in general terms.
But what of the mind? Where, or how, could it exist within that physical thing?
Or does it? Here is the crux of the problem. Most of us are willing to believe,
(again), that the mind is intimately associated with the brain. In fact, most
are willing to believe that mind is in the brain. If the brain is
destroyed or seriously injured, then the mind ceases to exist or is lessened.
Brain injuries and disease bear clear witness. (Conversely, if we were to lose
our arms, or our legs, let us say, most of us are prepared to believe
that our minds would not necessarily be diminished.) Is the mind in all of the
brain, or only part of it? Is it different from the physical process or some
level of complication of it?
The "replacement argument" is germane and quite well known. It
is both clear and convincing and it should help to clarify the context. It goes
like this. Let us assume that some small part of the physical brain can be
replaced by a mechanical substitute -whose net effect on overall function is
exactly that of the replaced physiological part. (This is not an absurd
assumption given the state of actual research which is attempting things just
like that.) Furthermore, for the purposes of discussion, let us take
"having consciousness" as very roughly equivalent to "having a
mind".
Question: assuming that the original brain was conscious, (roughly equivalent
to "had a mind"), would the modified brain still be conscious, (have
a mind)? Suppose we were to replace each of the physiological parts and
functions of the brain successively in a like manner. At what specific point
would the brain cease to be conscious, (have a mind)? Or would it? This is an
actual research problem in the discipline of artificial intelligence, but it
also frames large aspects of the general question reasonably well.
The flip side of the argument is the question of whether a "mind" in
our ordinary sense ever did exist! Now this is a very shocking idea, but
again it is a logically consistent position. Under this idea all that exists
are the physical world and our bodies and brains within it. Under it what we
call "mind" is a "figment" of language. We are automatons,
("zombies"), which only produce sounds and mechanical writings
mimicking "mind" because of the design of the mechanism! This is
Dennett's conclusion.
Though absurd and extreme at first hearing, if you grant that the whole of the
brain may be considered as, (or perhaps replaced by), pure mechanism, then all
aspects of human behavior may be legitimately considered completely in terms of
the functioning of that mechanism. Since such a view is adequate, and no
productive placement of "mind" in our physical universe in any other
sense has till now been proposed, it became a very strong argument. There are
other strong aspects of this argument having to do with perceptual experiments
-the "color phi" for instance which demonstrate flaws in our
perception of time -of sequences of perceptions. Another line of the argument
has to do with the "homunculus problem" -the apparent necessity of an
infinite logical regress under our normal preconceptions. (See my Dennett and
Edelman appendices respectively for an elaboration.)
Sensory
surfaces are topologically mapped onto cortical surfaces. Squares are mapped
roughly onto squares and triangles roughly onto triangles. Thus, it would seem,
the brain's cortex actually "sees" what is presented to it. But what
is it that subsequently sees the maps on the cortex itself? Is it another
cortex, another brain? Is it a little man within our brain on whose brain it is
projected? But then how does his brain see it?……. This is the problem of
infinite regression which is termed the "homunculus problem". And
where, moreover, is the (simultaneous) theater in which it is projected?
Dennett's "zombie" argument mentioned above questions even the
possibility of such a theater -he argues that it cannot synchronize itself with
external time.
There are other materialist positions, not quite so strong, but all stand
before the same dilemma. How can a bio-mechanical process distributed through
space and time, (like the gears in a working machine), be integrated in any
sense other than a mechanical one? That the machine as a whole can act
decisively is indisputable, but can it "know" what it does? Where and
how? We as observers seem to be able to know, but how can a "gear"
know its own function or the function of other gears within the machine?
It can certainly be affected by them, (or synchronized with them), but how can
it know them? Knowing is not something that "gears" do, after
all, gears just do!
Under the standard paradigms of brain function, data (stimuli) only "wash
through" the brain. By this, I mean they are received in their parts,
those break down into modules, submodules and submodules of submodules…. and
finally make their way out of the body as action. Nowhere, however, does the
process require nor can it embody consciousness. It is distributed process,
pure and simple. Other functions, those that require self-recognition, and body
awareness for instance, feed back and modulate on the overall process–but they
too only "wash through" the brain –at the same level again without
any requisite, (or even a possibility of), consciousness. This is brain
science, pure and simple. Synchrony, integration are only aspects of that
process. They provide temporal integration, (a "clockspeed", so to
speak), which holds it all together.
Freeman, under another conception, sees the
brain as contributing a primary independent biological component which
is chaotically modulated by the flow of information and internal forces which
leads to spatial distribution. These are instantaneous
"frames". But, again, how are they seen?
My own opinion is that this materialist position is very close to correct. But
it is the "very close" that is the heart of the issue. I do not believe
that my mind, (taken in its ordinary sense), is a "figment". I
believe it truly exists. This is an absolute part of my realist beliefs. I
think it is probably part of yours also. But how and where? The ultimate
question, I argue, comes down to what is truly real in reality? What is
the "stuff" that is really real? This question must be considered
within the context of our initial realist agreement and forces a refinement of
our "contract" assumed at the beginning of our discussion.
Some of us think there are two basic kinds of
things in reality: physical stuff and mind stuff. These are the dualists.
Others think there is only mind stuff. These are the classical idealists. A few
believe there is only their mind stuff -these are the solipsists. Most,
however, believe that all that there is -is physical stuff. These are the
materialists and they dominate the current scene largely because of the
profound and productive scientific results their view has produced in our
modern life. Materialists also like to call themselves "realists" as
they refer all questions of reality to "material". It is the last
group that I wish to talk to. Though the other positions are certifiably
consistent, their positions can lead to no productive result -of any kind!
There is no experiment, (necessarily material and physical), which would prove
or disprove their ideas.
The mind-brain problem is the most difficult problem we have ever been called
to solve. But why? Why is this particular problem so difficult? I think that
the answer lies in what we demand to be and what we are prepared to believe -is
real.
All
of us begin by believing that the ordinary world in front of us - cars, trains,
people and baseballs and all the things they do -are real. But more than that!
We believe that they are really, really real! That is, we believe they exist
"out there", independent and absolute. But the sense of this last
sentence brings up deeper issues of reality and knowing and, scary and tainted
as the word is, of "METAPHYSICS"! This most disreputable word is the
hallmark of charlatans, herbal mediciners, palm readers, and, (as my daughters
would say), is not a particularly polite word to use! The best sense of the
word in its modern usage brings up images of centuries-ago academicians and theologians
arguing endlessly and unprofitably about such things as "first
causes" and "the mind of God". Modern man and modern scientific
minds in particular consider themselves well rid of that verbal jungle,
establishing themselves more profitably on the plains of experimental science.
But historical metaphysics had a larger scope. Even what we now call
"science" was itself once called "natural metaphysics".
There was yet another aspect to that ancient discipline which dealt with
something we all must and do still consider, though we may not explicitly admit
we do so. This is the aspect of what is -or could be- really, really real
"out there". It was called "ontology", and I will preserve
the name to distinguish it from any other aspect of metaphysics. What I have
described above, our beginning belief about reality is termed "naïve
realism" and it means that our ordinary objects -as they appear-
are truly, really real -they are ontic objects.
Since the time of ancient skepticism and certainly through the course of modern
science, this view has receded more and more from respectability. The practical
miracles of science make us believe that ontologic reality, (actual reality),
is composed of the objects science says it is - atoms, quarks, fields, et al.
What allows us to accept this view is that we may still preserve the sense of
our ordinary objects as physical clusters of those deeper existences: i.e. I
can think of myself as a cluster of atomic particles and fields shaped like me,
doing all the things I do, and positioned in ontic reality next to other things
and persons just as I ordinarily see myself.
This is still the view of most educated persons on the issue of ontology- at
least as considered at the human scale, -but it is an old view. It incorporates
what Roger Penrose calls the "billiard ball view of reality" and
constitutes, essentially, a Newtonian view of the universe. Under this view all
reality consists in the motions and dynamics of atomic particles in an
ontologically existing "space". Modern science -20th century science-
has questioned this view however. The primary theoretically and technologically
productive theories under which science now operates question the spatiality we
envisioned, and even the ontological clustering of that view. The atomic
particles of me no longer exist, (really exist), in a specific location, but
are spread across the whole of space! Even the "how many" of a given
particle is not fixed. (See Penrose.)
This is the view of current physics, and its strength stands, like the physics
before it, upon the actual scientific miracles it has produced and is still
producing. The Newtonian science which preceded it could produce no plausible
alternative! Since the new science works and produces new miracles, it would
seem to necessitate a new picture of ontology, a new and different picture of
what is really real "out there".
But Neils Bohr, the recognized "father" of quantum theory said that
such a picture was unattainable! He characterized his new science as a pure
algorithm, (i.e.: a rote, purely pragmatic but profoundly and
overwhelmingly useful procedure), instead. What the actual reality
beneath it is, he said, we cannot know and cannot picture. His theoretical
world could not, (cannot), fit any normal sense of the real world. And yet it
works and leads to the production of new things -transistors, nuclear power
plants, etc.
Most thinkers on our particular subject say that theory on the scale of
fundamental physics is not relevant to the mind-brain problem however. They say
that events and things of the size, (scale), of the brain and its happenings
-at the human scale- behave like the things of Newtonian physics. (Only a few
disagree.)
I find this view disturbing and self-contradictory, however. If we are, in
fact, products of the ultimate objects of science, (the "real
stuff"), how then can we ignore them at any scale, especially in
our conceptions of what it is that really exists? More disturbing is the blind
confidence those thinkers have in the "facts" of the scale with which
we are concerned.
I personally do not find it surprising that physics has reached Bohr's
conclusion. This is because I believe that even our very own "naïve
world", our normal perceptual and conceptual world, (by reasons of
evolutionary biology and logic), is itself precisely such an algorithm
in Bohr's sense! (See Mind:
the Argument from Evolutionary Biology) I believe it is a virtual
algorithm which enables an optimized biological function! It is this
conception, I will argue, which allows an actual solution, (and not just a
prevarication), of the mind-brain problem within the confines of science just
as Bohr's allowed the solution of the problems of atomic physics. It also
allows a consistent and plausible logical explanation of the dilemmas of mind
itself. It is not at all surprising to me therefore that when our naïve
world is pushed to the (small) limit in the experimental experience of science
that it must reach an algorithmic conclusion. This is exactly what my own
theories would predict from the starting point of biology. The science of
cognition is like the science of ultimate physics, I conclude, not because it
must adopt the "objects' of the latter to explain its dilemmas, (as Roger
Penrose has suggested), but in that it must adopt the selfsame strategy!
But what of the reality behind this strategy? Can we totally give up on what is
truly, really real -i.e. ontology? Even Immanuel Kant admitted that the latter
was impossible. He saw that all men needed a conception of the real. The task
he set himself was to define what it is that we really can know about it -and
how.
Though I cannot accept Kant's "categories", (and their implicit
quality of hierarchy), his overall conclusions embody a much deeper conception
of ontology - a relativistic view. He argued, in quite a modern vein, that
while sane, (i.e. realist), reason must accept the actual existence of an
ontological reality, it has no means of knowing any of its particulars, (its
ultimate "facts"). This is because human cognition, being part of
that reality, cannot separate its own particulars from that which it cognates.
Cognition, (experience), itself, he argues, is relativistic! (This is very
similar to Heisenberg's classic "indeterminacy" argument in quantum
mechanics 150 years later.) Kant's relativism is not laissez faire relativism,
(like "cultural relativism), however, but one which, like Einstein's, preserves
a very rigid, "mathematical" core: i.e. the constants and invariants
of phenomenal connection.
Kant is probably the least understood and the most misunderstood
philosopher in history. This is too bad because the problem he set himself was
exactly the same modern problem of human cognition which is our concern here.
It is the precise concern of modern cognitive science. Sadly he has been so
mislabeled and trivialized through history that modern thinkers are having to
reinvent what he has already blueprinted very clearly. He is admittedly hard to
comprehend, but this is a result of the specific nature, (the forced
relativism), of his problem, not of his writing skills. Relativism is a
difficult "stretch" for any mind.
Have you ever seen the modern remake of the
movie "Cinderella", ("Forever After")? There is a scene in
it where the heroine is seen paddling around, face-up in a lake. Prince
Charming arrives on the scene accompanied, strange to say, by Leonardo da Vinci
dressed, appropriately, in medieval clothes. Leonardo decides to try out his
latest invention, a pair of miniature canoe-like floatation shoes, and he
proceeds to walk on water, startling the heroine when he reaches her.
Try to hold that image - of the medieval Leonardo walking across the lake. It
reminds me, strange to tell, very much of Immanuel Kant exploring the
"lake" of ontology. Kant looked at the possibilities of human
cognition and concluded that our knowledge, (what we can know), could not be
the "solid knowledge" of "bottom dwellers", (objectivists,
materialists), nor could it be the "airy knowledge" of birds,
(idealists, solipsists), flying unattached and independent of the earth. He
concluded that human knowledge must take account of its own medium, (the
water). The best we could do was to discover the means to float upon it. We
cannot build a bridge here, (as the bottom dwellers insist), because the
lakebed is made of quicksand and the deeper we attempt to drive the piers, the
deeper they sink. Kant's "means", (his "buoyancy"), lay in
the fundamentally relativistic conception of realism that he spelled out. It
centers in the innate necessities of human cognition itself. The only knowledge
we are capable of is that "which floats"!
The metaphor is, of course, insufficient and incomplete. Most metaphors are.
The crucial element in Kant's relativism is that human cognition cannot
separate the aspects it in itself contributes from the aspects of the elements
it "sees".
And yet, Walter Freeman may be right about Kant. Kant saw perception as the (relativized) passage of information, (sensory data). Even though relativized, it is still a "passage". Maturana is more right. It is a "triggering" of response to generate a reaction (in Freeman's sense). I have dealt with this issue in my book. These are converse perspectives depending on which end of the "telescope" one looks through.
A Sketch of My Answer:
Once,
long ago as a student, I was overwhelmed with a blindingly beautiful idea. I
thought about the possibility of looking at complex metacellular animals
specifically as communities, -as "societies" of their
individual cells rather than as irreducible wholes! Enthused with my idea, I
mentioned it to a pre-doctoral assistant in a biology lab. Without batting an
eye, (and I have had the highest respect for the philosophical abilities of
biologists ever since because of it), he said simply and without hesitation
"Sure. There are sponges, for instance, which can be forced through a
sieve to break them into their individual cells, and which subsequently come
back together to make a metacellular entity." I don't claim to have
invented this idea, but I discovered it for myself, and it has influenced my
thinking ever since. I think it is the right idea! (There was an earlier,
deeper idea -my "second" thesis dealing with mind per se, but
comprehending it depends upon the understanding of this materialist
perspective.)
At the level of single celled organisms, there is clearly no point in talking about internal models of reality -there is no possible canvas upon which to draw them. What we have instead are merely input-output reactive couplings which are either beneficial or not to the individual organism. Still at the level of the unicellular, we may have multiple such couplings. The task for that unicellular is to combine them in some beneficial way. But how?
The obvious biological answer is: by pure
luck, -i.e. by random genetic accident. Increased survival then leads
to genetic passage to descendants! Such is surely the case for the
simplest multicellulars as well. Up through the levels of the sponges,
the mollusks, the ants, there is no platform even conceivably close to that
needed to supply a model of environment. What possible rationale for
organization can there be then? That rationale is self-organization
based on optimization -i.e. whatever it is that will work better! But
"whatever it is" must be equated with "anything that
works”. But does this organization, -need this organization preserve
contexts? There is no implicit requirement for a hierarchy of
response. This is where the conception of a self-organizing system enters
the picture. The only rule of such an organization is one of bettered
survival. Given a billion years or so, we can envision a holistic
response to environment -but it is not necessary to envision a unique
one! Current thinking believes that such an organization must be a
perfect mirror of externality, or, at the very least a perfect parallelism to
that externality. But why? It need only work!
I. My FIRST argument, (of three), begins with biology at the metacellular
level, and specifically at the level of very complex metacellulars. (The human
metacellular, for instance, is composed of about 70 trillion cells!) Because
the essence of the evolutionary principle is an optimization of performance,
("survival of the fittest"), I argue that the very coordination –as
coordination per se -of metacellular, ("megacellular"),
response is the key issue. But this response involves a profoundly
difficult organizational and control issue. In the case of profoundly complex
metacellulars, I argue further that an optimization of control is in actual
conflict with an incorporation of our assumed internal representative model of
ontology. (This is the "large database" problem elaborated in
Dreyfus' book: "What Computers Still Can't Do"-i.e. because such a
system must search the whole of its database to resolve its particulars.)
It is in conflict with even a parallel model of reality in biologic
function, (as urged by most modern cognitive scientists), because it neglects
the factor of urgency, (i.e. what is most important -danger /
risk)! More succinctly I claim that knowledge is in conflict with performance!
I urge that the pathway to an optimization of performance and control, (the
necessary evolutionary thing), lies rather in a schematic control
interface like, (but vastly more complex than), the graphic user interface,
("GUI"), of a modern computer -of a Macintosh, or "Windows"
on a PC for instance. This interface is keyed to urgency and response, however,
not to representation. The schematism of that control interface clusters
primitive, "atomic" response into “icons” however; it does not
cluster properties of or information about ontic objects "out
there". Our humanoid "objects", I argue, are actually
metaphors of response! They are artifacts of evolutionary process.
How could it work? I present an answer using W.J. Freeman's, (and
Edelman's), findings on the brain in "Mind: The Argument from
Evolutionary Biology" which. It postulates a chaotic rather than
a hierarchical mapping.
Imagine a GUI, not in two dimensions, but in three or four. Imagine that the
"objects" of this GUI embody the control functions of both the
monitoring readout and the operative control for some immensely complex
process, but combined in one as "icons". Imagine that the
control of this process is accomplished by a manipulation of those icons
themselves. It would be like controlling the speed of your car by pulling on
the speedometer needle itself!
Have you seen the movie "Matrix"? In it the hero, (and all the other
humans in the world), lived out his prior life immobile in a stationary
nurturing pod, while his mind lived in our contemporary world as part of a
universal computer program. His experiences were our normal, real world
experiences and did not reflect his actual existence. Hold the image!
Now let's modify the script somewhat to present a different conception.
Imagine our hero, (whatever he may truly be), performing some important and
complex project, or controlling some dangerous and immensely complex process by
manipulating icons under some appropriate set of "world laws", (i.e.
the writer's scenario). The icons and the rules would embody his most efficient
means to deal with the profound complexity and dangerous urgency of his actual
existence and he would be the "hero" of his megacellular fiefdom.
This is the sort of thing that I argue for our normal perceptual and conceptual
cognitive world. Following Kant, we never see, and have no means of seeing the
"pod" in which we live.
HOW IT MIGHT WORK: (RE-USING OUR EVOLUTIONARY
ARTIFACTS -AKA "OBJECTS")
(from Appendix: "Mind:
the Argument from Evolutionary Biology" )
II. My SECOND hypothesis starts, not from biology,
but from formal logic. Surprisingly it meshes smoothly with my first and
confirms it.
How is it possible to "know" anything? Leibniz stated the
problem as: "how is it possible for 'the one' to know 'the many'?"
How could one part of even a mental existence, (even a Solipsistic or an
Idealist one), know another part? In the terms of modern cognitive science, it
translates into "how could there be a 'Cartesian theater'?"
(Dennett's term roughly corresponds to the screen which the homunculus would see.)
The answer lies in the operative application of Hilbert's "implicit
definition".
It is possible for a system as a whole to actually know its objects if and only if those objects are implicitly defined, (i.e. logically defined), by the totality of the system itself. These, however are explicitly operative objects! (Representative objects are not the sort of things that implicit definition deals with!) I want to entice you, (only), with a brief citation on this aspect of my second thesis and let your imagination supply some of the details:
Moritz Schlick,
(physicist/philosopher and founder of the famous "
"[Hilbert's] revolution lay in the stipulation that the basic or primitive concepts are to be defined just by the fact that they satisfy the axioms.... [They] " acquire meaning only by virtue of the axiom system, and possess only the content that it bestows upon them. They stand for entities whose whole being is to be bearers of the relations laid down by the system.", (my emphasis).
Now think about this citation in the context of the Mind-Brain problem. Think about the problem of "knowing"! How can a system know its own "objects"? It can -if those objects are specifically operative objects of the system as a whole itself. Mathematics, (in principle), has already solved this key aspect of the mind-brain problem! It is true that "implicit definition" has fallen on hard times, but its replacement, "structuralism", (a dominant philosophy of modern mathematics), seems to inherit most of the desired properties.This is our keyway into Leibniz's problem, into the "Cartesian Theatre", and into the "homonculus". But this solution is commensurate with my first hypothesis -I call this commensurability "the Concordance".
Ultimately I propose a formal extension to
logic derived from mathematical considerations. I propose that the fundamental
logical units are like the axioms of mathematical axiom systems, and that these
"axioms" constitute the ultimate rules of thought which are
capable of "knowing". ( See Consciousness: A Simpler
Approach to the Mind-Brain Problem). They "implicitly
define" their objects and can truly know them as they are objects
(solely),of the system itself. This is an actual solution, (for the first
time), of Leibniz's problem! But, under that same conception, the only
objects they can truly know are their own operative objects -i.e. the
objects of the system. As I hope you can see, this conforms very well
with my first hypothesis whose only "objects" are again objects of
the system. I propose that we identify them with each other, ("the
concordance"). Thus the ultimate rule of logic and mind corresponds
to the ultimate rule of the brain itself. (See Cassirer on “concept” as a
rule: Logic)
Logic must be turned around and itself be considered as biological! It
becomes, instead, the rule of biological coupling with environment,
(extending Maturana's conception). Logic becomes bio-logic.
(This thesis defines a theory of meaning as well -the first, I think, with any
intuitive support at all -it defines meaning as contextual placement.)
A Biological
Model of Mind
(from "Consciousness: a Simpler Approach to the Mind:Brain Problem")
III. My THIRD and final hypothesis is the most crucial one for the existence of the mind. It is also the most conceptually difficult. It involves a deepening and expansion of science itself. Biology, (i.e. the considerations above), forces us there. It focuses on the very relativity of the scientific method. But its conclusion must lie within science itself, and not in philosophy. I propose an ultimate theory of relativity, (grounded in biology), following in the path of Ernst Cassirer's "Philosophy of Symbolic Forms" which is an analysis and confirmation of the actual basis of the scientific method. Cassirer's thesis, like Galileo's and Einstein's, is based in the mathematical conception of invariance, (the relativity of measurement while conserving the invariance of relationships). Cassirer's "invariant", however, is the constancy of the phenomena themselves. On the path to this third hypothesis, I examine the same kinds of issues that Kant was forced to deal with. What do we know and what can we know? I arrive at a solution very much like Kant's but radically enlarged through the eyes of Cassirer. In his “Philosophy of Symbolic Forms”, Cassirer argued that all knowledge, and specifically scientific knowledge deals not with the knowing of ontology itself, but rather with the purely internal organization of experience, (i.e. the phenomena -to include scientific experience). To quote a passage from Heinrich Herz, (cited by Cassirer on the methodology of science -i.e. on its defining of its primitive objects and relations):
"The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of
things; they have with things the one essential agreement which lies in the
fulfillment of the stated requirement, [of successful consequences], but
further agreement with things is not necessary to their purpose.
Actually we do not know and have no means of finding out whether our ideas of
things accord with them in any other respect than in this one fundamental
relation." (H. Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik",
p.1 ff, my emphasis)
What we can
know, and all that we can know are the constant, internal, and
unchanging rules which relate one organization of experience with another.
(This section of my book also deals with the question of why it is not
inherently self-contradictory for my theory to be framed in the terms of
ordinary science while at the same time arriving at a conclusion where they are
not necessarily, ontically true.) Cassirer proposes an absolute
epistemological relativism stemming from the very methodology of science. He
argues that there are multiple fundamental (and comprehensive)
organizations of reality -even in science itself. The reality of physics, he
argues, is not the reality of biology, nor of chemistry. Each "frames its
questions differently"! Biology, at least, seems to be reaching the
same conclusion. (Maturana, Edelman, Freeman) Biology's primitive
objects, for Maturana for instance, are "autopoetic entities",
"triggering" and "environment"; they are not the
"atoms", "quarks" or "superstrings" which are the
primitives of physics!
Because there is a multiplicity of possible organizations however, (of possible beginnings, accepting Cassirer's thesis), the real world, (ontology itself), cannot ever be known. Because any given scientific explanation involves a unique and distinct private logical framework, (its particular laws and presuppositions), it implies that reality in itself, "the thing in itself" stripped of that particular logical context becomes “a mere 'X' ", forever beyond our knowing. This is the “ontic indeterminism” I argue, and it leads to a proper solution to the Mind-Brain problem. It opens the possibility of shifting our focus from ordinary logic, ("knowing"), to intentional logic, ("believing", "thinking" -to include scientific beliefs), which is the crux of the problem.
There is an easier and more
intuitive approach to Cassirer’s ideas employing the mathematical notion of an
“ideal” however. The example given by Birkhoff and Mac Clane, (“A Survey
of Modern Algebra”), is clearly directly applicable, (by its substance),
to the immediate problem. It illustrates a very different and very
concrete notion of "relativism". While encompassing a scope
much wider than simple geometry, the example provides a very clear illustration
of the concept. The point is that
the same object, (here, the physical circle and, in general, phenomena themselves
-baseballs, elephants and all the things these things do), can be preserved in
a context-free setting.
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO CASSIRER'S IDEAS:
“The circle C of radius 2 lying in the plane parallel to the (x,y) plane and
two units above it in space is usually described analytically as the set of
points (x,y,z) in space satisfying the simultaneous equations:
(16) x2 + y2 –4 = 0, z – 2 = 0.
These describe the curve C as the intersection of a circular cylinder and a plane.
But C can be described with equal accuracy”, (as
well), “as the intersection of a sphere”, (my emphasis), “with the plane
z = 2, by the equivalent simultaneous equations:
(17) x2 + y2 + z2 – 8 = 0, z – 2 = 0.
Still another description", (my emphasis), " is possible,
by the equations
(18) x2 + y2 – 4 = 0,
x2 + y2 – 2z = 0.
These describe C as the intersection of a circular
cylinder with the paraboloid of rotation:
x2 + y2 = 2z.
Therefore the only impartial way to describe C”, (my emphasis), “ is in terms of all the polynomial equations which its points satisfy."
The descriptions above represent just a few of the
ways to represent the circle "C" however. But in fact
there are an infinity of ways to do so!
"But if f(x,y,z) and g(x,y,z) are any two polynomials whose values are
identically zero on C, then their sum and difference also vanish identically on
C. So, likewise, does any multiple a(x,y,z)f(x,y,z) of f(x,y,z) by any
polynomial a(x,y,z) whatsoever.”, (my emphasis). “This means that the
set of all polynomials whose values are identically zero on C is an ideal.
This ideal then, and not any special pair of its elements, is the ultimate
description of C. In the light of this observation the special pairs
of polynomials occurring in equations (16)-(18) appear simply as generators
of the ideal of all polynomials which vanish identically on C. ... ”, (my
emphases).
"The
polynomial ideal determined by this curve thus has various", (actually an
infinity of), "bases,
(20) (x2 + y2 – 4,
z – 2) = (x2 + y2 + z2 – 8, z – 2) =
(x2 + y2 – 2z, z – 2)…, ......, ......, ......, ......., .........................”
Mathematical “ideals” open a door to a
better understanding of Cassirer’s arguments, and a simpler understanding of my
third thesis. It illustrates the conception of a rigid
invariance –and not a mere, unstructured relativism! None of these
generators stands prior to any other, nor does it create the figure
comprehended. Each stands, rather, as an equipotent and relativistic “logical”,
(i.e. explanatory), basis fully exhausting the actuality of the figure. We start
with the phenomena themselves, not with theories. Theories must validate
the phenomena, not the converse. (But we must incorporate Merleau-Ponty's
input-output loop -his "intentional arc"- to truly understand the
relationship). "The circle" cited here would stand in place of
Cassirer's "phenomena", (sic), for my "percept" or for an
elephant. It is the invariant component of perception that we must needs
preserve. It is focused as an invariant under varying perspectives
relativistically but rigidly. This is how we can preserve the actuality
of our phenomena as relativistic invariants of our symbolic forms and
understand the rationale of those forms themselves! Percepts are not created
by, nor are they dependent upon any particular frame of reference. If they
reference ontology, then they do it as a composite ideal, and not in their
particular frames. This was the sense of Galileo’s profound insight long, long
ago.
But we must consider the "ideal"
within the larger context of mathematics. Not only can such descriptions
be relativized in relation to a fixed coordinate system, but the very
coordinate systems themselves stand in like case. Axes need not be
orthogonal, nor need they be rectilinear, (e.g. polar coordinates are
possible). Nor need they be fixed. They may be in translation –e.g.
relative motion, (which translates to special relativity), and they need not be
Euclidean, (nor Hyperbolic nor Spherical). Russell, for instance,
further argued that our descriptions of phenomena might even be based in
projective geometry. But need they be even spatial? Can we
not conceive of such explanations being framed as abstract transformations,
which latter are not defined on spaces, but on raw and unstructured
abstract sets as suggested in my illustration for brain function in my first
hypothesis.! Abstract sets, however, fall naturally within the scope of
axiomatics which grounds Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms”.
Finally,
consider the position of modern physics on the issue of ontology. The
noted mathematical physicist Roger Penrose classified theories as
"SUPERB", "USEFUL", "TENTATIVE", AND
"MISGUIDED", (his CAPS). For instance, he classified the best
of the best: Euclidean geometry as SUPERB: ("over a meter's range,
...errors in treating the geometry as Euclidean amounting to less than the
diameter of an atom of hydrogen!") Newtonian physics qualified as
"SUPERB" as well: ("As applied to the motions of planets
and moons, the observed accuracy.. is phenomenal -better than one part in ten
million."). Einstein's relativity falls into the same
category: ("One of these -the binary pulsar shows Einstein's theory
to be accurate to about one part in 10 to the 14th power"). Quantum
mechanics is also classified as "SUPERB", but as "having no
known discrepancies", (at all!)," from
experiment!" (Penrose: p152-154, 298)
But consider the viewpoint of the latter that Penrose describes on the issue of
ontology. Its perspective is very close to Cassirer's, Freeman's
and my own perspective in many details.
"Many physicists, taking their lead from the central figure of Niels Bohr, would say that there is no objective picture", (for quantum physics), "at all. Nothing is actually 'out there', at the quantum level. Somehow, reality emerges only in relation to the results of 'measurements'. Quantum theory, according to this view, provides merely a calculational procedure, and does not attempt to describe the world as it actually 'is'. This attitude seems to me to be too defeatist, and I shall follow the more positive line which attributes objective physical reality to the quantum description: the quantum state." (ibid, P.226, his emphases)
But what is a quantum state -what is this "more positive" reality of quantum physics? Quantum states, (psi functions), are the combinations of "square roots of probabililty functions" spread over the whole of space and time.
"We have seen that all alternatives must somehow be combined together with complex number weightings", (i.e. amplitudes), "like the 'complex square roots' of a probability...This collection of complex weightings describes the quantum state of the particle. ...every single position that the particle might have is an 'alternative' available to it. I am taking the view that view that the physical reality of the particle's location is, indeed, its quantum state psi." (Pps 240-243)
"There is a very precise equation, the Schroedinger equation, which provides a completely deterministic time-evolution for this [quantum] state. But there is something very odd about the relation between the time-evolved quantum state and the actual behavior of the physical world that is observed to take place. From time to time -whenever we consider that a 'measurement' has occured -we must discard the quantum state that we have been laboriously evolving, and use it only to compute various probabilities that the state will 'jump' to one or another of a set of new possible states." (ibid, P.226, his emphases)
It is only "in relation to the results of 'measurements'" that
concrete reality emerges -i.e. that a specific rendition of space-time is
enabled. What a strange conclusion, but it is the conclusion of the deepest
part of modern physics on the issue of ontology.
Now consider the very comparable biological picture I have proposed for the
human brain -the ontic indeterminacy that Cassirer, Freeman, (with
Merleau-Ponty) and I have argued -and look at the strong parallelism between
these two perspectives. The existance of "an observer", (more
precisely -the results of a measurement), conditions the focus of the
ontological objects of quantum theory. So also it is feedback through the
sensory loop, (through "the intentional arc" -in relation to the
results of 'measurements' through an observation), that conditions our
perceptual and theoretical reality in response to chaotic input using our
evolutionary "objects"/artifacts ", (as proposed in the Appendix
to "Mind: the
Argument from Evolutionary Biology"). These two perspectives are
strikingly close in import and consequence. Each embodies what Freeman
would call "circular causality".
Quoting Freeman:
“To explain how stimuli cause
consciousness, we have to explain causality. [But] We can’t trace linear
causal chains from receptors after the first cortical synapse, so we use
circular causality to explain neural pattern formation by self-organizing dynamics.
But an aspect [a key aspect] of intentional action is causality, which we
extrapolate to material objects in the world.” (Freeman, 1999)
“In particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in 'The Phenomenology of Perception'
conceived of perception [itself] as the outcome of the 'intentional arc', by
which experience derives from the intentional actions of individuals that
control sensory input and perception. Action into the world with reaction that
changes the self is indivisible in reality, and must be analyzed in terms of
"circular causality" as distinct from the linear causality of events
as commonly perceived and analyzed in the physical world." W.J.
Freeman, 1997
Freeman has proposed that our neural and mental world is intentional.
That is, that it is populated with entities of the sort: "I
think...", "I believe...", "I want...". But
these consist of probabilities. Science, (clearly in the case of
quantum mechanics), consists in the establishment of a metric across
probabilities as well. Each resolves itself by acting out into the world
by way of measurement. How different are these perspectives? Not
very, I think.
Penrose says: "The rules of quantum mechanics appear even to insist
that cricket balls and elephants ought to behave in this odd way... however we
never actually see cricket balls or elephants superimposed in this
strange way. Why do we not?" (ibid P.236)
I think I can supply the beginnings of an answer from the perspective of
biology. Repeating an argument from my paper: "Mind: the
Argument from Evolutionary Biology", we presume that our science maps
back, (automorphically), onto the very model we visualize. But the path
of the automorphism we seek, I propose, lies through the very "gears and
levers" of the original evolutionarily derived topobiological
cognitive model itself, (re-using its naive "objects").
Through another iteration -in another re-entrant mapping which supplies the
mechanics and transformation, (back into Freeman's non-topological -chaotic-
dispersive mapping into the overall brain), it supplies the correlation that we
seek.
I propose that reafferance within the loop of brain function combines
with input from outside the loop, (passing through the environment), to yield a
consistent, compound map which either does, or does not confirm our theoretical
constructs, (but necessarily preserving the phenomena). Nowhere does this
conception demand the absolute (ontic) reality of our constructs,
however. It is just a reuse of our evolutionarily pragmatic (cortical) objects,
(like Rosch's prototypes??), saying nothing whatsoever about the real
(external) world in which we live. I believe that our so-called
"objects", (our naive physical objects), are evolutionary artifacts
which are re-used, but solely within the brain. They are locked
into the perceptual loop, functioning solely to distribute the flow of process
within the brain. They moderate perception outside the loop, they do not
determine it. Our ontic world is indeterminate!
(As a brief suggestion on another note, consider the problem of why time cannot
work backwards? In terms of modern physics, this is a difficult
problem. As a lousy physical explanation, but a pretty good biological
one, it is because, (in terms of my diagram), Merleau-Ponty's loop, his
"intentional arc" acts in a counterclockwise direction and not
a clockwise one!)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KNOWING VS BELIEF: WHERE THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS LIES
On the issue of necessary realist belief, (which is different from realist knowledge), Cassirer believed, as did Kant, that there were two ontological primitives, (assumptions about ontology), in our intentional realist posture. (And these are definitely scientific premises -they lie at the core of science itself). These assumptions are: (1) the ontological existence of the outside world, ("substantia phenomena"), and (2) the ontological existence of experience, ("intuition").
I strongly differ. I propose that there is a necessary third ontological postulate, (an intentional postulate), to our realism. As realists we must presume the actual ontological existance of some necessary connection between these two, and therein lies the key. Cassirer's relativism forbids any specific description of this connection other than a relativistic one. I call it, simply, "interface". It is the substance of interface, (whatever and however it may be -but we must presume that it is!), which supplies the requisite substance of the mind! My third hypothesis is to assume that this interface is structured in the same way that I argued previously for my first two hypotheses. Granting that hypothesis, all of the substantive problems of "mind" are solved within my first two theses. "Mind" becomes real. We are conscious. We do exist. I maintain that all three premises lie at the heart of our realist beliefs, and therefore at the heart of realist science itself. The Mind-Body problem is solved.
From a strictly biological or physical standpoint however, I believe that consciousness is the physical connectivity of the cortex, (i.e. the organization of that connectivity). It is the non-hierarchical, dispersive mapping of the cortex described by Freeman viewed through the perspective of Merleau-Ponty. (See "Mind: the Argument from Evolutionary Biology" -especially "Appendix: Freeman and Automorphism" ). Does this physical description describe ontology itself? No, it cannot for the reasons outlined above -it is necessarily only one of many.
My ultimate conclusion, like Kant's, says that science will never answer the really real question of ontology. That is not the business of science. I argue, as he did, that there is room for faith. Our "realism" is based in intentionality. It is based in belief -and that belief is grounded in its primitive axioms: I propose they are the three I have just named.
But how can I possibly ask you to
take such an obvious absurdity seriously? As a movie script it might be
plausible, but as a fundamental belief about reality it is quite another
matter. You are right, and it is a perfectly reasonable objection. Absurdity is
only plausible if it produces profound results. Consider my reasons carefully:
(a). It is exceedingly strong purely as a biological and evolutionary argument
-I believe it is the only consistent evolutionary argument for consciousness.
(b). It is sound from an engineering standpoint.
(c). It provides the basis for the first explanation yet put forth and
consistent with science, of our normal mental world. No other alternative,
(rather than a denial of the problem itself), has yet been proposed to this
fundamental aspect, (i.e. the existance of an actual "mind"), of our
realist agreement. Under my thesis, there can be a "Cartesian
theater" – a wholeness and an awareness of experience. (My second
hypothesis deals specifically with the logical aspects of the problem.) It
solves the homunculus problem as well. (See "Consciousness: a Simpler
Approach to the Mind-Brain Problem"). These are huge and
necessary aspects of the problem we have set ourselves!
(d). It produces a viable and believable theory of meaning for the first time.
Migrating Hilbert's "implicit definition" to a biological, operative
setting supplies such a rationale.
(e). There is a long list of other "others", (too long to be
listed here), not the least of which is its consistency with the viewpoint of
modern physics. But, most of all, I suppose, because it leads to fruitful new
perspectives across a myriad of issues -which latter is what we believe our
deepest theories must do. It may be absurd, but it is absurd, I argue, in just
the same way that modern physics is absurd.
(f) Perhaps most importantly from a pragmatic point of view, it agrees with new
and fundamental brain research. This is where its fate will be ultimately
decided. Walter Freeman, for instance, argues a very similar case, (as elaborated
in the "Mind: the Argument from Evolutionary Biology" paper mentioned
above.)
I have
concluded, with Walter Freeman, that the essence of mind is ultimately
intentional -in reflects organic necessity, not representation. If this is so,
then our "knowledge" is really a choice of beliefs. I do not believe
that all beliefs are equal however; neither do I believe that there is only one
best belief. Materialism has gone too far. It has gone from being the basis of
a superb and wonderfully productive theory of science into a
"religious" dogma. It purports to know reality, not just to
explain and predict it. It has been mortally wounded by 20th century science,
and, as a dogma, I believe it will finally break itself upon the rock of
"mind". We cannot tithe to this church though we must support its
good works! I think we need to be realists, but I do not think we need to be
dogmatic materialists.
If you would like to examine my ideas further, let me suggest that you begin with my book itself: "Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained", (or the same in PDF form), and, if that piques your interest, that you examine the two papers mentioned above, ("Evolutionary Biology" and "Consciousness" which are revisions and crucial expansions of chapters one and two of that book.
Conclusion:
In the beginning we started from the
necessity of mutual agreement. We had to agree on our basic premises to arrive
at common answers. This is actually an instance of Cassirer's epistemological
relativism, (his theory of "Symbolic Forms"), in its rawest form.
Different premises, even purely scientific ones, lead to different world views.
The biological reality of Maturana, (or Edelman or Freeman), is not the same as
that of the mathematical physicist. This is where it makes most sense to
conceive of axiomatics. Different fundamental assumptions, (axioms),
lead to radically different conclusions about the world. But why must we assume
that there is a privileged set of fundamental assumptions. Without
"god-knowledge", (which I don't think anybody would posit for
biological organisms), it is not an option. This is where the relativism comes
in. We manufacture systems, (of premises), to explain and operate in our
reality. Alternative systems explain different aspects of that reality. There
is room even for purely ethical and religious perspectives provided they meet
the necessary criteria. Must only one of them mirror ontology? Or can we,
extending Einstein, (and like Cassirer), conceive a relativity of our very
epistemology itself?
Dogmatic
materialism requires the death of "mind" and "spirit".
Thereby it robs ethics, humanism, religion of any real significance. Under its
mechanical absolute it does not really matter whether a given mechanistic
organism makes "pain noises" or "happy noises". What then
is the choice between Dauchau and a humanitarian fundraiser? All that remains
are relative ethics, relative values and those are as changeable as the wind.
I do not believe in relative ethics,
(cultural relativism) -I think it leads nowhere. This is not to say that I
believe that each and every, (or any), aspect of my particular,
culturally influenced views is absolute. Far from it. What I do believe is that
there are absolutes -inherents of the unique human brain and spirit and
that they are ultimately approachable scientifically. If my specific beliefs do
not match those findings, then I will have to abandon them.
This is a new world, barely glimpsed and must be the subject of other works.
This particular writing has only one thing to say on the subject: there is room
for faith. But not all "faiths" are equal.